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Abstract
I present a thesis in three chapters on human capital, labor supply, and their
relationship with cultural values. Chapter 1 and 2 contribute, respectively, to
the questions of what share of income differences across countries that can be at-
tributed to human capital, and on what determines differences in human capital.
They rely on unique Swedish employer-employee linked administrative data to
estimate differences in human capital as country-of-origin specific labor produc-
tivity terms in firm production functions. Unlike previous migrant-based mea-
sures in the literature, this is immune to concerns related to wage discrimination
and robust to other varieties of discrimination. After accounting for education
and experience, estimated human capital still varies by a factor of 3 between
the countries at the 90th and 10th percentile of the human-capital distribution.
When I investigate which country-of-origin characteristics most closely correlate
with my estimates of human capital, cultural values elicited from the World Val-
ues Survey are the only robust predictor. This relationship persists among the
children of migrants, which lends further credence to the cultural interpretation
of human-capital differences unexplained by education and experience.
Chapter 3 documents substantial cross-sectional variation in labor supply across
countries, after taking into account differences in tax rates and real wages. When
investigating which country characteristics that best explain the variation, I find
that a cultural measure of preferences for leisure exerts an economically larger and
statistically more robust influence than do traditional measures of labor market
frictions. Micro-level labor supply choices of descendants of immigrants in the
United States and Sweden buttress the cultural interpretation, that part of differ-
ences in labor supply can be attributed to differences in preferences. As an “out
of sample” test, the paper looks at the implication of differences in preferences for
cross-country differences in labor taxation. Economic theory suggests a negative
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Chapter 1
A Productivity-Based Measure of
Human Capital
1.1 Introduction
There are very large observed income differences across countries. Quantitative
assessments of proximate causes have typically found that at least half of the GDP
per capita variation remains unexplained after controlling for human and phys-
ical capital (Hall and Jones, 1999; Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 1997; Caselli,
2005). However, recent studies have been able to reduce the unexplained variation
by proposing novel measures of human capital which differ from the traditional
ones, in that they allow for factors other than observed schooling (Hendricks and
Schoellman 2018; Lagakos et al. 2018). These findings underscore the importance
of making further progress in estimating human-capital differences across coun-
tries, as well as of identifying determinants of human-capital differences other
than schooling. This thesis contributes to both of those questions.
My first contribution is to provide a new measure of human capital differences.
I exploit unique Swedish administrative data that matches employees to their
employers, allowing me to estimate firm-level production functions with hetero-
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geneous labor.1 In particular, I am able to estimate country-of-origin specific
productivity parameters, and I interpret differences in these parameters as cross-
country differences in human capital. The labor inputs enter the production func-
tion estimation after an adjustment for schooling and experience, so the estimated
human-capital differences capture factors over and above these “traditional” de-
terminants.2
The early work in the development accounting literature constructed human cap-
ital stocks based solely on years of schooling paired with pecuniary returns to
schooling. Innovating on this unidimensional measure of human capital, Hen-
dricks (2002) and Hendricks and Schoellman (2018) proposed studying human-
capital via wages of U.S. immigrants. If wage differences among immigrants to the
US, where they are faced with the same institutional and technological environ-
ment, are similar to wage differences among country-of-origin wages, then human
capital must be an important determinant of the latter.3 This approach holds the
desirable feature of allowing for differences in every potential dimension of hu-
man capital (as measured by labor market returns). However, immigrant wages
are potentially (and heterogeneously) affected by ethnic or racial discrimination
(Oreopoulos, 2011; Booth, Leigh, and Varganova, 2012; Neumark, 2018), so that
a non-negligible fraction of the wage differentials that Hendricks and Schoell-
man attribute to human capital could conceivably be caused by differential wage
1The unique part is that the data includes information on individuals’ country of birth and
parental country of birth. Previously, Statistics Sweden has only released this type of data
aggregated to the continent level, or for a small set of countries. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first paper that exploits disaggregated information on individual and parental country
of birth, for a large number of countries, in Swedish administrative data.
2To control for unobserved firm-level productivity, I follow the proxy-variable literature
initiated by Olley and Pakes (1996). The baseline approach assumes that different types are
perfect substitutes. Results are robust to allowing for imperfect substitution across types of
workers, across educational types, across occupations, and when estimating a translog produc-
tion function rather than a Cobb-Douglas production function.
3Hendricks (2002) found substantial convergence of immigrant wages to native wages, sug-
gesting a relatively small role for human capital. Due to data limitations, he was forced to rely on
an assumption of limited differential selection into migration. The key innovation by Hendricks
and Schoellman (2018) is to properly account for differential selection via pre-migration wages.
Since that selection turns out to be very strong, and wage differentials between countries-of-
origin exhibit surprisingly strong persistence, they conclude that human capital accounts for a
much greater share of income differences than both traditional development accounting studies,
and Hendricks earlier paper, found.
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discrimination.
My approach to measuring human capital is similar to Hendricks and Schoellman
(2018), in that it relies on the same identifying assumption: the only country-
of-origin characteristic that affects migrants’ productivity is embodied human
capital. However, instead of inferring migrant productivity from wages, I directly
estimate their contribution to production at the firm level, so that wage discrim-
ination cannot possibly affect my estimates. I also present evidence that my
results are robust to other varieties of discrimination. When I hold occupation
constant, I do not detect any signs of the reversal in human capital estimates
that positional discrimination, via differential selection, would imply. Similarly,
restricting attention to workers in occupations with a low level of customer-facing
intensity does not significantly alter the results, as a story of large-scale societal
discrimination would suggest.4
I find economically substantial differences in estimated human capital with a
90/10-percentile ratio of around 3. This is larger than, and in addition to, the
difference that education and experience imply. However, it is quantitatively
smaller than human-capital differences that can be inferred from the estimates
in Hendricks and Schoellman (2018). This may be due to their differences partly
picking up wage discrimination as human-capital differences, but it could also be
because I am not able to account for selection on unobservable characteristics as
well as they are.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
data. Section 3 outlines the approach to estimate human capital and presents
how it varies across countries. In Section 4, I study what fraction of unexplained
cross-country differences in TFP that human capital can account for. Section 5
concludes.
4Methodologically, the paper most closely resembles Gallen (2015), who study what frac-
tion of the gender pay gap productivity differences can account for, by comparing the relative
marginal products and wages for males and females.
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1.2 Data
To estimate cross-country differences in human capital, the paper uses adminis-
trative individual-level data covering the entire Swedish working age population,
and the universe of Swedish firms (excluding financial institutions). All individu-
als have a unique civic registration number that allows linking information across
registers. The Total Population Registry contains basic demographic character-
istics such as year and country of birth, gender, parental country of birth, etc.
Data on educational attainment is from the Education Registry and the Employ-
ment Register provides employment-specific information such as occupation and
income from each individuals’ main employer. These registers cover the most
important variables with complete coverage of the population. I also link infor-
mation from two registers that do not cover the entire population — the Wage
Structure Register, and the Recruitment Authority. They provide data on, respec-
tively, hours worked for a large representative sample of workers, and a measure
of cognitive ability for native-born males carried out during the Swedish Military
Enlistment test.5
Firm-level data is from the database Business Economics, compiled by Statistics
Sweden (SCB) using mainly data collected by tax authorities. SCB calculates
value added as revenue less costs of intermediate inputs. I use the book value of
fixed assets and gross investment as the baseline measures of capital and invest-
ment.6, 7 Similar to workers, firms have a unique identifier. Measures of labor
5In practice, the Recruitment Authority has data on the cognitive ability test from 1997–
2010; earlier data is stored at the War Archive but the enlistment test was carried out by the
same authority.
6Fixed assets include physical capital like machinery, equipment, and land but excludes
cash, accounts receivable and inventories. It is the closest I get to a book measure of purely
physical capital, which is what the production function estimation literature has typically used.
However, it might be argued that if the firm did not actually need all of its capital to produce
the value added, then it would have distributed that to shareholders, why all financial capital
tied up in the firm should be seen as crucial for operations and included in the production
function. Therefore, I carry out robustness checks using total capital as the measure of capital.
7Gross investment maps into the theoretical counterpart of investment in Olley and Pakes
(1996). In robustness exercises, I try also the variable net investment provided by SCB, or
investment calculated using changes in the capital stock according to it = Kt+1 − Kt(1 − δ)
(with K equal to the book value of fixed assets) as investment.
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input for the firm come from the worker side data — the number of workers
(or efficiency units of labor input) per firm is aggregated via this unique firm
identifier. Creating firm-level worker characteristics this way, indirectly via data
collected by tax authorities, is useful as it is not sensitive to firms misreporting
their labor input.
Data is annual and covers the time period of 2008 through 2014, which is the
most recent year for which I have data. I make no sample restrictions on the
worker side per se but workers are indirectly restricted by which firm they are
working in — a worker is only included if (s)he works for a firm that is included
in the sample. On the firm-side, the following sample restrictions are made.
The baseline sample excludes firms with five or less employees.8 By necessity,
I drop firms without information on industry, value added, or capital. That
leaves 407,183 firm-year observations; the average firm is included 5.6 out of 7
years. For estimations following the methodology introduced by Olley and Pakes
(1996) (OP), I can only include firms with non-zero investment data which further
restricts the sample to 270,109 firm-year observations.
Table 1.1 presents annual average summary statistics for private-sector firms, suc-
cessively adding sample restrictions. The Total numbers are included to illustrate
the coverage of the total private sector economy of the different sample restric-
tions. While I lose the majority of firm observations, first from excluding firms
with five or less employees (moving from column 2 to 3), and then excluding firms
with missing investment data (from column 3 to 4), I cover a much larger share of
the actual economy with, respectively, 88 percent of total sales (78 percent for the
OP-sample), and 85 percent of value-added (75 percent for the OP-sample). This
8I conduct robustness exercises where I vary the firm-size cutoff in the range of 3–15.
Including very small firms has several problems. The risk that the main function of the company
itself is tax avoidance is greater, as is the risk that non-negligible fraction of the company’s
employees, e.g. a spouse or other relatives of the owner, are hired for tax planning purposes.
Furthermore, issues with missing investment data are greater, and many of the very small firms
hold close to zero or zero fixed assets. If included, firms with 1–2 employees would dominate the
estimations as they make up roughly half of the unrestricted sample — while it is not obvious
that one would not want to include self-employed, when this category would so dominate the
sample, it would be preferable to focus separately on the self-employed if that were the specific
category of interest.
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is reflecting the fact that a majority of firms are very small with 0–2 employees.
Figure 1.1 shows the firm distribution of the share of foreign-born employees.
63 percent of firms have at least one foreign-born employee, male or female.
The spikes in Figure 1.1, for example around one third and one half, are due to
mechanical reasons, and decrease with a higher firm-size cut-off.9
In my production-function estimation I will want to distinguish between the effect
of a worker’s own country of origin on that worker’s productivity, and the effect
of firm-level diversity on a firm’s overall productivity. To control for diversity,
I construct a firm-level Herfindal index in the firm’s workers’ country of origin.
The firm distribution of country-of-origin heterogeneity is depicted in the right
panel of Figure 1.1. Appendix Figure 1.3 presents the firms size distribution, and
the firm distribution by share of foreign-born male employees.10
Table 1.1: Firm Summary Statistics for Relevant Sample Restrictions
(M SEK) All Firms Value-Added, Capital >0 Firms in Sample Firms in OP Sample
Av. Employment 7 9 36 45
Av. Sales 15 20 88 117
Av. Fixed Assets 12 16 66 89
Av. Total Assets 20 26 107 142
Av. Investment 0.7 1 4 6
Av. Value Added 5 6 25 33
Tot. Employment 2,839,503 2,449,825 2,065,739 1,748,074
Tot. Sales 5,796,226 5,671,858 5,108,392 4,499,723
Tot. Fixed Assets 4,535,810 4,450,350 3,860,133 3,415,718
Tot. Total Assets 7,625,199 7,117,814 6,230,953 5,497,301
Tot. Investment 243,931 243,426 215,023 215,023
Tot. Value Added 1,726,293 1,669,444 1,460,092 1,292,294
Number of Firms 431,387 279,075 58,169 38,587
Notes: Values are the yearly average over the pooled sample of firm-year observations (implying
e.g. that the total number of firm-year observations in the OP-sample is 7 times 38,587). The
financial variables are given in units of Million SEK. The first column include all private-sector
firms; in columns 2–4, I successively restrict the sample to exclude firms without (strictly
positive) data on value added and fixed assets, firms with five or fewer employees, and firms
lacking investment data (each new restriction is in addition to previous restrictions).
All workers employed by a firm are included as labor input for that firm, but
9A firm with e.g. 6 employees can end up at 33 or 50 percent foreign-born, but not at 35
or 52 percent. This, in combination with the relatively higher frequency of smaller firms, leads
to the spikes.
10627 firms in the sample have only foreign-born employees, so the number of firms with a
Herfindahl index of 1 is slightly larger than the number of firms with no foreign-born employees
at all, although the rounded number of 63 percent remains the same.
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(b) Distribution of Firms by Herfind-
ahl Index in Country-of-Birth Dispersion.
The histogram excludes the 37 percent of
firms with an index of 1. The average
value is 0.82 (including those with a value
of 1).
the focus of the analysis is on male workers. In particular, while I split male
workers into country-of-origin specific labor inputs, I split female workers only
into foreign-born and native-born types. The reason to focus on male workers
is the relatively strong relationship between female labor force participation and
cultural factors as demonstrated by Fernández (2007) and Fernández and Fogli
(2009), among others. Their results from a U.S. context replicate qualitatively
in Sweden — female labor force participation, as well as the difference between
male and female employment rates across country of origin are correlated with
country-of-origin cultural values. In other words, there is differential selection of
females into the labor force. Furthermore, that differential selection is correlated
to the cultural values I study below in chapter 2. There are no analogous results
for male labor force participation or indications of strong differential selection
into the labor force more generally.
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics for male workers aged 25–64 by region of
birth. The numbers are annual averages for my sample period. Age, years of
education, and hours worked are mean values conditional on being employed by
a firm in the main sample. These conditional means are relatively similar across
birth regions (differences in unconditional mean values across origins are some-
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what larger). Employment rates, however, differ substantially with particularly
low numbers for African and Asian-born workers; employment rates are lower
also conditional on education and age, indicating selection into employment (by
any sensible mechanism) is positive, in terms of productive capacity, for these ori-
gin regions. This suggests a possible upward bias in my human-capital estimates
for Africa and Asia. However in my estimates, African and Asian countries are
generally those with the lowest human capital.
Conditional on employment, Table 1.2 does reveal some differential sorting of
migrants, especially Asian and African-born, into cities and firms with a higher
share of migrants (conditional on city of residence, the differential selection into
firms is smaller than that indicated by the bottom row in Table 1.2). Firm-
sorting is only problematic for my estimates if it takes place in a discriminatory
fashion, i.e. if firms fill positions in a way that systematically penalizes certain
backgrounds at the expense of firms’ financial returns.11 Summary statistics is a
very blunt way of trying to assess whether that is the case. It cannot possibly
confirm or rule out its existence, but finding extreme levels of firm-sorting, with
certain groups of migrants relegated to separate labor markets, would be cause
for concern that it may not only take place, but also be quantitatively impor-
tant. However, I do not find any indication of that kind of extreme sorting — a
majority of workers from all groups are active in firms with a majority native-
born employees and are not confined to firms dominated by employees of similar
(non-Swedish) backgrounds.12
A key variable for my purposes is country of birth. SCB has historically been
very restrictive with releasing data on individuals’ (and parents’) country of birth
at a disaggregated level — normally it is given at the continent level. The data
11If one has a view of the labor market as characterized by the most extreme level of rents,
where the output generated by a given worker is solely determined by the characteristics of the
position of that worker and not at all by the human capital she possesses, then the firm-sorting
need not be discriminatory to be problematic; my entire approach would be meaningless.
12Also, note that what my estimates would be sensitive to is differential (discriminatory)
firm-sorting across different groups of migrants, and not migrants vis-à-vis native-born.
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Table 1.2: Worker Summary Statistics
Native-Born Parents Sec. Gen. Mig. Europe Asia Africa North Am. South Am.
Total Prime-Age 1,758,921 241,087 241,168 152,112 45,898 11,581 23,649
Share Employed 0.84 0.81 0.65 0.54 0.50 0.63 0.70
Share Employed in Private Sector 0.68 0.66 0.54 0.45 0.38 0.48 0.54
Share Employed in Firm Incl. in Sample 0.48 0.46 0.37 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.41
Share Employed in Firm Incl. OP Sample 0.42 0.40 0.31 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.34
Age, OP Sample 43.89 41.47 43.98 39.54 40.19 41.35 41.68
Years of Education, OP Sample 11.95 12.02 11.32 11.78 11.42 12.77 11.75
Percent of Full-Time Position, OP Sample 92.74 91.09 92.86 89.56 88.65 91.15 90.92
Hours Worked, OP Sample 131.92 127.97 133.52 130.84 127.00 131.43 131.54
Share Foreign-Born in City, OP Sample 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.23
Share Foreign-Born in Firm, OP Sample 0.10 0.13 0.25 0.34 0.35 0.23 0.28
Notes: The table presents average summary statistics for male workers for 2008–2014 by region
of birth. Native-born are workers born in Sweden with two native-born parents. Second Gen-
eration Migrants are workers born in Sweden but with at least one foreign-born parent. The
other columns refer to workers born outside Sweden. Total Prime-Age is a yearly average for
2008–2014; other values are for pooled averages over the same time period. In the sample are
employees in firms with data on value added and fixed assets; OP sample requires data also on
investment. The top five rows are based on all males, 25–64 years of age; row six and down are
based only on workers that are employed by a firm in the OP sample. Percent of Full-Time
Position is an alternative measure of average labor supply — for any individual worker it can
take any number in the range 0–100, where a number below 100 indicates a part-time position
whose scope corresponds to the number. The two bottom rows calculates the average share
of foreign-born individuals in city and firm over workers in each respective category. I treat
individuals born abroad, but with two native-born parents, as natives (the vast majority are
likely adoptees).
I use contains information on 129 different countries or groups of countries.13 To
obtain the release of country (and parents’ country) of birth at a more detailed
level than Statistics Sweden normally does, I have agreed to the condition that
no results are presented with individual countries named. Therefore, I will only
present results that are related to country characteristics, and never point to
specific countries.
1.3 A NewMeasure of Human Capital Differences
The main goal of this section is to construct a new measure of human-capital
differences across countries. The measure complements existing work in that it
is robust to discrimination-related issues, and by being based on high-quality
register data as opposed to survey data. I exploit the feature of the data that
employees are matched to their employers to estimate differences in human cap-
13SCB merged countries with less than 1,000 individuals in Sweden in 2014 into groups of
countries, each of which contains at least 1,000 individuals. Of the 129 country groups, all but
18 are individual countries.
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ital or labor productivity via firm-level production functions with heterogeneous
labor.
1.3.1 Estimating Production Functions with Heterogeneous
Labour
I estimate firm-level production functions with heterogeneous labor, on the form
of









+ θK ln(Kj,t) + ωj,t + j,t. (1.1)
Each firm j produce value added at time t by combining capitalKj,t and heteroge-
neous labor inputs Lj,c,t, where c is a mnemonic for “country of origin”. Effective
labor enters the production function as a CES aggregator over workers from dif-
ferent countries of origin with an elasticity of substitution of 1
1−ρ . The objects
of interest are the country-of-origin specific productivity terms δc. I intepret dif-
ferences in the δc’s as differences in human capital. As already implied in the
data section I estimate different δc’s for male workers by specific birth country,
plus a separate δ for native-born female workers and another for foreign-born
women. Equation 1.1 also contains fixed effects for five firm-size bins, industry,
and city, contained in the vector Dj,t, year fixed-effects αt, a firm-specific pro-
ductivity level ωj,t, unobserved but known to the firm, and an error term j,t,
containing firm-specific productivity shocks not known by the firm.14 The error
term also captures misspecification in the production technology and potential
measurement error.
Since I am interested in variation in the δs which captures differences in hu-
man capital not accounted for by the standard determinants of education and
14The firm-size bins are based on number of employees: up to 15 employees, 16–50, 51–150,
151–500, and > 500. Firm city is the city in which the firm has the majority of its employment;
I include fixed effects for cities as defined by SCB, which is the closest I get to local labor
markets. Industry fixed-effects are at the two-digit level.
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experience, the country-of-origin labor inputs Lj,c,t enter Equation 1.1 with an
adjustment for these observables. I now turn to these adjustments.
Labor Efficiency-Unit Adjustments
I employ two alternative (but partially overlapping) methods to account for differ-
ences across groups in education and experience, arguably the two most important
observable factors for labor productivity. As a baseline, I adjust the number of
efficiency units that a worker contributes using relative predicted wages. I run
a Mincerian regressions for native-born employed males, where education enters
as dummy variables for nine different educational categories, and experience as a
third-degree polynomial in (potential) years of experience. I then use the coeffi-
cients from this regression to generate predicted wages for all workers. Finally, I
adjust the number of efficiency units that an individual worker provides by the
size of that individual’s predicted wage relative to the average predicted wage.
If, for example, a worker has a predicted wage that is twice the average pre-
dicted wage, then that worker’s contribution to the relevant Lj,c,t is two efficiency
units.15 In addition to the efficiency adjustments, I also adjust the labor input
based on the average number of hours worked by workers from a given origin.
Unfortunately, I only have data on hours worked for a representative sample, not
for all workers. However, as my objects of interest are group averages, this should
not be a concern — differences are relatively small across origins (see Table 1.2,
rows 6 and 7).16
An advantage of only including native-born workers when I calculate predicted
wages is that the efficiency unit adjustment is not sensitive to differential wage
15Dividing by the average predicted wage does not make a difference for the labor productiv-
ity levels when Equation 1.1 is estimated; all it does is to keep the number of total (adjusted)
units of labor input equal to the total number of actual workers.
16Table 1.2 shows continent averages. But differences across countries are also small, rarely
larger than 5 percent. As a robustness check, I include hours worked in the Mincerian regres-
sions, based on the logic that the hourly wage (and worker efficiency) may be a function of
hours worked. Differences are negligible.
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discrimination between different groups.17 However, as a robustness exercise, I
estimate predicted wages including the foreign-born, and including a dummy for
migrating as a child (defined as up to 16 years old at the time of migration) and
a third degree polynomial in the time since migration. In yet another robustness
check, I exclude child migrants altogether from the groups of workers that form
the basis of country-specific labor productivity estimates. The results are very
similar to the baseline approach based on native-born workers only.
The predicted-wages approach implicitly assumes that efficiency units provided
by workers with different educational attainment are perfect substitutes. In an
alternative specification, I relax this assumption and add an educational layer in
the CES aggregator — a type of labor is then defined by both a level of education
and a country of origin.18 Hence, I replace Equation 1.1 with














+ θK ln(Kj,t) + ωj,t + j,t.
(1.2)
In Equation 1.2, e indexes for the different educational categories: less than high-
school degree, high-school but no college degree, and college degree or more.
γe captures the relative productivity, and σ the substitutability, across different
educational levels.19 The advantage of the baseline is that it is possible to control
for education at a more fine-grained level, and it is straightforward to include
other explanatory variables such as differences in time since migration.
17Theoretically, if other types of workers, and not only the reference group, were included in
calculating predicted wages, differential discrimination could pose a problem in the following
way. If a group of workers x suffer from discrimination and belonging to group x is strongly
correlated to characteristic y (e.g. tertiary education), then the market returns of y will be
downward biased due to the discrimination. From the downward biased estimate of returns
to y, it follows that the number of efficiency units provided by group x will also (on average)
be under-estimated, and the productivity of an efficiency unit provided by group x therefore
over-estimated.
18In Equation 1.2, I continue to account for differences in experience via predicted wages.
19I have also carried out robustness exercises where I add an occupational layer in a similar
fashion. However, I would want to include the differences emanating from different occupa-
tions in the average labor productivity estimates, insofar as that occupational sorting is not




There is a large literature on production function estimation. The main challenge
faced by this literature is the endogeneity of factor input choices to the unobserved
firm-specific productivity level ωj,t.20 For my parameters of interest, the specific
form this concern could take is that the firm uses knowledge about its produc-
tivity level when it decides the composition of labor types. If so, unobserved
productivity biases country-of-origin specific productivity estimates.21
To tackle the problem of endogenous factor input choices, I follow the proxy vari-
able literature. As a baseline, I follow Olley and Pakes (1996). Their basic idea
is that (observed) investment decisions are informative of the firm’s (unobserved)
productivity level.22 If the choice of investment is a monotonically increasing
function of productivity (for a given level of capital), this function can be in-
verted to get unobserved productivity as a function of investment and capital.
The inverted investment function ωj,t ≈ φ(kj,t, ij,t) is unknown so they, and I,
approximate it by a third-degree polynomial in investment and capital (including
all interactions). I also explore the modifications of Olley and Pakes’ approach
devised by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015)
as robustness exercises.23
20Some of the problems the production function estimation literature has faced are less of
an issue here. In virtue of the administrative data that firms are required to report for tax
reasons, measurement error should be less problematic than in survey data.
21If the firm uses knowledge about its productivity level to decide total labor input, but
chooses different types of labor at random conditional on total labor input, that would be a
problem for estimating the labor share, but should not pose a problem for estimating relative
productivity levels of different groups of labor.
22Unlike papers aiming to estimate firm-level TFP, for my purposes, OP also alleviates
concerns that stem from potential differences in markups across firms correlated to the labor
type composition, assuming investment responds to differences in profit opportunities caused
by market power similarly to differences in profit opportunities induced by firm-level TFP.
23Levinsohn and Petrin differs from Olley and Pakes in that they use intermediate inputs as
the proxy variable that contains information on unobserved TFP. Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer
modifies the approach by adding conditional moment conditions to relax assumptions related
to e.g. dynamic effects of labor input choices.
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Functional Form and Controlling for Cultural Heterogeneity
The Cobb-Douglas (CD) functional form assumption is a standard one in the
production function estimation literature; for this reason, and because it makes
the mapping to the standard aggregate production function straightforward, it is
my preferred choice. As a robustness exercise in Section 2.2.2, I instead estimate
a translog production function.
As a baseline, I follow the literature and set ρ = 1. The perfect substitutability
assumption has several advantages. The estimation doesn’t suffer from the iden-
tification issue pointed out by Diamond, McFadden, and Rodriguez (1978), and
it appears reasonable from an a priori perspective to treat workers with the same
education and experience level, but that are born in different countries, as very
close substitutes.24 I do relax the assumption in a robustness check; results are
robust, and the estimated ρ is very close to 1.
My parameters of interest, δ, capture the direct effect of country of origin on a
worker’s contribution to output. As mentioned in Section 1.2, it is important
that these estimates are not confounded by any potential effect of cultural het-
erogeneity on overall firm productivity — there is indeed a literature on diversity,
suggesting that diversity could be both advantageous and harmful for firm-level
output.25 To try and address this, I have conducted two robustness exercise, both
based on including a variable related to firm diversity, when I estimate Equation
1.1. The first diversity-related control is the Herfindahl index in the within-firm
country of birth dispersion, which I plotted in Figure 1.1. As an alternative, I
also calculate the average “cultural distance” within a firm. This is calculated by
first attributing to each worker the cultural value associate with that worker’s
country of birth, and then taking the standard deviation of those values within
24It also makes the comparison between marginal productivity and wage rates straightfor-
ward — with imperfect substitution, the estimated marginal productivity for labor types with
few workers are very sensitive to small changes in the elasticity parameter.
25See, among others, Williams, and O’Reilly III (1998), Alesina, and La Ferrara (2005),
Ottaviano and Peri (2006), and Parrotta, Pozzoli, and Pytlikova (2014).
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each firm.26 I include both of Inglehart’s and Welzel’s cultural dimensions as
measures of culture.27 These alterations leave the results largely unchanged.
1.3.2 Human-Capital Dispersion
I estimate Equation 1.1 by the various methods discussed above. Appendix Table
1.4 gives a summary of parameter estimates. In general, the production function
parameters are fairly plausible with estimates of returns to scale well in the range
of previous micro estimates.28 The goodness-of-fit is relatively high, with adjusted
R-squared in the range of 0.80–0.88.
Figure 1.2 gives a first graphical illustration of the dispersion in labor productivity
or human capital across countries. It plots the estimated human capital (the
δ’s from estimating Equation 1.1) using the baseline specification and method,
against GDP per worker; circle sizes are proportional to the country-of-origin
weight in the sample. Table 1.3 gives the corresponding summary statistics.29
Two immediate lessons emerge — there appears to be significant dispersion in
human capital across countries over and above any dispersion associated with the
quantity of schooling and experience, and those residual differences (for a given
level of schooling and experience) are strongly correlated to GDP per worker.
A 1 percentage-point increase in estimated human capital is associated with an
increase of 10 log-points in real GDP per worker. The relationship is statistically
significant at the 1-percent level, both when data are weighted by a country-of-
origin weight in the sample, and when they are unweighted.30
26As an alternative, I instead calculate the mean absolute deviation over all employees within
each firm.
27See e.g. Inglehart and Welzel (2005).
28The potential exception is a relatively low capital share. I discuss reasons for this in
Appendix 2.A. It is important to note that none of my results are driven by this — they are
robust to using an alternative measure of capital which brings factor-share estimates closer in
line with aggregate factor shares, they are robust to using cost-based factor shares, and the
results are quantitatively stronger with when fixing capital shares around aggregate values.
29The average estimated human capital is in itself uninformative for my purposes as the
native-born act solely as a reference group; I include it to provide a point of reference for the
standard deviation of 0.36 or 0.24, and for the 90/10-percentile ratio of 3.4.
30In Table 1.3 and Figure 1.2, I have dropped the δ’s that corresponds to groups of countries,
28
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Notes: The graph plots estimated relative labor productivity, on the y-axis, against log GDP per
worker on the x-axis. The unit of labor productivity is the productivity level of the reference
group (native-born male workers) whose productivity is normalized to 1. Estimated labor
productivities are based on micro-level data from SCB; GDP numbers are from the Penn World
Tables.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics for Estimated Human Capital
Av. δˆ Av. δˆ, Freq. St. Dev. of δˆ St. Dev. of δˆ 90/10-ratio Nbr. of Reg. Coeff. on
Weighted Freq. Weight Countries Log GDP
0.73 0.71 0.36 0.24 3.2 101 0.097
Notes: Summary statistics for the country-specific measures of human capital δˆc from equation
1.1, in the baseline estimation. Standard deviations and the 90/10-ratio quantify the country-
of-origin dispersion in human-capital estimates.
Appendix Table 1.4 reports the key statistics from Table 1.3 for alternative spec-
ifications of the firm-level production function, of how correction for schooling
and experience, and of estimation method. The cross-country dispersion in the
δ’s is somewhat smaller in some of these cases, and larger in others. However,
as opposed to country-groups made up of one single country. Including them, together with
the average GDP per worker of the countries each group is made up of, improves the statistical
significance of the of the GDP-δ relationship. As I am, for the most part, not able to include
these country-groups in Section 2.2 below, I do not include them here.
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considerable differences are always featured, with a minimum 90/10-percentile ra-
tio and standard deviation of 2.1 and 0.24 respectively for the specification that
both adds an educational layer in the labor aggregator and allows for imperfect
substitution (those alterations also, very marginally, decrease the goodness-of-
fit). I discuss several further robustness variations in Section 2.2.2, in relation to
determinants of human-capital differences.
The cross-country differences in human capital implied by my estimates are not
only large economically, but also large compared to those based on schooling
that have dominated the development-accounting literature. For example, the
90-10 percentile ratio in the cross-country average years of schooling distribution
is around 2, and so is the 90-10 percentile ratio in the human capital stocks
calculated by Hall and Jones (1999). Recall that my estimates capture human
capital differences other than those induced by the quantity of schooling, so an
implication of my findings is that factors other than schooling account for more
of the overall variation in human capital across countries than schooling itself.
Investigating what these factors may be is the focus of the next chapter.
Hendricks and Schoellman (2018) do not produce an estimate of human capital
differentials as their focus is on the fraction of income differences potentially ex-
plained by human capital. However, my back of the envelope calculation from
their results suggests a 90-10 percentile ratio, inclusive of both schooling- and
non-schooling components of human capital, in excess of 6 — hence somewhat
larger than mine.31 A possible explanation for this difference is that, indeed,
their wage-based measure exaggerates human capital differences because of wage
discrimination (if workers with low true human capital also happen to be dis-
criminated against). However, it is also possible that my estimates underestimate
31Hendricks and Schoellman report the share of income differences that human capital ac-
count for in their additive log decomposition, 60 percent, implying a role of country factors
(that they denote by z) of 40 percent. The number of “at least on the order of 6” is based
on a back-of-the-envelope lower bound of h90/h10 = 5.74 implied by following two equations.
y90
y10









6 where 22 is the 90-10 percentile GDP-per-worker ratio in
the 101 countries included in Table 1.3. The calculation is assuming that h and z are perfectly
correlated, which is why it is a conservative lower bound.
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human capital differences because migrants from low-human-capital countries are
more strongly positively selected on unobservables. I have a plan to correct my
estimates for such positive selection and the results will be included in future
work.
1.4 Conclusion
This paper provides a new measure of human capital based on migrants. I find
large differences in human capital net of education and experience; in that sense,
I reach the same conclusion as previous migrant-based measures of human cap-
ital: that years of schooling and experience is insufficient to properly account
for human capital differences across countries. In contrast to previous literature,
differential discrimination cannot explain the human-capital differences I find,
since the approach is immune to wage discrimination and robust to other types
of discrimination. In that sense, this paper upwardly adjust the lower bound of
human-capital differences across countries.
Whether this paper understates the human-capital dispersion across countries
due to an ability to properly account for migrant selection, or whether Hendricks
and Schoellman (2018) overstates the same dispersion due to differential wage
discrimination is an interesting avenue for future work.
Regardless of whether this paper or Hendricks and Schoellman (2018) comes
closer to the truth, the differences are quantitatively large and begs the question
of what determines human-capital differences in excess of what the traditional
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(b) Distribution of the share of foreign-
born male employees amongst the 55 per-
cent of firms that have a foreign-born male
employee. The average foreign-born share
of male employment in the sample (incl.
firms with no foreign employees) is 13 per-
cent.
1.A.2 Macro-Level Data
Below I list the data sources for cross-country variables and their corresponding
variables.
Barro and Lee (2013): measures of schooling quantity.
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Hanushek and Woessman (2012): measures of schooling quality.
World Development Indicators from The World Bank: Pupil/Teacher-ratio; Gov-
ernment Expenditure on Education; all measures of health and fertility.
Barro and McCleary (2006): Belief in Hell ; Monthly Attendance of Religious
Service.
Hofstede (e.g. 2001): Individualism.
The World Values Survey: all other measures of cultural values except those from
Barro and McCleary, and Hofstede.
Penn World Tables 7.1: National account aggregates.
Appendix 1.B Productivity Estimation
Table 1.4: Summary Table of Production Function Parameter Estimates for Var-
ious Specifications
NLS NLS Baseline Tot. Fixed Baseline Cost-Based Imp. Imp. Subst.
Full Baseline (Following Assets Factor Excl. LS, 3-dig. Subst. Nest.
OP) Shares Mig<18 Ind. Ed.
90/10-Ratio 2.9 2.6 3.2 2.9 4.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.1
δˆ St. Dev. 0.26 0.25 0.36 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.28 0.32 0.24
δˆ St. Dev., Weighted 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.30 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.16
θˆL, Eq. 1.1 1.0 0.98 0.96 0.72 0.70 0.96 Av: 0.79 0.96 0.92
0.0023 0.0027 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0023
θˆK , Eq. 1.1 0.084 0.11 0.067 0.27 0.30 0.069 0.078 ToDo ToDo
0.0004 0.0006 0.0016 0.0025 0.0015 0.0022
ρˆ, Eq. 1.1 0.93 0.95
Adj. R-Squared 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.88 0.80 0.85 0.82 0.85 0.84
Notes: The table presents production function parameter estimates for a select sample of the
specifications, as well as the 90/10-percentile ratios and standard deviations for the labor pro-
ductivity estimates, the δ’s. I.e. the top three rows corresponds gives summary statistics of
the country-of-origin specific labor productivity parameters that I retrieve from the produc-






Chapter 1 of this thesis, as well as other recent contributions (Hendricks and
Shcoellman, 2018; Lagakos et al. 2018) find large differences in human capital.
What drives these large differences, unexplained by schooling? Investigating that
question is the main contribution of this chapter. Concretely, I rely on the results
from Chapter 1 and regress my firm-level estimates of country-of-origin specific
productivity on a large number of country-of-origin characteristics. Several differ-
ent measures do have explanatory power, such as educational quality and health
indicators. However, in a “horse race” between different factors, only measures of
cultural values are economically and statistically significant predictors of human
capital. The most powerful predictor is the first principal component from a factor
analysis of a large number of answers to questions from the World Values Survey
(WVS), as estimated in highly influential work by Inglehart, Baker, and Welzel
(Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).1 A one standard devia-
1Inglehart, Baker, and Welzel select a set of questions from the WVS and run a factor
analysis on those questions. They identify the top two factors as a two-dimensional summary
of culture. This has become a standard reference in the fields of Political Science and Sociology.
Note that the factor analysis is conducted to explain as much of the variation in the underlying
WVS questions as possible, and not to maximize explanatory power of my human capital
measure.
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tion change in this cultural measure is associated with a 13–15 percentage-point
change in estimated human capital. When I “unpack” this principal component
and investigate which underlying questions most drive its relationship with human
capital, I find that an index aimed at measuring the value placed on autonomy
exerts an overwhelming influence.
The influence of culture on human capital proves robust to different specifications
of firm production functions, and concerns with selection into migration; it is still
detectable among second-generation immigrants; it is replicated in countries other
than, and culturally very distinct from, Sweden; and it is not simply proxying for
the effect of cultural heterogeneity within a firm’s workforce.
I also study the explanatory power of the cultural component of estimated human
capital on GDP-per-capita differences across countries. A culture-augmented
version of development accounting increases the explained fraction of income
differences by 16 percentage points (or around 50 percent). This is economically
substantial and lends further support to the proposition that cultural factors are
important to understand cross-country differences in economic development.
Confronted with evidence of large unexplained residuals in income differences
across countries, macroeconomists have tended to gravitate towards explanations
based on technology, institutions, geography, or misallocation. My paper suggests
that cross-country differences in prevailing cultural attitudes amplify differences
in human capital, and through these reduce the unexplained component of in-
come differences.2 The idea that culture influences human capital goes back at
least to the classic writings by Max Weber (1930). David Landes (1998), in an in-
fluential exposé of the causes of differences in income across countries, highlights
the cultural value of autonomy, or “the autonomy of intellectual inquiry” (his
2As implied by the discussion above, Hendricks and Schoellman also conclude that human-
capital differences are larger than previously thought, but they are silent on the underlying
drivers of human capital difference. Schoellman (2012) suggests educational quality, but I
find little room for educational quality as an explanatory factor once I control for measures of
culture. De Philippis and Rossi (2017) show that children of migrants from high PISA test score
countries keep performing well also in low-quality schooling systems; they suggest cultural traits
as an explanation of this persistence, in line with the cultural interpretation of my findings.
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italicization), as one out of three key explanations. Landes’ propositions are well-
grounded in the history of economic development, and he provides a multitude
of qualitative supportive anecdotes. My finding that autonomy is the strongest
predictor of human-capital differences constitutes further evidence of his thesis,
but of a more systematic kind.
My evidence does not allow me to pin down the specific mechanism through
which autonomy enhances human capital, but there are rich psychological and
sociological literatures that afford plausible mechanisms. The cross-cultural psy-
chology literature documents that culture has an impact on psychological and
personality traits (Markus and Kitayama 1991; Williams, Satterwhite, and Saiz,
2002; Schwartz, 2004; Heine and Ruby, 2010),3 while an overwhelming body of
research in psychology, sociology, management, and economics, demonstrate that
personality traits have an impact on job performance (Barrick and Mount, 1991,
1993; Borghans et al., 2008; Ployhart and Moliterno, 2011). A particular per-
sonality trait highlighted in this literature is proactivity (e.g. Griffin, Neal, and
Parker, 2007). Proactivity amongst the workforce decreases the need for scarce
managerial resources, and potentially mitigates issues related to incomplete con-
tracts. Taking on additional tasks is one particular form of initiative found to be
strongly positively related to high job performance (Morgeson, Delaney-Klinger,
and Hemingway, 2005). Related to role breadth is role choice, or sorting into
more or less productive occupations (Holland, 1997). There is also a significant
relationship between workplace obedience and workers taking on more routine-
based tasks (Campante and Chor, 2017). This evidence suggests a natural and
plausible interpretation for the role of a culture that values autonomy in affecting
human capital, in that an upbringing emphasizing autonomy is likely to forge
more proactive individuals. Consistent with this channel, I find evidence that
3As Markus and Kitayama (1991) notes in an influential paper, “People in different cultures
have strikingly different construals of the self, of others, and of the interdependence of the two.
These construals can influence, and in many cases determine, the very nature of individual
experience, including cognition, emotion, and motivation”. In particular, Schwartz (2004) doc-
uments systematic cross-cultural variation in autonomy which he contrasts to embeddedness, or
the desire to sustain the social order, avoid change, and retain tradition.
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workers from high-autonomy backgrounds sort into jobs with a high degree of
non-routine task intensity.4,5
At first sight, an alternative interpretation for my findings could be offered by
the model in Gordnichecnko and Roland (2017).6 In their model individualism
is growth-enhancing because it alters social incentives, so that achievement, and
in particular innovation, receives greater social recognition, permitting more in-
dividualistic societies to grow faster. To the extent that societies that value
autonomy are also more individualistic, one might conclude that the connection
between autonomy and productivity I uncover is driven by the Gorodnichenko
and Roland mechanism. However, note that in their model, the individualism
that matters to shape workers’ incentives is the one in the environment in which
a worker makes her choices, not the one in which the worker grew up. Since
my measure of human capital is estimated on workers all operating in the same
society, my results are unlikely to be driven by their mechanism.7,8
Aside from the individualism-collectivism dimension emphasized by Gorodnichenko
and Roland, the two cultural traits that have been more systematically explored
4The cultural psychology and cultural neuroscience literatures describe the difference be-
tween individualism and collectivism in the sphere of parenting as one of encouraging autonomy
vs. embeddedness — analogous to Schwartz (2004). They have also pointed out that auton-
omy is likely more advantageous in the workplace, while a relational approach is perhaps more
desired within families (Triandis, 1989, 2001; Maselko, 2016).
5The literature on positive psychological capital documents a significant, positive relation-
ship between self-efficacy and job performance (Avey et al., 2011). Self-efficacy, or “the belief
a person holds regarding his or her power to affect situations positively”, is also the main trait
that Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2016) propose to explain the Long-Term Persistence in
civic capital that they find amongst Italian cities. Self-efficacy is probably correlated with au-
tonomy in that they are both cultural attributes, but it is conceptually distinct: autonomy is
a value while self-efficacy is a belief.
6See also Gordnichecnko and Roland (2011).
7For migrants who do not integrate, it could be that social rewards are still similar to their
respective origin country. However, this would still be distinct from the proposed mechanism of
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2017). Their story posits a trade off between higher growth-rates
from the positive spillovers of innovation (a dynamic advantage) in individualistic societies vs.
more efficient production (a static advantage) in collectivist societies. The dynamic part of
their story would not play out in my setting, and my static findings are inconsistent with their
thesis, with higher productivity estimates for workers from more individualistic origins.
8Gorodnichenko and Roland also present cross-country regressions showing that a measure
of individualism is positively correlated with country growth. As expected, the correlation
between their measure of individualism, due to Hofstede (2001), and the WVS measure of
autonomy, is positive, at 0.44, but in my human-capital regressions, it lacks explanatory power
once I control for autonomy, which on the other hand remains statistically significant at a
1-percent level.
37
in the macroeconomics and development literature are religiosity ant trust. The
evidence on the impact of religiosity on economic growth is mixed. Barro and
McCleary (2003, 2006) find a positive relationship but Durlauf, Kourtellos, and
Tan (2012) question these results’ robustness. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2003) find that religiosity is associated with characteristics that are beneficial
for economic activity, such as industriousness, thriftiness, trust(worthiness), and
attitudes towards corruption. Bryan, Choi, and Karlan (2018) find a positive
impact of evangelical catechization on outcomes related to health and income.
On the other hand, Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015) find a negative re-
lationship between certain religious practices and economic growth. I do not find
a significant role for religiosity once I control for autonomy and trust.
I also find a positive effect of trust on human capital. In the literature, the typical
interpretation of the finding that trust is beneficial for economic activity is that
trust facilitates interaction and exchange, whether in markets for goods (Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2009), financial markets (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales,
2004, 2008), labor markets (Algan and Cahuc, 2009; Fehr et al., 1998), or within
firms or other production teams (La Porta et al., 1997; Bloom, Sadun, and Van
Reenen, 2012; Ilzetzki and Simonelli, 2018).9 My evidence on trust supports the
view that a trusting attitude increases a worker’s effectiveness within production
teams.10
By looking at inherited cultural traits through the second generation of migrants,
the paper is related to the literature that follows the epidemiological approach.
9Ilzetzki and Simonelli’s contribution relates to mine in another way as well: they also offer
a novel way to estimate differences in human capital. They look at cross-regional differences in
vote-counting rates in Italian elections. Since vote counting is a simple task, requiring virtually
no capital, no technology, no particular skills, and featuring no institutional differences, they
argue that vote counting speed is a good proxy for raw labor productivity. Their reported
cross-regional variation in vote-counting efficiency is similar in magnitude to the differences in
human capital I find. One difference between my approach and theirs is that their approach by
construction can only be applied to within country variation, and so cannot be used to estimate
cross-country differences in human capital.
10Having said that, it is worth stressing that my evidence on trust differs from most of the
literature in that it is at the individual level — namely it relates an individual’s trust to that
individual’s productivity. In that sense, my exercise is closesr to Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso
(2016), who look at the relationship between individual trust and individual outcomes.
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Numerous papers argue that there is an inherited component to cultural values,
e.g. Bisin and Verdier (2001), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008), Tabellini
(2008), and Dohmen et al. (2012). Fernández (2011) provides an exhaustive
survey.11 This paper contributes to the epidemiological branch of the culture
literature by studying both a new outcome, labor productivity or human capital,
and new measures of cultural values. Furthermore, I am able to control for
parental characteristics in a more detailed way than previous papers typically
have been able to do.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 investigates the
drivers of human capital differences; it includes an extensive list of robustness
variations and experiments. In Section 2.3, I combine the results from sections
1.3 and 2.2 and study what fraction of unexplained cross-country differences in
TFP that differences attributed to cultural values can account for. Section 2.4
concludes.
2.2 Determinants of Human Capital Differences
The findings in Chapter 1 suggest that human-capital differences are substan-
tially larger than what is captured by direct measures of years of schooling. This
section investigates what the key determinants of human capital (HC) are. The
measure of HC is the one constructed in Chapter 1 above, with the same baseline
specification. I explore a large number of different versions of human-capital esti-
mates; the great majority of these are based on estimating firm-level production
functions with heterogeneous labor, similar (or identical) to Equation 1.1, with
some variation in functional-form specifications and/or sample restrictions.
I begin by investigating the explanatory power of different categories of country-
of-origin characteristics in OLS regressions.12 Although these regressions at first
11See also Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) for a survey of the literature on culture in
economics more generally.
12As pointed out in Chapter 1, Statistics Sweden (SCB) has historically been very restrictive
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glance look like standard cross-country regressions, they are not. The dependent
variable in these regressions is a country’s HC as estimated from workers operating
in Sweden, which greatly diminishes the risk of relevant omitted variables. Any
country-of-origin omitted variable must have followed the worker in his/her move
to Sweden, and I believe my regressions below truly exhaust the possibilities that
plausibly fit this requirement. In fact, since (as I show below) my results are
robust to using second-generation migrants, omitted variables must not only be
embodied in the migrants but also susceptible of intergenerational transmission.
None of the usual institutional, geographical, or factor-endowment variables can
fit these criteria.
2.2.1 Different Categories of Country Characteristics
For the reasons discussed above, in my baseline analysis, I mainly restrict atten-
tion to country-of-origin characteristics that can plausibly have a direct impact
on transportable human capital.13 These characteristics fall into the broad cate-
gories of education, health, and cultural values. First, I examine these categories
separately. Then, I compare the statistically most successful predictors of human-
capital differences from each category. The data sources for the cross-country
variables used, in this section and the previous one, are quite standard and I list
them in Appendix 1.A.
Educational Factors
Table 2.1 reports the result of OLS regressions of estimated human capital on
measures that capture educational characteristics of origin countries: educa-
with releasing data on individuals’ (and parents’) country of birth at a disaggregated level as
opposed to the continent level. To obtain the release of disaggregated data, which is key for what
I do in this chapter, I have agreed to the condition that no country-level results are attributable
to specific countries. Therefore, I present results that are related to country characteristics, but
never point to specific countries.
13In a robustness exercise, I also try all of the country characteristics that Sala-i-Martin
(1997) investigates.
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tional quality as measured by pupil performance in standardized test scores, the
pupil/teacher-ratio, government expenditures on education, the respective shares
of the working-age population with a given (highest) educational attainment, and
the average years of education of workers in my sample. I weight by the number of
workers each δˆc is based on.14 The characteristic with the strongest relationship
with human capital is educational quality.15
There are two main take-aways from Table 2.1. First, measures of educational
quantity, whether in terms of proportion of workers achieving a certain educa-
tional attainment, or in terms of average years of schooling, are never significantly
related to my measure of human capital. This is reassuring, as it suggests that my
adjustment for schooling quantity in the production function estimates has been
effective at netting out its contribution to human capital.16 Second, measures
of schooling quality, based on test-scores, do correlate positively with estimated
human capital. Recall that I did not adjust the labor inputs for schooling quality,
so this finding is entirely consistent with schooling quality being an important
determinant of human capital. It is also in line with the findings of Schoellman
(2012). What remains to be seen is if the relation between schooling quality and
human capital is robust to adding additional possible determinants of human
capital.
Health and Fertility
Another intuitive determinant of mobile human capital is health — which has
also received a great deal of support in the development literature. I also include
fertility here as it is associated with health; fertility rates often decrease in tan-
dem with infant mortality. Furthermore, fertility also has its own direct impact
14Weighting by the (inverse of the) standard error of δˆ yields very similar results.
15For ease of comparison, both here and later on, I have restricted the sample to only include
origin countries for which I have data on educational quality. Relaxing the restriction does not
change the overall picture.
16If I estimate human capital based on a pure body count labor input measure, average years
of education for workers in the sample does have predictive power for estimated differences.
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Table 2.1: Human Capital and Education-Related Country Characteristics





Government Educational 0.0674∗∗∗ 0.0288
Expenditures (0.0226) (0.0289)
Share Primary -0.00293 -0.000405
Education (0.00550) (0.00601)
Share Secondary 0.00123 -0.000183
Education (0.00402) (0.00451)
Share Tertiary 0.00730 0.00278
Education (0.00553) (0.00469)
Years of Education -0.0464
of Workers in Sample (0.0525)
Observations 63 59 61 60 63 57
Adjusted R2 0.333 0.122 0.161 0.180 0.014 0.308
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc from
Equation 1.1. Education quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012) and based on test
score results from international assessments. The other variables are self-explanatory. The
shares of workers with different educational attainment are the in-country shares, while the
years of schooling variable is based on the Swedish sample.
42
on human capital. If parents (and society) have limited resources to invest in
their children, then a higher fertility rate implies less resources from the previous
generation invested per individual child.
Table 2.2 presents results analogous to those in Table 2.1 but with fertility and
health measures as the independent variables. In line with the intuitions I have
described, fertility is negatively related to human capital differences and the mea-
sures of health are positively related, although only the fertility rate and life ex-
pectancy are statistically significant. The general explanatory power of health
measures is weaker than that of educational quality. This is also relatively in-
tuitive considering that the human capital estimates are constructed conditional
on labor supply and the largest impact of health issues on output is likely via
labor supply. Furthermore, the convergence in healthcare access that takes place
among Swedish immigrants is also bound to lead to a partial convergence in
health status.
Table 2.2: Human Capital and Health-Related Country Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fertility Rate -0.0165∗∗ -0.0234∗∗∗
(0.00625) (0.00815)
Life Expect. at Birth 0.0187∗∗ 0.0276∗
(0.00930) (0.0161)
Immunization Rate, 0.000846 -0.00224
Measels (0.00491) (0.00460)
Share Low -0.00797 0.00581
Birth-Weight (0.0135) (0.00996)
Mortality -0.00327 0.00568
Under 5 (0.00235) (0.00419)
Observations 62 62 61 62 61 61
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.122 -0.016 0.007 0.076 0.180
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01




The economics literature has suggested several different channels for cultural
values to impact economic prosperity. I will investigate the relationship between
estimated human capital and dimensions of culture that previous literature has
proposed, with a particular emphasis on cultural characteristics that could most
plausibly affect individual worker performance at the firm level — consistent with
the setting from which I derive my measures of human capital.
Table 2.3 shows the predictive power of different cultural values on estimated
human capital. Belief in Hell and Monthly Attendance follows the hypothesis
of Barro and McCleary (2006) (inspired by Weber, 1930) that religiosity is con-
ducive to economic growth, but that the resources invested in religion (attend-
ing services) are costly. In contrast to their findings, but similar to Campante
and Yanagizawa-Drott (2015), I find a negative relationship between religiosity
and human capital. Columns 2–6 look at variables representative of the cate-
gories that Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) identify as most conducive to
economic prosperity, in the order they introduce them, measures of attitudes to-
wards: cooperation; women; legal norms; the market; thriftiness.17 Among these,
the measure with the strongest relationship to labor productivity, trust, has been
proposed by many other authors as important for economic prosperity (Algan
and Cahuc, 2010; Ilzetzki and Simonelli, 2018). Thrift, and market attitudes are
also significantly related to human capital. Column 8 follows Gorodnichenko and
Roland (2017), who suggest that individualism is important for economic growth.
The simple bivariate relation with human capital is indeed positive.
The cultural measures in Column 9 and 10 of Table 2.3 are constructed following
work by Ronald Inglehart, Wayne Baker, and Christian Welzel (e.g. Inglehart
17I exclude attitudes towards the government, as those questions relate specifically to the
government in the respective country, for example, to what extent people have confidence in
the police or the military in the country they live. This does not naturally carry over to a low or
high confidence in the Swedish military. Including the category change none of the conclusions.
I have chosen the WVS question in each category with the greatest R-squared.
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and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), that has been very influential in
political science and sociology. The variables are the top two factors extracted
from an underlying set of answers to WVS questions by means of factor analysis;
the original authors refer to the factors as Traditional vs. Secular-Rational, and
Survival vs. Self-Expression values. These factors explain on the order of 70
percent of cross-country variation in the underlying questions.18
Column 11 in Table 2.3 runs a “horse race” between the different variables that
were individually significant.19 The single predictor that remains statistically sig-
nificant is the top cultural factor from Inglehart, Baker, and Welzel. Figure 2.1
gives a graphical illustration of the relationship. It has the highest R-squared on
its own, almost identical to when I include all the variables, and remains statisti-
cally significant at a 1 percent level with a stable point estimate when I pairwise
include the other cultural variables (Appendix Table 2.32). This is consistent
with the view that cultural values in general are important for human capital,
and that factor analysis successfully extracts more information on culture than
individual questions. Since cultural values are often strongly correlated, Column
11 in Table 2.3 does not imply that non-significant variables do not matter. In
particular, trust, is also one of the underlying questions included in Inglehart and
Baker (2000), as is another measure of religiosity, strongly correlated to belief in
hell. For this reason, and because of the drawback that factors in themselves
are difficult to interpret, I will later investigate which of the finer cultural values
subsumed in the first principal component of culture most drive its relation with
human capital.
18Note the difference between using factor analysis to find the combination of WVS questions
that explain as much as possible of the variation in estimated human capital. That is not what
I do here. The cultural measures are constructed to explain as large a fraction as possible
of cultural differences across countries. That measure is then a fixed measure like any other
cultural measure in the regressions in Table 2.3. I discuss the questions included in the factor
analysis, and their respective importance, below.
19I exclude individualism because I lose 10 observations from including it; nevertheless in-
cluding only works to strengthen the economic and statistical significance of the top cultural
factor, and individualism itself is insignificant.
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Table 2.3: Human Capital and Cultural Traits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Belief in Hell -0.405∗ 0.0225
(0.227) (0.144)
Rel. Service, Monthly Att. -0.206
(0.231)






Attitudes Towards 0.133∗∗∗ -0.00622
the Market (0.0485) (0.0500)




Inglehart et al.’s 0.163∗∗∗ 0.126∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0205) (0.0711)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.112∗∗∗ 0.0412
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0341) (0.0472)
Observations 40 63 62 63 62 63 52 63 63 61
Adjusted R2 0.292 0.448 -0.017 0.005 0.175 0.181 0.083 0.471 0.215 0.470
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc from
equation 1.1. Belief in Hell is the average response to a yes/no-question. The attitudes towards-
questions are, in order of appearance in row 3–6, the fraction of respondents who say that most
people can be trusted as opposed to you cannot be too careful ; to what extent respondents
agree that being a housewife is just as fulfilling ; whether it is Justifiable: someone accepting a
bribe; the average agreement with private ownership of business should be increased as opposed
to government ownership of business should be increased ; the average agreement with People
should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs. The government should take more
responsibility to provide for people. The market- and thrift-variables are both coded so that a
high value reflect a more market- and less government-friendly attitude. Cultural factors 1 and
2 are the top two factors from a factor analysis on a set of answers to WVS questions, following
Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker; see e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000).
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Top Cultural Factor
Notes: The graph plots estimated relative human capital on the y-axis against the top cultural
factor on the x-axis. Estimated labor productivities are based on micro-level data from SCB.
The measure of cultural values is based on data from the World Values Survey following In-
glehart, Welzel, and Baker; see e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000). They name the top factor
Traditional vs. Secular-Rational values.
Comparing Categories
Table 2.4 presents a comparison of the different categories of country-characteristics
related to transportable human capital. I include the variables from each of the
categories with the strongest predictive power: educational quality, fertility and
life expectancy, and the cultural factors. The top cultural factor is the explana-
tory factor with the most robust and quantitatively strongest relationship with
human capital — a one standard deviation change is associated with roughly 13
percentage points higher labor productivity. No other explanatory variable is
robustly related to human-capital differences.
Column 3–5 and 6 includes a number of characteristics of the workers in my
sample whose labor productivity I have estimated. I account for education at the
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micro level. To the extent that the functional form does not accurately capture
the impact of education, I have tried to include the average number of years
of education. Other characteristics are average age at migration and time since
migration, and average share receiving residence permits as refugees or to reunite
with family.20
Including GDP per capita as an explanatory variable is questionable — after all,
the purpose of the paper is to explain differences in income via human capital.
Seeing as it is the most frequently included variable in cross-country regressions,
I nevertheless try including it. As I show in Section 1.3, it is strongly corre-
lated to the measure of human capital on its own. Here, after controlling for
human capital determinants, it lacks predictive power. The dependent variable
is constructed to capture human capital, and independent variables are chosen to
explain human capital differences as well as possible. Therefore, it is reassuring
that GDP, a variable which is a combination of TFP and human and physical
capital, does not add explanatory power, both for the choices of potential human-
capital determinants, and for the identifying assumption that the migrant-based
measure reflects human capital levels of origin countries, but not TFP or physical
capital. The key takeaway from Table 2.4, as from the many robustness exercises
I carry out below, is that the one country characteristic that remains strongly sta-
tistically and economically related to estimated human capital is the top cultural
factor.
Individual questions underlying the cultural factors
The two cultural measures I include above are composite measures extracted
from an underlying set of WVS questions by means of factor analysis. One of
the lessons from the work of Inglehart, Baker, Welzel, and others, is that many
cultural attitudes are strongly correlated and it is thus difficult to conclusively
20I try all of these characteristics at the micro level instead when labor efficiency units are
computed — results are very similar.
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Table 2.4: Human Capital and Country Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.150∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0393) (0.0397) (0.0346) (0.0399) (0.0418) (0.0289) (0.0254)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0463 0.0495 0.0474 0.0487 0.0406 0.0477 0.0566∗
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0438) (0.0460) (0.0352) (0.0369) (0.0374) (0.0290) (0.0309)
H-W Ed. 0.0793 0.0881 0.0638 0.0665 0.0381
Quality (0.0966) (0.106) (0.197) (0.237) (0.243)
Fertility Rate 0.00379 0.00394 0.00366 0.00365 0.00370 -0.00494∗∗ -0.00703∗∗∗
(0.00916) (0.00915) (0.00812) (0.00840) (0.00850) (0.00214) (0.00237)
Life Expect. at Birth -0.00882 -0.00716 -0.00597 -0.00612 -0.00912 -0.00127 -0.00729
(0.00902) (0.0105) (0.00811) (0.00817) (0.00954) (0.00678) (0.00654)
Log GDP per Worker -0.0182 0.0426 -0.0181 0.0236
(0.0668) (0.0678) (0.0452) (0.0420)
H-W Ed. Quality, 0.135 0.130 0.163
Basic (0.458) (0.573) (0.585)
Years of Ed. -0.0370 -0.0374 -0.0404 -0.0357
in Sample (0.0269) (0.0276) (0.0263) (0.0229)
Av. Age at Migration -0.0186 -0.0188 -0.0204 -0.0242∗
(0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0139) (0.0132)
Av. Time in Sweden -0.0101 -0.0107 -0.0116 -0.0142
(0.00760) (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.00895)
Share Refugees 0.0171 0.00351 0.131
(0.191) (0.191) (0.148)
Share Fam. 0.0116 -0.0190 -0.129
Reunification (0.338) (0.344) (0.270)
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 81 81
Adjusted R2 0.494 0.486 0.526 0.507 0.501 0.500 0.539
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc,
retrieved from estimating equation 1.1. Independent variables included are those with the
strongest predictive power from each respective categories of health and fertility, education,
and cultural values. The Cultural Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from running a factor
analysis on a set of answers to questions in the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker.
See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational
and Survival vs. Self-Expression.
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disentangle their respective separate effects. The results indicate that culture
generally is an important determinant of human capital. The drawback is that
it is difficult to give a more detailed interpretation of why cultural values affect
human capital based on the factor (although underlying factor loadings can give
some guidance). Therefore, I look at the underlying questions individually. I find
that the key dimensions are autonomy and trust. Below, I give three separate
but closely related statistical arguments for this conclusion, reinforced by a priori
reasoning.
Table 2.33 in the appendix provides a first piece of evidence; it presents regres-
sions of the baseline productivity measure on the individual questions. Auton-
omy and trust are the two question with the highest R-squared and t-ratio. A
second reason is given by the combined picture of several different model se-
lection methods. Table 2.5 presents the specification selected by, respectively,
the General-to-Specific, or GETS approach (Hendry and Krolzig 2004, 2005;
Hoover and Perez,1999); the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator
or LASSO (Tibshirani, 1996); the square-root LASSO (Belloni, Chernozhukov,
and Wang, 2011); an information-criterion based step-wise forward selection; an
information-criterion based step-wise backward elimination.21 All of the differ-
ent model-selection methods include the dimension of individual autonomy vs.
authority or obedience. The leaps-and-bounds algorithm (Furnival and Wilson,
1974) also supports the conclusion that autonomy and to some extent trust are
the two key dimensions of culture; Table 2.35 in the appendix presents the differ-
ent models selected by this algorithm. Although these methods are typically used
for more high-dimensional data than what is the case here, they have the advan-
tage of being agnostic, and all provide support for the view that the autonomy
vs. obedience-dimension of culture is key.
Table 2.6 presents a third piece of perhaps more immediately transparent evi-
21The information-based model selection algorithms are implemented by Lindsey and
Sheather (2010); the selected model is the same with the different information criterions: Mal-
lows’s Cp, Akaike’s information criterion, and Akaike’s corrected information criterion.
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Table 2.5: Specifications Selected by Various Model-Selection Methods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GETS LASSO Sqrt-LASSO Backward Elim. Forward Selec.
Greater Respect for Authority -0.0711∗∗ -0.0531∗ -0.0678∗∗ -0.0670∗∗ -0.0531∗
(E018) (0.0273) (0.0289) (0.0274) (0.0263) (0.0289)
Autonomy 0.139∗∗∗ 0.0916∗∗ 0.0929∗∗ 0.0948∗∗ 0.0916∗∗





Sign a Petition 0.0400
(E025) (0.0262)
Observations 63 63 62 62 63
Adjusted R2 0.491 0.507 0.505 0.453 0.507
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc from
equation 1.1, estimated by nonlinear least squares. Attendance of religious services is from
Barro and McCleary (2006); the measure of individualism is constructed by Hofstede (and sug-
gested as important for growth by Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017). The remaining categories
are one question each from the categories that Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) propose
as potentially important for economic prosperity. The individual questions are, in order of
appearance, A030 mentioning Hard Work as an important child quality; E037 agreement to
People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs. The government should
take more responsibility to provide for people; A165 Most people can be trusted ; F117 Justifi-
able: someone accepting a bribe; D057 agree that Being a housewife is just as fulfilling ; E036
Private ownership of business should be increased.
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dence. There, I show the output of OLS regressions with the autonomy index
included throughout, and pairwise inclusion of the other WVS questions; auton-
omy remains statistically significant throughout, while trust is the only question
that remains significant once autonomy is included (with the exception of ques-
tion E018, which is itself a question concerning the autonomy vs. authority
dimension).22
Table 2.6: Human Capital and Questions Underlying Inglehart et al.’s Cultural
Factors





Greater Respect for Authority -0.0650∗∗
(E018) (0.0253)
Sign a Petition 0.0291
(E025) (0.0324)










Autonomy 0.140∗∗∗ 0.0895∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.110∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
( Y003) (0.0410) (0.0421) (0.0351) (0.0391) (0.0602) (0.0452) (0.0481) (0.0426) (0.0432)
H-W Educ. 0.0594 0.0334 0.0472 0.0396 0.0439 0.0568 0.0442 0.0565 0.0573
Quality (0.0359) (0.0395) (0.0303) (0.0386) (0.0450) (0.0385) (0.0429) (0.0350) (0.0369)
Observations 63 63 63 62 62 61 62 63 63
Adjusted R2 0.452 0.486 0.499 0.403 0.462 0.458 0.465 0.465 0.457
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Economically, a one standard-deviation change in autonomy is associated with a
10–18 percentage-point change in human capital, based on the point estimates in
Table 2.6. Finding the strongest relationship with human capital for dimensions
of culture that can plausibly be thought to have an impact on productivity lends
credence to the view that the relationship is not spurious. It would have been
22Here, I include the measure of educational quality throughout as it is the non-cultural
variable with the strongest relationship with labor productivity, I consider education to be the
most important a priori explanatory factor, and I do account for the quantity of education
at the micro level (excluding educational quality here does not matter for the assessment of
between-question importance).
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reasonable to exclude some of the questions on a priori grounds. It is difficult to
think of reasons why political or moral opinions concerning very specific questions
(abortion or homosexuality) would directly affect a worker’s labor productivity.
Also happiness is a questionable candidate. In contrast to the other questions, it
appears to be more a state of mind than a deeply held value, and is less likely to
exhibit the persistence as individuals migrate that many cultural values have been
shown to do.23 For trust and religiosity on the other hand, there is an existing
body of work suggesting that they are important for economic prosperity.
The economics literature on autonomy is more sparse, but there are rich psycho-
logical and management literatures offering plausible mechanisms. A particular
personality trait highlighted is proactivity (e.g. Griffin, Neal, and Parker, 2007)
argue for an important role of proactivity and adaptability in worker perfor-
mance). Proactivity amongst the workforce also decreases the need for scarce
managerial resources, and potentially mitigates issues related to incomplete con-
tracts.24 Taking on additional tasks is one particular form of initiative found to be
strongly positively related to high job performance (Morgeson, Delaney-Klinger,
and Hemingway, 2005). Related to role breadth is role choice, or sorting into
more or less productive occupations (Holland, 1997).
Recent work in economics documents a significant relationship, specifically be-
tween workplace obedience, and workers taking on routine task intensive jobs
(Campante and Chor, 2017). To further probe the interpretation that auton-
omy is an important dimension of culture for human capital, I go back to the
micro-level data and investigate occupational sorting. Consistent with Campante
and Chor, I do find that workers from cultural backgrounds that place a higher
23I consider national pride and to what extent people would sign a petition intermediate
cases. They may capture something productivity-related (e.g. potential cooperation problems
with people from other countries for national pride and a higher general level of engagement
for sign a petition, but they are less clear candidates than the remaining four: trust, religiosity,
post-materialism, and autonomy.
24The cultural psychology and cultural neuroscience literatures describe the difference be-
tween individualism and collectivism in the sphere of parenting as one of encouraging autonomy
vs. embeddedness — analogous to Schwartz (2004). They have also pointed out that auton-
omy is likely more advantageous in the workplace, while a relational approach is perhaps more
desired within families (Triandis et al. 1985; Triandis, 1989; Maselko, 2016).
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value on autonomy tend to select into occupations characterized by a low de-
gree of routinization. I make use of the task-based measures of occupations
constructed by Autor, Levy, and Murname (2003), denoted by T xxo , and follow
Autor and Dorn (2013) and Campante and Chor (2017), and combine different
task-based measures into one measure of non-routine task intensity of occupation
o as NRTo = ln(T nr,cao ) + ln(T nr,mo )− ln(T r,co )− ln(T r,mo ) where nr denotes non-
routine, c(a) cognitive (analytical), and m manual.25 With a measure of occu-
pational non-routineness at hand, I split workers into percentiles based on where
in the distribution of employed workers they are, so that NRT PCi,o ∈ {1, ..., 100},
and regress the percentile NRT PCi,o of individual i on education, experience, and
the cultural measure of autonomy.26
Table 2.7 present the results of this exercise. Individuals with an origin country
characterized by placing a higher value on autonomy tend to work in less rou-
tinized occupations. This is true both of the first generation (colums 1–3) and
the second generation of migrants (columns 4–6); on average, a one standard
deviation increase in autonomy is associated with moving up 3.6–3.9 percentiles
in the non-routineness distribution of occupations for migrants. For children
of migrants, the corresponding change in the parental country-of-birth proxy of
cultural autonomy is associated with a 1.3–2.4 percentile change. In columns
2–3 and 5–6, I control for an interpersonal task intensity measure due to Sevinc
(2018); the reason is that, this being a migrant-based study, I aim to avoid pick-
ing up cultural differences or some version of interpersonal discrimination that
could have a detrimental impact on worker performance. I also try controlling
for earnings, which is somewhat problematic as there is clear reverse causality —
remuneration is lower in more routinized occupations. The relationship between
non-routine occupations and autonomy does remain also conditional on earnings.
25This differs from Campante and Chor in that I exclude the measure of non-routine cognitive
interpersonal task intensity. Including it has a negligible impact on the results.
26I also include year and city fixed effects in the regression. The statistical significance of
autonomy is virtually identical with the raw measure of non-routine task intensity rather than
percentile. The percentile-version of the dependent variable makes the quantitative interpreta-
tion more straight-forward.
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Table 2.7: Non-Routinized Occupations and Autonomy
First Generation Second Generation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Autonomy 7.259*** 7.838*** 6.460*** 2.695*** 4.876*** 4.017***
(1.332) (1.123) (1.019) (0.607) (0.871) (0.811)
Years of Education 3.467*** 3.343*** 2.995*** 3.831*** 3.689*** 3.344***
(0.292) (0.281) (0.283) (0.00752) (0.0136) (0.00331)
Experience 0.513*** 0.679*** 0.135*** 0.527*** 0.693*** 0.163***
(0.0195) (0.0213) (0.0265) (0.0132) (0.0182) (0.0143)
Experience -0.00349*** -0.00613*** 0.00148*** -0.00323*** -0.00594*** 0.00147***
Squared (0.000369) (0.000265) (0.000211) (0.000194) (0.000263) (0.000226)
Foreign -10.34*** -9.919*** -8.190*** -0.873** -0.627*** -0.400***
(Parent) (0.914) (0.833) (0.780) (0.319) (0.0926) (0.0944)
Interpersonal 13.657*** 14.044*** 13.823*** 14.171***
Task Intensity (0.165) (0.135) (0.0711) (0.0643)
Log Income 7.066*** 6.730***
(0.277) (0.0573)
N 11145730 10936204 10817132 10145467 9946952 9840809
Adj. R-sq 0.147 0.283 0.307 0.145 0.287 0.309
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.2.2 Robustness Variations
This subsection outlines general robustness variations of how I obtain human-
capital estimates, e.g. variation of data choices. The majority of the concrete
results are located in appendix 2.B.1.
Production Function Variations
I explore variations in both the labor aggregator, how to account for differences
in TFP and factor shares, and the high-level structure. I begin with two al-
terations in the labor aggregator. The first alteration is to not assume perfect
substitutability across groups of origins but estimate the elasticity of substitution
parameter ρ in Equation 1.1; the second is to relax the implicit assumption that
different levels of education are perfect substitutes and calculate the relative la-
bor productivity level with an added educational layer in the CES aggregator, as
outlined by Equation 1.2. The relationship between cultural values and produc-
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tivity with these specification changes is very similar; see tables 2.20 and 2.14 for,
respectively, the first and both of these alterations in how the dependent variable
is calculated.
The departure from the assumption of perfect substitutability across labor types
leads to the the problem, pointed out by Diamond, McFadden, and Rodriguez
(1978), that the elasticity of substitution may be upward-biased by technical
change. The only way to solve this is to take a stance on the form of the technical
growth. The simplest way for me to address the issue is to estimate human
capital using data for only one year and assume that there is no technical growth
— indeed, there is then no time-variation. Results, presented in Table 2.23, are
robust.
Investigating returns to scale and factor shares has been one frequent purpose of
estimating production functions. It is not my aim. That enables me to carry out
robustness exercises otherwise not possible. In a first, I simply keep them fixed
at 2/3 for labor and 1/3 for capital, which maps into the aggregate production
function I will make use of later.27 Table 2.19 shows the analogous results —
they are quantitatively stronger for the top cultural factor.
Imposing the same production structure for the entire economy is a potentially
restrictive assumption. I relax this in two alternative ways. The first alternative
is to set factor elasticities based on average labor costs at the three-digit industry
level; in the second, I estimate elasticities at the two-digit level and allow the
parameters in the approximation of the inverted investment function (following
OP) to vary at the same level. Tables 2.17 and 2.18 presents the respective
results.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas (or first-order loglinear approximation) production
function, like I do above, is very common in the literature on estimating produc-
tion functions. In appendix 2.21, I present results analogous to those in Table 2.4,
27For C-B production to aggregate I need constant returns to scale.
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but where I have estimated country-specific productivity with translog produc-
tion function (or a second order loglinear approximation). A translog production
function relaxes the unitary elasticity of substitution and admits a more flexible
relationship between labor and capital.28 The qualitative pattern in Table 2.21
is the same as in Table 2.4 with the top cultural factor significantly related to
human capital, statistically and economically. Also for individual questions un-
derlying the cultural factors, the relationship remains similar. Autonomy and,
to a lesser extent, trust appear to be the key underlying cultural values that
drive the relationship. The same three statistical arguments I put forth for this
conclusion in Section 1.3.1 holds virtually identically when labor productivity is
calculated based on the specification here. Table 2.34 and 2.24 presents results
analogous to those of tables 2.33 and 2.6. Column 10 of Table 2.24, which includes
the autonomy index and question E018 on support for an authoritative society,
is the specification that results from the GETS approach. Again, the conclusion
that autonomous vs. authoritative values are the main underlying driver receives
support.
Variations of Data Choices
The labor literature has found that the age at migration as well as the time
elapsed since migration are important factors for labor market success. If these
variables are correlated to the cultural values, that, rather than the cultural
channel proposed here, could explain the relationship between cultural values
and human capital. Above, I have included the average characteristics at the
country-level. I have also carried out three different robustness exercises at the
micro-level when estimating human capital in the first place. Two of them are to
simply exclude, either migrants arriving in Sweden at the age of 17 or younger,
or migrants who have acquired 50 percent or more of their schooling in Sweden.
28The main advantage with the Cobb-Douglas production function is that it is straightfor-
ward to use the Cobb-Douglas productivity estimates for the augmented development account-
ing exercise in Section 2.3 since it is the same theoretical framework as in “classical” development
accounting. It is also less demanding of the data, with fewer parameters to estimate.
57
Tables 2.28 and 2.29 presents the results. The results are quantitatively stronger,
as one would expect in the case where both time and age of migration are not
strongly correlated to cultural values, and there is some convergence for young
migrants with respect to culture and schooling quality.
On the cross-country level, to ease worries that results are mainly driven by
the nordic countries, I have exclude nordic countries; Table 2.30 presents results
showing that is not the case.
I also try total assets as a measure of capital rather than fixed assets. The baseline
is following the standard in the production function estimation literature, but it is
a standard grounded in studying fixed-asset heavy manufacturing. From a finance
perspective, one could argue that firms by construction need the all their assets
— if they did not, then the assets that were not needed should be distributed to
shareholders (ignoring e.g. debt held for tax purposes). By this logic, total assets
is a more accurate measure of capital. Neither of the two measures are perfect.
For the purpose of this paper, it is nevertheless reassuring to see that results in
Table 2.31 are robust to using a measure that is likely an upper bound of capital
rather than the standard measure in the literature which is likely towards the
lower end of actual assets needed to carry out the firm’s activities.
Additional Cross-Country Controls
It is easy to think of a long list of characteristics of a given country that affect
labor productivity in that country. The advantage of studying labor productivity
through migrants is precisely that the act of migration physically separates the
migrant worker from geographic, institutional, and technological factors in their
respective origin country. They all work in one and the same labor market, shar-
ing the same institutional setting, why institutional and geographic differences
between countries are no longer candidates to explain differences in labor pro-
ductivity. Instead, any such candidate must be related to the human capital that
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a migrant brings with him. Looking at country characteristics that that do not
have a direct logical connection to transportable human capital is betraying the
purpose of studying migrants.29 Nevertheless, when presenting this paper, there
has been persistent demand to look at other country characteristics more broadly
that the empirical growth literature has emphasized. To do so in a systematic
fashion, I try all the variables that Sala-i-Martin (1997) studied. I show these re-
sults in appendix 2.B.1. I also try a number of variations of the measures included
in the baseline tables. The top cultural factor remains robust throughout.
2.2.3 Selection
There are issues of potential differential selection in almost every study of mi-
grants. This study is no exception. There is clear differential selection, but se-
lection that attenuates the relationship I find between productivity and cultural
values.
Which individuals that decide to leave their home country is generally not ran-
dom. Empirically, migrants to rich countries are predominately positively se-
lected.30 What matters for the results in this paper is not the average selection
of migrants to Sweden vs. natives, but the differential selection across source
countries. If it were the case that individuals from countries with a low TR-value
(where TR abbreviates the name given the top cultural factor by its original au-
thors) were negatively (or less positively) selected relative to high TR countries,
then that could cause a spurious relationship between low TR origins and low
29Some aspects of institutional quality may impact different dimensions of human or social
capital, including cultural values. For example, growing up in a corrupt society likely affects
an individual’s level of trust or trustworthiness. However, it appears a roundabout way to then
study the relationship between a given institutional factor and labor productivity rather than
directly study the human or social capital related characteristic that the particular institutional
factor may impact. Furthermore, cultural values likely play a role in shaping institutions, see
e.g. Alesina and Giuliano (2015). Again, it is precisely to get out of this complicated causal
nexus that I study migrants rather than workers in their respective origin country.
30The canonical Roy model would predict negative selection from poorer countries as Swe-
den’s income distribution is relatively compressed. See e.g. Grogger and Hanson (2011) for
an empirical documentation of positive selection from poorer to richer countries, as well as a
modification of the Roy model that predicts positive selection.
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estimated productivity.31 I do not actually observe individuals’ place in their
respective country of origin human-capital distribution. What I can do is to
compare how migrants in my sample fare on observables related to productivity
relative to their respective source-country average. Figure 2.2 plots, for a given
country, the ratio of the educational attainment of migrants in my sample to the
average educational attainment in that source country, against the top cultural
factor. Migrants from low-TR countries are better educated relative to their
source-country average, compared to the education level of migrants from high-
TR countries relative to their source country. That indicates a stronger positive
selection from low-TR countries on education. As I control for education, the
relevant selection would in fact be individuals’ human capital conditional on ed-
ucation. However, the selection mechanism that would imply significant negative
selection on observable human-capital related characteristics but significant posi-
tive selection on unobservable human capital appears highly contrived. Hendricks
and Schoellman (2018) provides a concrete piece of evidence that selection on ob-
servable and unobservable productivity factors are positively correlated. They
also find that the extent of positive selection is negatively related to average
income in the origin country, which is in line with what I find in Sweden.32
31The name given is Traditional vs. Secular-Rational values.
32Hendricks and Schoellman have data on both pre and post migration wages, as well as
data on education, for immigrants in the United States. It is this data, and the assumption
that wages reflect productive capacity, that enables them to say something informed on the
question of selection on unobservables.
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Figure 2.2: Cultural Values and Educational Attainment of Migrants Relative to
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Top Cultural Factor
Notes: Data on average years of education is from Barro and Lee (2013). Data on years of
education of migrants is calculated based on micro level data from SCB.
The y-axis represents the average educational attainment of employed migrants in Sweden from
a given country relative to the average educational attainment in that source country. A value
above 1 indicates a higher educational attainment for migrants from that country, than for
a randomly chosen person in that source country. The graph plots these relative educational
attainments against TR values across countries.
A second point of similar potential differential selection is that immigrants can
re-migrate; who decides to stay in the country is unlikely to be random. Gener-
ally, I find that those who re-migrate are doing worse in the labor market than
those who remain.33 If re-migrants from low-TR countries are less (more) neg-
atively selected relative to re-migrants form high-TR countries, then this would
downward (upward) bias the productivity estimates for low-TR countries, and
upward (downward) bias the relationship between TR-values and productivity.
Figure 2.4 plots the earnings of “leavers” relative to “remainers” for the respective
source countries against the TR values. It shows that the differential selection is
relatively more negative for emigrants from low TR countries, suggesting that, if
33This finding mirrors Lubotsky’s (2007) result for (re-)migrants in the United States.
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anything, the bias from re-migration is towards underestimating the relationship
between culture and productivity.
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Notes: The graph shows a country of origin specific emigrant fixed effect from a Mincerian
regression of earnings that includes also education, and third-degree polynomials in experience
and time since arrival in Sweden. It plots the fixed effect against the TR values across countries.
Thirdly, there is selection into employment. As my human-capital estimates are
based solely on employed individuals, selection into employment affects those es-
timates. Employment rates are lower for low TR countries. Assuming selection
into employment is positive, which any reasonable selection mechanism would
predict, then selection is more strongly positive for low TR countries. This is a
third source of selection that plausibly attenuates the positive relationship be-
tween estimated productivity and TR values.
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Notes: The graph shows the employment rates across birth countries plotted against the top
cultural factor, TR.
In summary, there is differential selection of who immigrates, remains in the coun-
try, and finds employment, but it appears to overwhelmingly be in the direction
of dampening the relationship between TR values and productivity relative to
the “true” relationship absent of selection.
2.2.4 Occupational Discrimination
The baseline approach is immune to wage discrimination. However, being paid
less for the same position is only one type of discrimination. It may be that
positions are allocated in a discriminatory way, with high-productivity positions
more difficult to obtain for certain groups of workers. Analogous to Becker’s
model of taste-based discrimination, employers could be prepared to take a cut
in value added-generating capacity to avoid granting workers from the groups
they are averse to high-productivity positions. Then, for a given position, those
63
suffering from discrimination would need to be superior in productive capacity
to acquire that position — it is a story of discrimination that implies differential
selection, conditional on occupation.34, 35
It could be the case that the relationship I detect between cultural values and
human capital is driven by occupational discrimination e.g. related to ethnicity.
I conduct two separate robustness experiments to address this concern. Both
are in the spirit of holding occupation constant and see if there are any signs
of a reversal in estimated productivity. The first alteration is straightforward; I
include occupational fixed-effects at the 4-digit level when labor input efficiency
units are estimated based on predicted wages. The second alternative is to add
an occupational layer in the labor aggregator, so that the labor input of firm











σ where o ∈ {Manager, High-Skilled, Low-Skilled, Unskilled}
(2.1)
Analogous to the discussion concerning how to account for differences in edu-
cation, the advantage of the first is that it holds occupation constant at a very
detailed level; the advantage of the second is that it relaxes the assumption of
perfect substitutability across occupations.
I present results, with human capital estimated following the two respective al-
terations outlined above, in Table 2.8 and 2.9. The results are similar to the
baseline results, albeit slightly quantitatively weaker. Note that solely a weaker
relationship between cultural values and estimated productivity is not a prob-
34It need not be taste-based discrimination. A model where search is costly, and it is more
costly to extract accurate information on workers from certain groups would have the same
prediction — that workers from those groups would need to be on average “better” (from a
value-added generating perspective) to acquire a given position.
35The logic does assume that the value-added generation associated with a given position is
not completely unrelated to the human capital of the worker filling that position — a view of
the labor market where differences in output between workers are purely driven by differences
in rents tied to the position the worker holds would invalidates not just the argument made
here, but the entire paper.
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lem.36 If the baseline results were explained by occupational discrimination, that
would imply a reversal via differential selection — that the workers suffering from
discrimination had a higher estimated productivity, conditional on occupation,
implying a negative coefficient on the top cultural factor. There is no indication
of that; the relationship remains statistically and economically significant, far
from a reversal. Even if the alterations to control for occupation are not perfect,
the results here strongly suggest that the relationship between cultural values and
human capital is not spuriously driven by occupational discrimination. They do
suggest that a fraction of estimated human-capital differences are explained by
occupational sorting, but not of the discriminatory kind.
2.2.5 Human Capital Determinants in the Second Genera-
tion
Studying the second generation of migrants serves several purposes. It is the
cleanest test of separating cultural values from educational quality and health.
The second generation has grown up in the same country, been through the same
schooling system, and had access to the same healthcare, but differ in inherited
cultural values.37 For the same reason, transferability of skills is also not an issue
for the second generation.38
My baseline results estimate Equation 1.1 with country-specific labor types. Un-
36Not even a zero-relationship between cultural values and estimated human capital once
occupation is held constant would be a problem; it would indicate that the baseline results were
driven by occupational sorting. To the extent that the occupational sorting is not done in a
discriminatory way, I would want to include that sorting. The real problem is if that sorting
takes place in a discriminatory fashion. There is no indication of that here.
37As argued by, among others, Bisin and Verdier (2001), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2008), Tabellini (2008), Algan and Cahuc (2010), Dohmen et al. (2012), and Ek (2017),
people’s beliefs and values are determined partly by their contemporaneous environment, and
partly by beliefs and values inherited from previous generations.
38It is sometimes claimed that selection is also not an issue for the second generation. It is
likely mitigated by moving a generation away from the actual migration selection. However,
that it would no longer be an issue at all appears too strong of a claim. Consider the evidence on
the inheritability of many characteristics, cognitive or non-cognitive, (and regardless of whether
it takes place via nature or nurture) paired with how the second generation of migrants in the
United States has typically outperformed natives, and it seems questionable that there is no
selection at all.
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Table 2.8: Country Characteristics and Human Capital Estimated Incl. Occupa-
tion Fixed Effects at 3-digit Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Educ. 0.187∗∗∗ 0.0479 0.0720
Quality (0.0641) (0.0706) (0.0713)
Life Expectancy -0.00523 -0.0119 -0.00680
at Birth (0.00685) (0.00847) (0.00779)
Fertility Rate 0.00172 0.00222 0.00238
(0.00690) (0.00869) (0.00823)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.101∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0213) (0.0404) (0.0385)
Inglehart et al.’s -0.000574 0.0188 0.0279
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0194) (0.0283) (0.0338)
Log GDP per Worker -0.0532
(0.0719)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.239 0.279 0.282
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1 by nonlinear least squares, but where labor efficiency
units are calculated based on predicted wages that includes occupation fixed effects at the 3-
digit level. Independent variables included are those with the strongest predictive power from
each respective categories of health and fertility, education, and cultural values. The Cultural
Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from running a factor analysis on a set of questions in
the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they
label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on
health and fertility measures are from the World Bank Development Indicators. Educational
quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
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Table 2.9: Country Characteristics and Human Capital Estimated with Occupa-
tional Layer in CES Aggregator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Educ. Quality 0.140∗∗ 0.00797 0.0346
(0.0679) (0.0672) (0.0643)
Life Expectancy -0.00363 -0.0106 -0.00492
at Birth (0.00645) (0.00753) (0.00714)
Fertility Rate -0.000846 -0.00114 -0.000957
(0.00676) (0.00842) (0.00803)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0807∗∗∗ 0.0941∗∗ 0.0893∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0241) (0.0421) (0.0402)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.00211 0.0227 0.0328
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0186) (0.0249) (0.0305)
Log GDP per Worker -0.0588
(0.0624)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.240 0.253 0.262
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1 by nonlinear least squares, but with an occupational layer
added in the labor aggregator, allowing for imperfect substitution across types. Independent
variables included are those with the strongest predictive power from each respective categories
of health and fertility, education, and cultural values. The Cultural Factor 1 and 2 are the two
top factors from running a factor analysis on a set of questions in the WVS, following Inglehart,
Welzel, and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they label the factors Traditional
vs. Secular-Rational and Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on health and fertility measures
are from the World Bank Development Indicators. Educational quality is from Hanushek and
Woessman (2012).
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Figure 2.5: Estimated Labor Productivity of Workers Binned by TR-Values
(a) Estimated productivity of foreign-born
workers.
(b) Estimated productivity of native-born
workers.
Notes: The bars show the estimated relative productivity of groups of workers; the error bars
represent the 90 percent confidence interval of the estimated productivity. In (a), workers are
binned based on the TR-value of their country of birth. In (b), they are instead binned based
on the average TR-value of their parents’ countries of birth. “Natives” are native born with
both parents native born — this is the reference group.
fortunately, the number of second generation migrants is not large enough to
produce country-specific estimates.39 Therefore, to estimate differences between
groups of second-generation migrants, I split (second generation) migrants into
groups based on the TR-value associated with their (parental) country of birth.
Figure 2.5 presents the result of this exercise. For both native and foreign born,
the productivity is increasing in the TR measure of cultural values. This persis-
tence of estimated productivity differences into the second generation provides
additional evidence that a cultural channel really plays a role in driving produc-
tivity differences.
Human Capital Via Wages
While issues like transferability of skills and imperfectly measured quantity or
quality of education can arguably be ruled out as issues for the estimates based
on the second generation, there may be other non-cultural candidate explana-
tions. Socioeconomic status is one; ethnically related discrimination is another
(although the latter conflicts with the results above thad condition on occupa-
39For most countries, the standard errors are at least an order of magnitude larger than
point estimates.
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tion). Parental country of birth is related to ethnicity and correlated to socioe-
conomic status. To control for parental characteristics at a more detailed level I
move to study human capital differences via wages. An individual-level outcome
variable enables me to include individual characteristics at a level of detail that
would render the number of distinct labor types unmanageable for production
function estimation.
Appendix 2.A.1 shows that wages in my data do reflect differences in estimated
productivity well, at least at the group level.40 The precise quantitative rela-
tionship between estimated productivity and wages differ slightly across specifi-
cations, but the data always rejects a zero relationship and can never reject that
average marginal productivity move one-for-one with average wages.41 With the
result that earnings differentials reflect productivity differences for male workers
quite well as motivation, I look at individual worker earnings as the outcome
instead of firm-level value added. This enables me to control for individual char-
acteristics of workers in a much more detailed way, and without binning origin
countries. I run Mincerian regressions on the form of Equation 2.2.
ln(wi,c) = α + ρPi + ψDi + βXi + γCc + εi,c. (2.2)
Here, P includes the parental characteristics of education, income, and age at
which the income was earned, D includes dummies for city and a dummy for
having at least one foreign-born parent, X includes individual characteristics of
education, age, and a mandatory ability test administered by the military. The
key variables of interest are the group-level characteristics associated with the
parental countries of birth, here captured by C.
I present the results of these regressions in Table 2.10. The key takeaway is
40This result, that wages reflect productivity across groups, is merely a tool for the purpose
of this paper. Nevertheless, it is far from something that can be taken for granted, or projected
onto other settings; although not central here, it is a finding that deserves a paper of its own.
41This finding is for male first and second generation migrants; there are some indications
of discrimination towards foreign-born females.
69
that the top cultural factor (TR) remains strongly positively related to earn-
ings as I successively add controls for parental wages and education, individual
education, and the ability test score, suggesting that inherited cultural values
matter for productivity over and above any relationship they may have with
parental income and education, and individual education and ability. The results
corroborate the cultural interpretation of previous results; they are inconsistent
with socioeconomic stories of explaining lower estimated productivity of certain
second-generation migrants with low parental earnings and education.42 Another
story related to ethnicity is the controversial proposition that there are inher-
ited IQ differences related to ethnicity; see e.g. Rushton and Jensen (2005) for
a survey. The positive relationship between the top cultural factor and earnings
persists when I control for ability — if this relationship was actually driven by
ethnical differences in inherited ability, it should not remain.43
2.2.6 External Relevance
The main results of this paper are based on outcomes in Sweden. While it is a clear
advantage of the paper to hold labor market institutions, technology, and the like
constant when studying human capital differences, there is also a potential down
side — it could be the case that while certain cultural traits are detrimental for
productivity in the Swedish labor market, that need not necessarily be the case
elsewhere. Here, I follow two separate routes to address this concern. The first
42Table 2.10 also partly alleviates concerns about certain kinds of discrimination, under the
following added assumption: the positive coefficient on parental earnings reflect inherited pro-
ductive capacity and not solely an advantage of a materially richer upbringing — this should be
less controversial in a welfare state with free education than in e.g. the United Stats. Under this
assumption, if there is positional discrimination related to ethnicity, presumably, individuals’
parents would suffer at least as much from this discrimination as their children. Then, parental
earnings should reflect this discrimination, and since individual wages are positively related to
parental wages, the suppressed parental wages should partly account for the lower individual
earnings.
43The ability score is a military test score. The test is mandatory for all Sweden-born males.
As an example of how military test scores in a similar setting does change results drastically,
in Fryer (2011), the racial wage gap in the United States largely vanishes when a test score is
added as a control: the black male gap goes from −39% to −11%; black women, and hispanic
men and women respectively move from −13, −15, and −6 percent to a wage premium of 13,
4, and 16 percent relative to their white counterparts.
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Table 2.10: Regression of Individual Log Wages on Parental Characteristics, and
Characteristics of Parental Country of Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage Father 0.0607∗∗∗ 0.0550∗∗∗ 0.0572∗∗∗ 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.0482∗∗∗
(64.16) (88.03) (73.47) (56.86) (49.56)
Wage Mother 0.0452∗∗∗ 0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0417∗∗∗ 0.0375∗∗∗
(62.05) (61.61) (57.63) (42.12)
Education, Father -0.00703∗∗∗ -0.0201∗∗∗ -0.0199∗∗∗
(-11.31) (-46.85) (-44.69)
Education, Mother 0.000782 -0.0111∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗
(1.64) (-15.45) (-13.65)




Foreign Parent -0.0869∗∗∗ -0.0731∗∗∗ -0.0684∗∗∗ -0.0681∗∗∗ -0.0553∗∗∗ -0.0608∗∗∗
(-4.90) (-7.46) (-7.00) (-6.97) (-5.97) (-4.94)
TR 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0962∗∗∗ 0.0818∗∗∗ 0.0789∗∗∗ 0.0824∗∗∗ 0.0668∗∗
(5.79) (5.13) (4.25) (4.14) (4.75) (2.81)
SS -0.00224 -0.0202 -0.0167 -0.0144 -0.00753 -0.0153
(-0.15) (-1.81) (-1.38) (-1.19) (-0.64) (-1.08)
Educational Quality 0.0843 0.0866∗ 0.0917 0.0927 0.0737 0.0675
(1.76) (2.04) (1.92) (1.95) (1.65) (1.44)
GDP/Cap, Educational
Controls Throughout
N 717965 645155 604071 604071 604129 419938
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Source: Author’s calculations based on Swedish register data and data from the World Bank,
the WVS, and Hanushek and Woessman (2009).
Notes: The Dependent variable is average individual log gross earnings averaged over four years.
The first seven rows are based on individual level register data. The following three rows are
characteristics associated with the individual’s parents countries of birth; I use the average
value of the two birth countries. Standard errors are clustered at the parental country of birth
level (using mother’s, father’s, or unique combination of countries of birth does not matter for
the statistical significance of TR).
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one addresses the very general phrasing of this issue, that what is a productive
characteristic in Sweden may not be so elsewhere, without considering why that is.
I simply estimate country-of-origin specific labor productivity in other countries.
The second approach relates more specifically to being a migrant in Sweden and
again uses the same data as the baseline estimates do. There, I control for
within-firm cultural dispersion and split the sample into workers in occupations
with, respectively, high and low levels of customer-facing intensity. The latter
approach also constitutes a further robustness check against large-scale societal-
level discrimination.
Non-Swedish Evidence
Ideally, the paper could replicate the same exercise outside of Sweden. Unfortu-
nately I do not have access to the same kind of data in other countries. Instead,
I am forced to rely on the assumption of competitive labor markets and use
wages or labor income as a proxy for productive capacity. I study the relation-
ship between inherited cultural values and productivity by estimating Mincerian
regressions as specified by Equation 2.3. Subscripts h and o indicate the respec-
tive host and origin country of the individual worker. Both equations include
host-country specific intercepts and returns to education. The parameters of in-
terest are the country-of-origin specific intercepts in Equation 2.3 captured by
the δ-parameters.
ln(wh,o,i) = αh + βhEdh,o,i +
∑
o
1(oi 6= hi, oi = o)δo + γXh,o,i + εh,o,i. (2.3)
Under the assumption of competitive labor markets, so that the marginal product
of labor equals the wage rate, the δ parameters in Equation 2.6 estimates a
country-of-origin specific labor productivity (or human capital) that is equivalent
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to the δ-parameters in Equation 1.1 above.44 In a “second stage” I then relate the
estimated human capital to country of origin characteristics, analogous to those
above using human-capital measures based on production function estimation.
Since the paper’s main result on determinants of human capital pertains to cul-
tural values, it is of particular interest to investigate the same relationship in
countries that are culturally distinct from Sweden. I make use of three sepa-
rate publicly available data sources that contain such countries (as measured by
the top cultural factor). The first one of these sources is IPUMS International.
It contains data for a long list of countries. For my purposes, I crucially need
information on labor income and country of birth for individual workers. This re-
duces the sample substantially. I estimate Equation 2.3 using one narrow sample
of countries that include information on both labor earnings and hours worked,
so that I can calculate the wage rate. To be able to extend the sample, I also
estimate the same equation relying on total income of an individual as a proxy
for wages.45
Table 2.11 presents the results of regressing the country-of-origin specific relative
wage (the δ-parameters from Equation 2.3) on country-of-origin characteristics.
The results in Column 1 and 2 are based on the restricted sample where data
exists for both labor earnings and hours worked, while in Column 3 and 4, the
dependent variable is total labor income rather than hourly wages. The restricted
sample includes data from Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela;
the wider sample also contains the Dominican Republic, Panama, South Africa,
and Trinidad and Tobago.46 All of these countries have TR-values below the
global average and are hence characterized by significantly more “traditional”
44The equivalence of δc in 1.1 and δo in 2.6 also requires the additional assumption that labor
types in 1.1 are perfect substitutes (which I maintain in the baseline specification). If not, the
relative marginal product of labor in 1.1 is δg
(Lg
Lh
)(ρ−1) — with the empirical estimates of the
substitutability close to perfect across types of labor (ρ in the range of 0.91–0.99), δg ≈ δo holds
also without the strict assumption.
45Hours worked are not significantly correlated to the origin country characteristics that I
study (when data on hours worked exists) why, for my purposes, this approximation appears
reasonable.
46Note that these are the host countries; the number of observations in Table 2.11 refers to
the number of origin countries.
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values than Sweden.47 As is clear from Table 2.11, workers with an origin charac-
terized by more “secular-rational” or autonomous values (a higher TR-value) have
a higher estimated labor productivity (as proxied by their wage) than workers
with a culturally more “traditional” background — if anything, the quantitative
relationship in these host countries, culturally distinct from Sweden, is stronger
than the corresponding relationship in Sweden.
Table 2.11: Country Characteristics and Human Capital Via Wages Using IPUMS
International Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.231∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0647) (0.101) (0.0584) (0.0872)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.111 0.101 0.151 0.0216
Cultural Factor 2 (0.130) (0.130) (0.117) (0.135)
H-W Ed. Quality -0.820∗∗ -0.328
(0.318) (0.298)
Fertility Rate -0.113 0.126
(0.199) (0.218)
Life Expectancy 0.0621∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0212)
Observations 50 49 57 56
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.600 0.274 0.485
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variables throughout are the δ-parameters from estimating equation 2.6,
in column 1 and 2 with hourly wages and in column 3 and 4 with total income. Micro data is
from IPUMS International. The Cultural Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from running
a factor analysis on a set of questions in the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker.
See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational
and Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on health and fertility measures are from the World
Bank Development Indicators. Educational quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
Observations are weighted by the number of individuals they are based on.
The sample using IPUMS International data is dominated by South and Central
47Pureto Rico, Panama, Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago are not included in
the WVS why the statement is not strictly speaking true. However, geographical clustering in
cultural values, as well as “popular beliefs” (loosely speaking), would be that these countries
are culturally distinct from Sweden. Canada, on the other hand, would by many accounts be
culturally similar to Sweden, although, as measured by TR values, it is not. Crucially, none
of the results presented here are sensitive to the exclusion of some or all of these countries. In
terms of number of observations, the sample is dominated by Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and
Venezuela.
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America (with the exception of South Africa). I also make use of data from the
European Social Survey (ESS), including data from 31 European countries, and
U.S Census data. Appendix 2.B.2 presents those results — again, they are in line
with the cultural interpretation proposed in the main text of this paper.48 There
are no indications that the estimated relationship between labor productivity and
cultural values at the origin varies systematically with the cultural values of the
host country. If anything, when studying host countries culturally distinct from
Sweden, the quantitative relationship is stronger than the baseline results.
Accounting for Cultural Differences
The paper has proposed the interpretation of the results that it is the level of
certain cultural values that explains differences in estimated human capital. An
alternative interpretation is that it is not about the level of cultural values, but
how those cultural values differ from those of the majority population’s. This is a
particular concern because Sweden is an outlier in terms of the cultural factors —
I cannot simply control for both the level and the difference as they are virtually
perfectly collinear. The results above from culturally distinct countries is one
way of addressing the concern; it is reassuring for the level-interpretation to find
similar results elsewhere. In this section, I instead try and tackle this at the
micro-level in the Swedish data.
Since I estimate human-capital differences across countries through migrants,
those estimates are in principle both a function of the direct level of all of the
skills, knowledge, health, attitudes, values, etc. that any one migrant brings, and
of how those skills and values interact with the host society. That interaction
takes place both within the firm, and with broader society, mainly via customers
48Quantitatively, the U.S. results are roughly in line with those in Sweden. The ESS results
are quantitatively a bit weaker, but there are some important downsides to the ESS data. It
is survey data with very small sample sizes for some origin countries, and the only included
income measure is total family income. Crucially though, for the issue of Sweden being a
cultural outlier, is that results in the ESS data if anything becomes somewhat stronger when I
restrict the sample to countries that are the least similar to Sweden (as measured by the top
cultural factor).
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of the firm. I try and isolate the human capital related to the level of cultural
values by altering the baseline production function estimation in two ways to
address the two respective types of interactions.
Firstly, I control for the cultural dispersion within the firm when I estimate
human capital. Each employee of a firm is attributed the cultural factor 1 and
2 associated with the employee’s country of birth. The measure of dispersion
in cultural factor X is the standard deviation of that measure within the firm.
I also try the mean absolute deviation of the corresponding measures, as well
as a Herfindahl-Hirschman-index in countries of birth within the firm with only
negligible differences to the results I present here.
Secondly, I split the sample of workers based on the degree of customer-facing
intensity of an individual worker’s occupation. I follow Sevinc (2018) who develop
a measure of interpersonal task intensity (ITI) focused specifically on customer
interactions. I split workers into two groups by the median ITI-value so that a
worker type is defined by both country of birth and degree of customer-facing
job.
The first reassuring result for the interpretation that it is the level of cultural
values driving the lion’s share of estimated differences in human capital, rather
than the cultural distance to Sweden, is presented in Table 2.12. There, the
dependent variable is the country-specific human capital for non customer-facing
workers, estimated in a production function that controls for the within-firm
cultural dispersion. The second, indirect result, not shown here, is that the
relationship between human capital and cultural factor 1 is similar for more
customer-facing workers — the difference is statistically insignificant (see Table
2.38 in the appendix).49
Overall, considering both the results here in Table 2.12, and the evidence from
49There is a slight difference between the two measures. Since the task-based measure
of customer-facing intensity is correlated to other task-based measures such as non-routine
cognitivie analytical, it is unclear whether this difference is driven by differences in the degree
of customer-facingness or other occupational differences.
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Table 2.12: Country Characteristics and Human Capital for Workers with a Low
Level of Customer Facing Intensity Estimated Controlling for Within-Firm Cul-
tural Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Educ. Quality 0.156 -0.0370 0.00943
(0.122) (0.116) (0.136)
Life Expect. at Birth 0.00804 -0.00240 0.00625
(0.00931) (0.0111) (0.0155)
Fertility Rate 0.00225 0.000215 0.000590
(0.00893) (0.0109) (0.0112)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.112∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.123∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0396) (0.0579) (0.0563)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0329 0.0416 0.0650
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0322) (0.0435) (0.0424)
Log GDP per Worker -0.105
(0.0895)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.251 0.217 0.228
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating a modified version of equation 1.1 by nonlinear least squares. The
modification is to distinguish labor types by customer facing intensity as well as birth country
(results here are for a low level), and controlling for within-firm cultural dispersion. Independent
variables included are those with the strongest predictive power from each respective categories
of health and fertility, education, and cultural values. The Cultural Factor 1 and 2 are the two
top factors from running a factor analysis on a set of questions in the WVS, following Inglehart,
Welzel, and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they label the factors Traditional
vs. Secular-Rational and Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on health and fertility measures
are from the World Bank Development Indicators. Educational quality is from Hanushek and
Woessman (2012).
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other countries, the relationship between cultural values and human capital does
neither appear to be driven by cultural distances to Sweden specifically, nor by
some more general characteristic of countries culturally similar to Sweden.
2.3 TFP Differences
An important motivation to study the determinants of human capital differences
is the very large unexplained TFP variation across countries.50 In this section,
I carry out a relatively standard development accounting exercise with the mod-
ification that I adjust human-capital stocks across countries based on the main
determinant of residual human capital (net of education and experience) accord-
ing to Section 2.2 — cultural values. The purpose is to study how much of
unexplained cross-country income disparities human capital differences related to
cultural values can explain.
I follow the development accounting approach and notation of Caselli (2005).






where kc and hc are respectively the per worker physical and human capital
stock of country c. The accounting exercise essentially consists of comparing
how much output variation that a factor-only model ykh = kαh1−α can explain
of the variation across countries relative to the actual output y = Aykh. I in-






, each with their own known advantages and
50Jones (2014) argues that differences in educational attainment across countries can explain
income differences entirely, once imperfect substitutability across skill levels are taken into
account. If that were true, I (and indeed much of the growth and development literature) would
have no reason to search for alternative explanations. However, Caselli and Ciccone (2017) show
that Jones’s conclusion is driven by the extreme (and implausible) assumption that the relative
wage of skilled workers is determined solely by factors embedded in the workers, and not at all
by e.g. institutional or technological factors, giving Jones’ argument an air of circularity.
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draw-backs. A value for these respective ratios close to 1 (0) indicates that the
factor-only model explains cross-country differences in income very well (poorly).
The importance of cultural values is measured by the magnitude increase in the
respective ratios, relative to the baseline, when human capital is augmented by
the cultural component of labor productivity. My aim here is not to argue that
technology, institutions, and other factors captured by TFP are unimportant,
but rather that culture is important. Therefore, I am more concerned with the
improvement of the factor-only model, relative to the baseline, than achieving a
ratio close to 1.
In the baseline approach, human capital is a function of average years of schooling,
hc = e
φ(sc), where φ(sc) is a piecewise linear function following average returns to
schooling at different levels of average schooling across countries.51 I additionally
adjust the human capital stock based on the cultural component of estimated













so that the estimated country-specific labor productivity multiplies the (educa-
tion and experience-adjusted) labor input from country c in an Cobb-Douglas
production function. Following that model, I adjust human capital stocks by
simply multiplying them with (the cultural component of) their corresponding
estimated labor productivity. The country-specific estimates of labor productiv-
ity likely capture other factors related to country of origin, as well as noise, not
just culture. To get the cultural component (after controlling for differences in
educational quality and health), I use the predicted value of labor productivity
δˆc based on the point estimates presented in Table 2.12, Column 3.52 The rea-
51Following Hall and Jones (1999), φ(s) = 0.134s if s ≤ 4, φ(s) = 0.1344 + 0.101(s − 4) if
4 < s ≤ 8, and φ(s) = 0.1344 + 0.1014 + 0.068(s− 8) if 8 < s.
52Instead using the point estimates presented in Table 2.12, Column 2, makes only a negli-
gible difference.
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son I use the estimates from Table 2.12 in Section 2.2.6 rather than the baseline
estimates in Table 2.4 is the focus on cultural values combined with the move to
the cross-country level — I want differences in human capital driven by the level
of cultural values rather than e.g. the within-firm cultural distances. Therefore,
in the culture-augmented version, I adjust the human capital stock according to
h˜c = δˆchc.53
The development accounting exercise then consists of comparing the baseline
version, where ykhc = kαc h1−αc , to the culture-augmented version, where ykhc =
kαc h˜
1−α
c . Table 2.13 presents the results of this for years 1995 and 2005. I con-
sciously do not use the most recent data — since my estimates of human capital
are based on migrants in Sweden around 2010, they reflect country-of-origin char-
acteristics when these workers grew up, at the very least 20 years prior to the time
in which I estimate human capital.54 Adjusting the human capital stock based
on the culturally related component of estimated labor productivity decreases
the unexplained variation in income differences as measured by the variance ratio
(the 90th-to-10th percentile ratio) by 16 (15) percentage points in 1995, and 16
(11) percentage points in 2005.
Since the adjustment here is only for the direct impact of cultural values on human
capital, it neglects the potential role of culture for technological or institutional
differences, or differences in factor accumulation; this makes it a conservative
estimate for the broader question of “the impact of culture”. The improvements
in explanatory power for the augmented factor-only model is nevertheless eco-
nomically substantial and adds further credibility to the conclusion that culture
matters for productivity.
53To be clear, the hat in δˆc refers to the predicted value based on point estimates in Table
2.12, and not the fact that the original, non-culture adjusted δc is itself an estimate.
54In practice, it should make little difference, as the cross-country differences, especially in
cultural values, are very persistent.
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Table 2.13: Development Accounting with Culture-Augmented Human Capital
1995 2005





0.51 0.66 0.37 0.48
var[log(ykh)]/var[log(y)] 0.31 0.47 0.26 0.42
Number of Countries 57 57 71 71
2.4 Conclusion
The large differences in human capital over and above differences in education
and experience that recent contributions have found beg the question of what
determines those differences. The data in this paper supports cultural values
as a key determinant. “Secular-rational” values, or values related to autonomy
and trust, are the strongest and most robust predictor of human capital. The
conclusion receives support both from direct estimates of production functions
with heterogeneous labor, where the different groups of workers are defined by
the their country of origin, and Mincerian regressions, using data from countries
culturally distinct from Sweden. Key pieces of evidence relate to the second
generation of migrants — the relationship with productivity persists, so that
differences in schooling or transferability of skills cannot account for productivity
differences. Furthermore, robustness exercises demonstrate that (non-cultural)
channels related to discrimination — a first-order concern when studying migrants
— do not appear to drive the results.
The relatively well-identified relationship between the parental country of birth-
based proxy of cultural values and estimated productivity for the second genera-
tion, as well as the economically quantitatively substantial impact of culture on
productivity for both the first and second generation of migrants, provide sup-
port for the proposition that cultural factors are key to understand differences in
economic development. This has previously been articulated by e.g. David Lan-
des, although he provided mostly anecdotal evidence. A development accounting
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exercise constitute further support. The cultural component of estimated pro-
ductivity decrease unexplained cross-country differences in income by around 16
percentage points.
I consider the estimated impact of culture on cross-country differences in income
conservative. Firstly, there are several points of selection that attenuate the pro-
ductivity estimates’ relation to the cultural values. Secondly, I only estimate the
direct impact on productivity and ignore any potential indirect channel, such as
the impact of cultural values on institutions, on average educational attainments,
on technological progress, or on capital accumulation. These indirect channels
are exiting avenues for future research.
82
Appendix 2.A Human Capital Estimation
2.A.1 Human Capital Through Earnings
Here, I argue that relative wages of groups reflect their respective relative produc-
tivities well. This enables me to use wages as an outcome that approximates pro-
ductivity well.55 To make that argument, I compare estimated relative marginal
productivities of groups of workers with the corresponding relative wages. In
a perfectly competitive labor market with profit-maximizing firms, where the
(relative) marginal products of input factors equal their (relative) rental rates
(wages), productivity moves one for one with wages. However, frictional labor
markets may be far from this theoretical ideal.
The probably biggest worry when studying migrants is differential discrimination,
so that certain groups receive wages below the level that their respective produc-
tivity level motivate. If the level of (hypothetical) discrimination is correlated to
the cultural values of different types of workers (directly, or through ethnicity),
that could drive a spurious relationship between those values and wages. Figure
2.6 presents a first indication that relative wages reflect productivity quite well.
It plots relative wages against relative productivities. If wages were uninforma-
tive about productivity, the fitted values represented by the solid line would be
horizontal; if wages instead moved one for one with productivity, the fitted values
should coincide with the dashed 45-degree line. In Figure 2.6, the fitted values-
line is steeper than the 45-degree line so that productivity appear to move more
than one for one with wages — if anything, this would indicate that productivity
comparisons through wages may understate productivity differences.
55Here, I use wages interchangeably with earnings. I do not actually observe hours worked
for all workers, why part of differences in average earnings may reflect differences in work hours
rather than differences in wages. However, when I compare relative wages to relative marginal
products, differences in work hours would “show up on both sides”, why these comparisons are
not actually sensitive to differences in work hours at all (at least not when groups are perfect
substitutes). Furthermore, I do control for differences in work hours at the group level, based
on a representative sample of workers — differences in work hours across groups are very small.
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Notes: The graph plots relative productivity levels against relative wages with circles pro-
portional to the number of workers included in each respective group. The solid line is the
(weighted) linear fit — a comparison with the 45-degree dashed line is informative of whether
relative productivity moves more or less than one for one with relative wages.
Although the main second step of the argument in this section relates to earn-
ings of second generation migrants, Figure 2.6 presents the relationship between
wage and productivity levels for groups of first generation migrants. I do this
for two reasons. Firstly, the greater number of first generation migrants in my
data enables me to look at productivity at a more detailed level, with country-
specific estimates, which is closer to what I do in the wage regressions below for
the second generation. Secondly, as a test of discrimination, it should be a more
demanding test — if the first generation does not generally suffer from ethnically
related wage discrimination, it appears unlikely that the second generation would.
Nevertheless, there may be differences between the first and second generation.
Figure 2.7 show that estimated relative wages are informative of relative produc-
tivity levels also for the second generation. There, workers are binned based on
their average parental TR value. When I compare relative wages with marginal
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products across groups, productivity moves more than one for one with wages.56
Alternatively, comparing the ratios of relative productivity to relative wage across
the groups, productivity for groups with low TR values is larger relative to wages
compared to higher TR groups.57 Overall, the evidence indicates that relative
wages reflect relative productivity levels very well for both the first and second
generation of migrants — if anything, productivity comparisons through wages
could underestimate productivity differences. In a country such as Sweden, with
strong social norms in favour of equality and a relatively compressed wage struc-
ture, it is perhaps not so surprising to find that high productivity workers are
slightly underpaid from a pure productivity perspective.
56The statement is based on comparing productivity estimates with assumed perfect substi-
tutability. The same is true for estimates based on imperfect substitutability if the reference
group with the lowest TR value is included. For the second generation estimates, I prefer those
where perfect substitutability is assumed for two reasons. Firstly, it makes less sense a priori
to consider workers born in the same country, that have been through the same educational
system, imperfect substitutes, than it does for first generation migrants originating in vastly
different countries. Secondly, there are large differences in group sizes in the productivity es-
timation underlying the result presented here, stemming from four different groups of foreign
born that are significantly larger than the second generation groups. These large differences in
group size make estimated marginal products of the smallest groups (high and medium TR)
very sensitive to small changes in the elasticity of substitution estimate.
57The latter statement is not true for estimates based on imperfect substitutability across
groups, but all ratios are within one standard deviation of the productivity estimate for the high
or med-high TR group (standard errors of productivity estimates are an order of magnitude
larger than relative wage estimates), i.e. also in this case, I would not be able to reject the
hypothesis that there is no systematic relationship between the ratio of estimated relative
productivity and wages on the one hand, and TR values on the other.
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Figure 2.7: Relative Marginal Productivities vs. Relative Wages
Notes: The figure shows relative marginal productivities and relative wages for groups of second
generation migrants. Workers are binned based on the individual workers’ average parental TR
value. The rightmost group, with the lowest level of TR values, is the reference group. For each
cluster of columns, the left and middle column show respectively the point estimate of rela-
tive marginal productivity assuming perfect substitutability and estimating the substitutability
across groups of workers; the right column represent relative wages. The error bars represent 90
percent confidence intervals. Relative marginal products are calculated following the baseline
specification, netting out educational differences based on predicted wages.
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Appendix 2.B Determinants of Human Capital
2.B.1 Robustness Variations
Production Function Variations
Table 2.14: Country Characteristics and Human Capital Estimated with Imper-
fect Substitution and Education Layer in CES Aggregator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.147∗∗ -0.0148 -0.0175 0.0160
(0.0718) (0.0517) (0.0541) (0.0534)
Life Expect. at Birth 0.00909 0.00157 0.00106 -0.00182
(0.00593) (0.00495) (0.00607) (0.00526)
Fertility Rate 0.00520 0.00540 0.00536 0.00352
(0.00573) (0.00524) (0.00524) (0.00425)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0934∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.0856∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0215) (0.0296) (0.0299) (0.0244)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0268 0.0223 0.0214 0.0139
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0199) (0.0231) (0.0246) (0.0234)
Log GDP per Worker 0.00569 0.00556
(0.0434) (0.0439)
Incl. Av. Sample Characteristics No No No No Yes
Observations 62 63 62 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.225 0.439 0.431 0.421 0.565
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1, but with an educational layer added in the labor aggrega-
tor, which also allows for imperfect substitution across types. Independent variables included
are those with the strongest predictive power from each respective categories of health and
fertility, education, and cultural values. The Cultural Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors
from running a factor analysis on a set of questions in the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel,
and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-
Rational and Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on health and fertility measures are from
the World Bank Development Indicators. Education quality is from Hanushek and Woessman
(2012) and based on test score results from international assessments.
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Table 2.15: Country Characteristics and Human Capital Estimated with Imper-
fect Substitution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.277∗∗∗ 0.0891 0.0961 0.113
(0.0681) (0.0802) (0.0877) (0.0830)
Life Expect. at Birth 0.00217 -0.00780 -0.00649 -0.00879
(0.00711) (0.00813) (0.00947) (0.00902)
Fertility Rate 0.00462 0.00319 0.00331 0.00363
(0.00655) (0.00800) (0.00796) (0.00724)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.127∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0220) (0.0360) (0.0363) (0.0354)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0310 0.0362 0.0387 0.0370
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0222) (0.0358) (0.0383) (0.0334)
Log GDP per Worker -0.0145 0.0300
(0.0616) (0.0617)
Incl.Av. Sample No No No No Yes
Observations 62 63 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.340 0.460 0.478 0.479 0.510
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1 by nonlinear least squares, but allowing for imperfect
substitution across types of labor. Independent variables included are those with the strongest
predictive power from each respective categories of health and fertility, education, and cultural
values. The Cultural Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from running a factor analysis
on a set of questions in the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart
and Baker (2000); they label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and Survival vs.
Self-Expression. Data on health and fertility measures are from the World Bank Development
Indicators. Educational quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
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Table 2.16: Human Capital and Country Characteristics, Labor Cost Based Fac-
tor Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.194∗∗ 0.0168 0.00718
(0.0767) (0.0722) (0.0759)
Life Expect. at Birth -0.00500 -0.0154∗ -0.0174∗∗
(0.00738) (0.00800) (0.00795)
Fertility Rate -0.00524 -0.00687 -0.00693
(0.00682) (0.00913) (0.00921)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.124∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.120∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0212) (0.0455) (0.0489)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.00653 0.0387 0.0351
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0203) (0.0281) (0.0342)
Log GDP per Worker 0.0212
(0.0722)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.258 0.371 0.392 0.383
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1 by nonlinear least squares, but fixing the labor share within
each 3-digit industry based on the average fraction of labor costs to value-added within that
industry. Independent variables included are those with the strongest predictive power from
each respective categories of health and fertility, education, and cultural values. The Cultural
Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from running a factor analysis on a set of questions in
the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they
label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on
health and fertility measures are from the World Bank Development Indicators. Educational
quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
89
Table 2.17: Human Capital and Country Characteristics, 2-digit Industry Spec.
Factor Shares and OP Proxy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.224∗∗∗ 0.0888 0.110
(0.0643) (0.0868) (0.0860)
Life Expect. at Birth 0.00244 -0.00276 0.00175
(0.00554) (0.00786) (0.00800)
Fertility Rate 0.0101 0.0121 0.0122
(0.00670) (0.00823) (0.00806)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0858∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0247) (0.0291) (0.0269)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0144 0.00851 0.0165
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0217) (0.0364) (0.0394)
Log GDP per Worker -0.0471
(0.0561)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.171 0.259 0.305 0.304
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1 by nonlinear least squares, and allowing parameters in
the function proxying for unobserved productivity, as well as factor shares, to vary by 2-digit
industry. Independent variables included are those with the strongest predictive power from
each respective categories of health and fertility, education, and cultural values. The Cultural
Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from running a factor analysis on a set of questions in
the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they
label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on
health and fertility measures are from the World Bank Development Indicators. Educational
quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
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Table 2.18: Human Capital and Country Characteristics, Labor Cost Based Fac-
tor Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.194∗∗ 0.0168 0.00718
(0.0767) (0.0722) (0.0759)
Life Expect. at Birth -0.00500 -0.0154∗ -0.0174∗∗
(0.00738) (0.00800) (0.00795)
Fertility Rate -0.00524 -0.00687 -0.00693
(0.00682) (0.00913) (0.00921)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.124∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.120∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0212) (0.0455) (0.0489)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.00653 0.0387 0.0351
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0203) (0.0281) (0.0342)
Log GDP per Worker 0.0212
(0.0722)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.258 0.371 0.392 0.383
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1 by nonlinear least squares, but fixing the labor share within
each 3-digit industry based on the average fraction of labor costs to value-added within that
industry. Independent variables included are those with the strongest predictive power from
each respective categories of health and fertility, education, and cultural values. The Cultural
Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from running a factor analysis on a set of questions in
the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they
label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on
health and fertility measures are from the World Bank Development Indicators. Educational
quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
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Table 2.19: Human Capital and Country Characteristics, Fixed Factor Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.246∗ -0.0498 -0.0379
(0.145) (0.157) (0.159)
Life Expect. at Birth -0.00240 -0.0109 -0.00837
(0.0132) (0.0171) (0.0187)
Fertility Rate -0.00226 0.00555 0.00563
(0.0141) (0.0154) (0.0154)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.205∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0440) (0.0762) (0.0754)
Inglehart et al.’s -0.0262 -0.00412 0.000353
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0377) (0.0622) (0.0706)
Log GDP per Worker -0.0262
(0.123)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.100 0.310 0.315 0.304
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1 by nonlinear least squares with fixed CRS factor shares.
Independent variables included are those with the strongest predictive power from each respec-
tive categories of health and fertility, education, and cultural values. The Cultural Factor 1
and 2 are the two top factors from running a factor analysis on a set of questions in the WVS,
following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they label the
factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on health and
fertility measures are from the World Bank Development Indicators. Educational quality is
from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
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Table 2.20: Country Characteristics and Human Capital Estimated with Imper-
fect Substitution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.277∗∗∗ 0.0891 0.0961 0.113
(0.0681) (0.0802) (0.0877) (0.0830)
Life Expect. at Birth 0.00217 -0.00780 -0.00649 -0.00879
(0.00711) (0.00813) (0.00947) (0.00902)
Fertility Rate 0.00462 0.00319 0.00331 0.00363
(0.00655) (0.00800) (0.00796) (0.00724)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.127∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0220) (0.0360) (0.0363) (0.0354)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0310 0.0362 0.0387 0.0370
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0222) (0.0358) (0.0383) (0.0334)
Log GDP per Worker -0.0145 0.0300
(0.0616) (0.0617)
Incl.Av. Sample No No No No Yes
Observations 62 63 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.340 0.460 0.478 0.479 0.510
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1 by nonlinear least squares, but allowing for imperfect
substitution across types of labor. Independent variables included are those with the strongest
predictive power from each respective categories of health and fertility, education, and cultural
values. The Cultural Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from running a factor analysis
on a set of questions in the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart
and Baker (2000); they label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and Survival vs.
Self-Expression. Data on health and fertility measures are from the World Bank Development
Indicators. Educational quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
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Table 2.21: Human Capital and Country Characteristics, Translog Production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.115∗∗∗ 0.0177 0.0141
(0.0423) (0.0398) (0.0396)
Life Expect. at Birth 0.00861∗∗ 0.00411 0.00335
(0.00378) (0.00381) (0.00431)
Fertility Rate 0.00759∗ 0.00813∗∗ 0.00811∗∗
(0.00391) (0.00356) (0.00357)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0536∗∗∗ 0.0750∗∗∗ 0.0756∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0128) (0.0168) (0.0169)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0253∗ 0.0119 0.0106
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0129) (0.0166) (0.0177)
Log GDP per Worker 0.00788
(0.0271)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.391 0.422 0.412
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating a translog production function. Independent variables included are
those with the strongest predictive power from each respective categories of health and fertility,
education, and cultural values. The Cultural Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from run-
ning a factor analysis on a set of questions in the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker.
See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and
Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on health and fertility measures are from the World Bank
Development Indicators. Educational quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
Table 2.22: Estimates of the elasticity of substitution-parameter ρ across years
(1 corresponds to perfect substitution).
2008–2014 2008 2010 2012 2014
Estimated ρ 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.96 0.93
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Table 2.23: Human Capital and Country Characteristics, Imp. Sub. Using Year
with Lowest Estimated Elast. of Sub.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.0795 -0.130 -0.146
(0.0908) (0.110) (0.111)
Life Expect. at Birth 0.00684 -0.00896 -0.0123
(0.00845) (0.0113) (0.0126)
Fertility Rate -0.00562 -0.0118 -0.0119
(0.00892) (0.0109) (0.0110)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0973∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0253) (0.0384) (0.0427)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0420∗ 0.0734∗ 0.0675
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0225) (0.0403) (0.0457)
Log GDP per Worker 0.0346
(0.0779)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.249 0.237 0.227
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1, but allowing for imperfect substitution across types of
labor, and only using data for the year with the lowest estimated elasticity of substitution,
2010. Independent variables included are those with the strongest predictive power from each
respective categories of health and fertility, education, and cultural values. The Cultural Factor
1 and 2 are the two top factors from running a factor analysis on a set of questions in the WVS,
following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they label the
factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on health and
fertility measures are from the World Bank Development Indicators. Education quality is from
Hanushek and Woessman (2012) and based on test score results from international assessments.
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Table 2.24: Labor Productivity and Individual Questions



















Index: Autonomy 0.164∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
Y003 (0.0355) (0.0335) (0.0261) (0.0340) (0.0524) (0.0375) (0.0390) (0.0333) (0.0352) (0.0245)
H-W Ed. -0.00274 -0.0294 -0.0184 -0.0255 -0.00716 -0.0108 -0.0245 -0.0100 -0.00783
Quality (0.0311) (0.0275) (0.0220) (0.0278) (0.0366) (0.0316) (0.0287) (0.0265) (0.0315)
Observations 63 63 63 62 62 61 62 63 63 63
Adjusted R2 0.391 0.439 0.487 0.361 0.394 0.413 0.424 0.461 0.414 0.492
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable throughout is estimated country-specific labor productivities
from estimating a translog production function by nonlinear least squares, with labor input as
a nested CES aggregator over educational levels and countries of origin; independent variables
are the individual questions that Inglehart and Welzel include in the factor analysis to construct
the composite cultural measures TR and SS. Observations are weighted by the number of
individuals they are based upon. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
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Alternative Country Characteristics
Several alternative country-of-origin characteristics without a direct logical link
to transportable human capital have been tried. This is a response to seminar-
demand; I consider it a betrayal of the identifying assumption.
Table 2.25: Human Capital, Cultural Factors, Educational Quality, and Country
Characteristics from Sala-i-Martin (1997)
Top 5 Var. 1-5 Var 6-10 Var. 11-15 Var. 16-20
Inglehart et al.’s 0.189∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0704) (0.0523) (0.0628) (0.0641) (0.0694)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0959 0.112∗∗ 0.0620 0.0257 0.0643
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0588) (0.0538) (0.0567) (0.0744) (0.0625)
H-W Ed. 0.0360 0.0784 -0.0913 0.00774 0.00763
Qual. (0.101) (0.131) (0.140) (0.164) (0.111)
Observations 41 46 42 42 44
Adjusted R2 0.650 0.598 0.592 0.549 0.588
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.26: Human Capital, Cultural Factors, Educational Quality, and Country
Characteristics from Sala-i-Martin (1997)
Var. 21–25 Var. 26–30 Var. 31–35 Var. 36–40 Var. 41–45
Inglehart et al.’s 0.227∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.179∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0587) (0.0633) (0.0737) (0.0535) (0.0715)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0544 -0.00694 0.0848 0.0601 0.153∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0540) (0.0585) (0.0566) (0.0437) (0.0489)
H-W Ed. 0.141 0.0434 -0.0292 -0.0643 0.154
Quality (0.109) (0.116) (0.0997) (0.101) (0.134)
Observations 44 45 47 46 36
Adjusted R2 0.532 0.500 0.588 0.649 0.558
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.27: Human Capital, Cultural Factors, Educational Quality, and Country
Characteristics from Sala-i-Martin (1997)
Var. 46–50 Var. 51–56 Var. 57–61
Inglehart et al.’s 0.194∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0850) (0.0588) (0.0638)
Inglehart et al.’s -0.000127 0.105∗∗ 0.0452
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0719) (0.0484) (0.0602)
H-W Ed. -0.0482 0.0160 -0.0110
Quality (0.174) (0.0838) (0.117)
Observations 40 50 47
Adjusted R2 0.501 0.597 0.516
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Variations in Underlying Data
Here, I present regression tables where human capital is estimated based on al-
ternative data choices,
Table 2.28: Country Characteristics and Human Capital Estimated Excl. Mi-
grants Arriving < 18
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.449∗∗∗ 0.181 0.148
(0.107) (0.136) (0.137)
Life Expect. at Birth 0.0112 -0.00285 -0.00985
(0.00901) (0.0128) (0.0113)
Fertility Rate 0.0145 0.0139 0.0136
(0.00987) (0.0145) (0.0144)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.189∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0338) (0.0491) (0.0555)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0608∗∗ 0.0465 0.0340
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0298) (0.0604) (0.0680)
Log GDP per Worker 0.0732
(0.109)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.513 0.537 0.538
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1, but excluding individuals who arrived in Sweden at an age
of 17 or younger. Independent variables included are those with the strongest predictive power
from each respective categories of health and fertility, education, and cultural values. The Cul-
tural Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from running a factor analysis on a set of questions
in the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they
label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on
health and fertility measures are from the World Bank Development Indicators. Educational
quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
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Table 2.29: Country Characteristics and Human Capital Estimated Excl. Ma-
jority Sweden Educ.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.379∗∗∗ 0.127 0.121
(0.0927) (0.116) (0.116)
Life Expect. at Birth 0.00752 -0.00700 -0.00820
(0.00781) (0.0106) (0.0100)
Fertility Rate 0.0108 0.00874 0.00870
(0.00884) (0.0120) (0.0120)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.163∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0293) (0.0426) (0.0453)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0531∗∗ 0.0534 0.0513
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0255) (0.0495) (0.0556)
Log GDP per Worker 0.0125
(0.0848)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.364 0.512 0.536 0.528
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1 by nonlinear least squares, excluding individuals who
undertook a majority of their schooling in Sweden. Independent variables included are those
with the strongest predictive power from each respective categories of health and fertility, edu-
cation, and cultural values. The Cultural Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from running
a factor analysis on a set of questions in the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See
e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and
Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on health and fertility measures are from the World Bank
Development Indicators. Educational quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
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Table 2.30: Human Capital and Country Characteristics, Excluding Nordic Coun-
tries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.262∗∗∗ 0.168 0.172
(0.0976) (0.109) (0.113)
Life Expect. at Birth -0.00165 -0.00205 -0.00130
(0.00724) (0.0109) (0.0111)
Fertility Rate 0.00417 0.0105 0.0105
(0.00811) (0.0105) (0.0106)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.131∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.123∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0286) (0.0495) (0.0519)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0185 0.00571 0.00630
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0289) (0.0542) (0.0567)
Log GDP per Worker -0.00753
(0.0763)
Observations 58 59 58 58
Adjusted R2 0.197 0.250 0.282 0.268
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc,
retrieved from estimating equation 1.1. Independent variables included are those with the
strongest predictive power from each respective categories of health and fertility, education,
and cultural values. The Cultural Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from running a fac-
tor analysis on a set of questions in the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See
e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and
Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on health and fertility measures are from the World Bank
Development Indicators. Educational quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
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Table 2.31: Human Capital and Country Characteristics, Using Total Assets as
Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Ed. Quality 0.215∗∗ 0.0956 0.105
(0.0851) (0.0942) (0.0945)
Life Expect. at Birth 0.00531 0.00434 0.00635
(0.00726) (0.00851) (0.00961)
Fertility Rate 0.0119 0.0180∗∗ 0.0180∗∗
(0.00752) (0.00878) (0.00879)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0922∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0291) (0.0365) (0.0364)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.00291 -0.0208 -0.0173
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0285) (0.0358) (0.0387)
Log GDP per Worker -0.0209
(0.0590)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.193 0.237 0.225
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating equation 1.1 by nonlinear least squares, but with total assets as the
measure of capital instead of fixed assets. Independent variables included are those with the
strongest predictive power from each respective categories of health and fertility, education,
and cultural values. The Cultural Factor 1 and 2 are the two top factors from running a fac-
tor analysis on a set of questions in the WVS, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See
e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they label the factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and
Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on health and fertility measures are from the World Bank
Development Indicators. Educational quality is from Hanushek and Woessman (2012).
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Individual Questions
Table 2.32: Human Capital and Cultural Traits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.143∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.1000∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.126∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0244) (0.0464) (0.0413) (0.0277) (0.0324) (0.0711)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0385 0.0412
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0263) (0.0472)
Belief in Hell -0.0168 0.0225
(0.145) (0.144)
Attitudes Towards Cooperation 0.306∗ 0.266
(0.161) (0.225)
Attitudes Towards the Market 0.000414 0.00622
(0.0371) (0.0500)
Attitudes Towards Thriftiness 0.00552 -0.0580
(0.0366) (0.0552)
Observations 63 61 63 62 63 61
Adjusted R2 0.483 0.460 0.492 0.463 0.463 0.470
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc from
equation 1.1. Belief in Hell is the average response to a yes/no-question. The attitudes towards-
questions are, in order of appearance in row 4–6, the fraction of respondents who say that
most people can be trusted as opposed to you cannot be too careful ; the average agreement
with private ownership of business should be increased as opposed to government ownership of
business should be increased ; the average agreement with People should take more responsibility
to provide for themselves vs. The government should take more responsibility to provide for
people. The last two variables are both coded so that a high value reflect a more market- and
less government-friendly attitude. Cultural factors 1 and 2 are the top two factors from a factor
analysis on a set of answers to WVS questions, following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker; see e.g.
Inglehart and Baker (2000).
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Table 2.33: Labor Productivity and Cultural Values





















H-W Ed. 0.277∗∗∗ 0.104 0.189∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.107 0.195∗∗∗ 0.129 0.275∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.108∗
Quality (0.0546) (0.0718) (0.0506) (0.0651) (0.0805) (0.0608) (0.0787) (0.0569) (0.0528) (0.0640)
Observations 63 63 63 62 62 61 62 63 63 63
Adjusted R2 0.331 0.459 0.440 0.318 0.427 0.395 0.422 0.331 0.367 0.460
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable throughout is estimated country-specific labor productivities,
the δcs from estimating equation 1.1 by NLS; independent variables are the individual ques-
tions that are included in the factor analysis to construct the composite cultural measures.
Observations are weighted by the number of individuals they are based upon.
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Table 2.34: Labor Productivity and Questions Underlying TR and SS





















H-W Ed. 0.0984∗∗∗ -0.00176 0.0412∗ 0.0352 0.0132 0.0420 0.00291 0.102∗∗ 0.0678∗∗ -0.00326
Quality (0.0362) (0.0318) (0.0246) (0.0312) (0.0428) (0.0294) (0.0324) (0.0392) (0.0297) (0.0301)
Observations 63 63 63 62 62 61 62 63 63 63
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.383 0.390 0.209 0.294 0.313 0.357 0.185 0.271 0.400
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable throughout is estimated country-specific labor productivities
from estimating a translog production function by nonlinear least squares, with labor input as
a nested CES aggregator over educational levels and countries of origin; independent variables
are the individual questions that Inglehart and Welzel include in the factor analysis to construct
the composite cultural measures TR and SS. Observations are weighted by the number of
individuals they are based upon. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
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Section 2.2.6 presents results based in data from IPUMS International. Here, I
show the analogous results using U.S. census data, via Schoellman (2012), and
ESS data for European countries. For the latter, there are few individuals per
country for many of the origins, making the approach specified by 2.3 untenable.
Therefore, for the ESS data, I estimate Mincerian regressions on the form of
Equation 2.6, where I directly include country of origin characteristics CCk, which
is statistically more efficient than the “two-stage” approach. The characteristics
I include are cultural values and educational quality.
ln(wh,o,i) = αh + βhEdh,o,i + 1(o 6= h)(δ1CC1,o,i + ...+ δNCCo,iN ) + γXh,o,i + εh,o,i.
(2.6)
There are some downsides to the ESS data — the sample sizes are small and the
only included income measure is total family income. I estimate Equation 2.6
and present the results in Table 2.36. I split the sample in two separate ways.
Firstly, because the income measure is at the family level, I look separately at
a subsample consisting of only non-married individuals in columns 1 and 2, so
that the income is attributable to the worker for which I have country of birth
data. Secondly, as the main purpose of the exercise is to study also the impact
of cultural values in countries culturally distinct from Sweden, in Column 2 and
4, I restrict the sample from all 30 countries in the ESS (except Sweden, which
I never include) to countries with a TR-value below the global average. This
leaves Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and Turkey. Albeit quantita-
tively somewhat weaker than in the Swedish data (perhaps due to the imprecision
brought about by the income measure), the qualitative pattern remains the same,
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and restricting attention to the more “traditional” countries if anything strength-
ens the relationship quantitatively.
Table 2.36: Income and Country of Origin Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non-Mar, Full Non-Mar, TRh < 0 Incl. Mar, Full Incl. Mar, TRh < 0
H-W Ed. 0.00874 -0.00727 0.00875∗∗ -0.00646
Quality (0.00666) (0.0106) (0.00392) (0.0127)
TR 0.0427∗ 0.0758∗∗ 0.0539∗∗∗ 0.0872∗∗
(0.0230) (0.0333) (0.0154) (0.0328)
SS 0.0460∗∗ 0.0889∗∗∗ 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.0739∗∗∗
(0.0194) (0.0263) (0.0135) (0.0237)
Observations 16726 1732 35212 4103
Adjusted R2 0.194 0.218 0.253 0.263
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable throughout is total family income (the only available income
variable in the ESS). TR and SS are the two cultural measures constructed by running a factor
analysis over a set of questions, following Inglehart and Baker (2000); H-W Educational Quality
is a measure from Hanushek and Woessman (2009). Standard errors are clustered at the country
of origin level.
Finally, I take advantage of work done by Schoellman (2012) who looks at the
relationship between quality of schooling across countries and how that help ex-
plain different returns to education for migrants in the United States (a country
characterised by significantly more traditional values than Sweden, as measured
by a TR-value close to the global average). For this purpose, Schoellman calcu-
lates country specific returns to education.58 Column 1 in Table 2.37 shows the
result of regressing the returns to education from table A1 in Schoellman (2012)
on data on educational quality compiled by Hanushek and Woessmann (2012).
The positive and significant coefficient on educational quality corresponds to the
positive slope of the linear fit in figure 1(b) of Schoellman (2012).59 In the second
column of Table 2.37, I add the TR and SS cultural measures based on WVS data
(exchanging TR and SS for the measures of autonomy and trust yields similar
results). Reassuringly, the result here mirrors that in Table 2.4 above — cultural
58This is an intermediate purpose. Schoellman’s ultimate purpose is to look at how much of
income disparities across countries that can be explained by human capital differences.
59The first column in Table 2.37, and other versions is essentially Schoellman’s empirical
support for that differential returns to education reflect differences in educational quality.
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values are positively and significantly related to returns to education while the
coefficient on educational quality is insignificant (and here even turns negative)
once the cultural measures are included.
Table 2.37: Country of Origin Specific Returns to Education and Country Char-
acteristics
(1) (2) (3)






Observations 59 59 59
Adjusted R2 0.235 0.528 0.529
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The dependent variable is returns to education from table A1 in Schoellman (2012).
H-W Cognitive is the main measure of educational quality in Hanushek and Woessman (2009).
TR and SS are the two cultural measures as constructed by Inglehart and Baker (2000) or
Inglehart and Welzel (2005).
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Level of vs. Difference in Cultural Values
Table 2.38: Country Characteristics and Human Capital for Workers with a High
Level of Customer-Facing Intensity Estimated Controlling for Within-Firm Cul-
tural Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-W Educ. Quality 0.286∗∗∗ 0.0528 0.0323
(0.0908) (0.104) (0.117)
Life Expect. at Birth -0.0103 -0.0229∗∗ -0.0269∗∗
(0.0113) (0.00987) (0.0130)
Fertility Rate -0.00549 -0.00621 -0.00632
(0.00926) (0.00864) (0.00905)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.158∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
Cultural Factor 1 (0.0328) (0.0436) (0.0474)
Inglehart et al.’s 0.0141 0.0551 0.0438
Cultural Factor 2 (0.0351) (0.0417) (0.0450)
Log GDP per Worker 0.0489
(0.0801)
Observations 62 63 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.329 0.365 0.358
Ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the human capital measure across countries, δˆc, re-
trieved from estimating a modified version of equation 1.1 by nonlinear least squares. The
modification is to distinguish labor types by customer-facing intensity (results here are for a
high level), as well as birth country, and controlling for within-firm cultural dispersion. Inde-
pendent variables included are those with the strongest predictive power from each respective
categories of health and fertility, education, and cultural values. The Cultural Factor 1 and
2 are the two top factors from running a factor analysis on a set of questions in the WVS,
following Inglehart, Welzel, and Baker. See e.g. Inglehart and Baker (2000); they label the
factors Traditional vs. Secular-Rational and Survival vs. Self-Expression. Data on health and
fertility measures are from the World Bank Development Indicators. Educational quality is






The time-series macro literature has recently devoted substantial attention to
the variation over time in the labor wedge as a measure of labor market frictions.
This paper instead focuses on the cross-sectional variation in the labor wedge
and documents significant differences. Quantified in terms of hours supplied, the
necessary adjustment to reach a labor wedge that is constant across countries,
ranges from a 54% decrease (1,073 yearly hours) in labor supply for Hungary, to
a 33% and 31% increase for the Netherlands and Switzerland (464 and 517 hours
per year respectively).
The substantial labor-wedge variation naturally raises the question of what lies
behind. I try a long list of potential explanatory factors that the literature has
suggested as important for labor market frictions, but make little progress with
these alternatives. What is found to be more successful, is widening the scope of
potential institutional explanations, to include also the slow-moving institutions
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that are cultural values.1 A cultural variable from the WVS improves significantly
on the explained variation, and is by far the most robust explanatory factor.2
Interpreted as partly reflecting differences in preferences, the individual country
results are sharply at odds with what is popularly believed and generally reflected
in the media.3 For example, the cultural interpretation of labor wedge differences,
after controlling for for typical measures of labor market frictions, imply that
Greece and Italy have a markedly weaker preference for leisure than northern
and western European countries such as the Netherlands, Ireland, and Sweden,
with Germany falling somewhere in between the northern/western and southern
European countries.4 Moreover, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the United
States exhibits a relatively strong preference for leisure.
To further test my cultural interpretation of that (part of) the cross-sectional
labor-wedge variation reflects differences in preferences, I turn to U.S. micro-level
data. As suggested by previous work, individuals’ attitudes are shaped by their
contemporaneous environment and by cultural beliefs and values passed down by
previous generations.5 Within the United States, second and successive genera-
tions of immigrants share the contemporaneous, first component. They do, how-
ever, differ in the dimension of beliefs and values that are passed down. Since such
influences are determined at a considerable temporal as well as spatial distance,
these preferences are unlikely to be affected by current economic and institutional
1Roland (2004) refers to cultural values as “a prime example of slow-moving institutions”.
2I use the question that comes closest to asking individuals about their relative labor/leisure
preference. The question is C041 from the World Values Survey: Do you agree or disagree with
the following statement? Work should always come first, even if it means less spare time.
3Beliefs concerning labor/leisure preferences may have a considerable impact on interna-
tional cooperation. The rhetoric used during the euro crisis provides some recent suggestive
evidence that cultural beliefs may influence political outcomes. See for example The Economist,
June 15th 2013: “The second reason for Germany’s reluctance to lead is the belief that the ul-
timate cause of the euro-zone crisis is the laziness of southern Europeans.” In other domains,
there is actual evidence of cross-country beliefs affecting economic outcomes. For example,
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) show that beliefs regarding trustworthiness can affect
international trade.
4The measures of labor market frictions include, but are not limited to, unionization, em-
ployment protection, employment/population-ratios, tax avoidance, unemployment, and unem-
ployment benefits.
5Examples include Dohmen et al. (2012); Bisin and Verdier (2001); Bisin, Topa, and Verdier
(2004); Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008); and Algan and Cahuc (2010).
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factors. I exploit this inherited cultural component by assigning individuals the
preference for leisure measure associated with their stated country of ancestry.
Reassuringly, in reduced-form regressions of individuals’ labor supply, this pref-
erence measure does exhibit statistically significant explanatory power. In the
United States, descendants immigrants from countries with a weaker preference
for leisure tend to work more hours, in line with the suggested interpretation of the
model’s measure as capturing some underlying difference in actual preferences.
The same results hold true when looking at children of migrants in Sweden.6
Finally, the paper conducts an “out of sample” test by asking the question of what
differences in preferences for leisure theoretically imply for cross-country differ-
ences in the level of labor taxation, and whether this prediction, together with
the differences in preferences suggested by the documented labor wedge variation,
line up with the observed empirical relationship. Theoretically, a stronger prefer-
ence for leisure implies a lower optimal level of labor taxation. The reason for this
negative relationship is that a stronger preference for leisure is associated with a
larger elasticity of labor supply to taxation, and labor taxes therefore result in
greater distortionary effects when preferences for leisure are strong. Empirical
data verify the relationship between labor taxation and labor-wedge differences;
taxes are significantly and negatively correlated with a larger labor wedge, also
after controlling for total government spending and a number of labor market
indicators.7
This paper does not in any way argue that tax rates, productivity changes, and
institutional factors are not important for influencing labor supply decisions. It
is reasonable to assume that differences in preferences across countries change
very slowly, so that as a factor, preferences really cannot explain the variations
in labor supply observed over the last half century. However, responses to policy
6I have verified this, although the current draft does not include the actual results; a next
draft of the paper will include them.
7Furthermore, the choice of lower labor taxes in the face of a more elastic labor supply
can be interpreted as suggestive evidence of the responsiveness of policy choices to underlying
cultural differences. Ignoring this responsiveness would lead to an underestimation of taxation’s
distortionary effects in a cross-country setting.
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changes and institutional design look different if preferences for leisure are allowed
to vary, as does optimal policy prescriptions. If taxes are high in certain countries
because they can be (because they are less distortionary), then assessing distor-
tionary effects from cross-country data, while ignoring cross-country differences
in preferences, would underestimate the distortionary effects of labor taxation.
So far, this introductory discussion has used the term “culture” without offering
a more precise definition, and at times has used “culture” interchangeably with
“preferences.” Throughout the analysis, I follow Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2006) and define “culture” as those values and beliefs that are passed down fairly
unchanged from generation to generation. Cultural values are part of the deep
mental programming shaping the lens through which people view themselves and
their surrounding environment, and how people act in that environment. For my
analysis, key in this definition is the persistence — that those values and beliefs
are not a continuously updated best-response to a changing environment, but
remain fairly unchanged, both over time, and as people migrate.
Relation to the literature This paper is related to at least three different fields
in the economics literature. The first is the strand of the empirical business cycle
literature that studies labor market frictions over time by backing out a labor
wedge from a representative-agent model; this is technically identical to backing
out a labor wedge for the purpose of studying cross-sectional variation. Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007), using a model nesting the one used here, show
that time fluctuations in output, labor, investment, and government consumption
can be characterised by fluctuations in corresponding output, labor, investment,
and government consumption “wedges”, and that any friction used in this model
can be expressed as a combination of these wedges. Shimer (2009) uses a similar
accounting exercise to back out a labor wedge in a representative-agent model.8
8There is a large literature investigating various angles of labor wedge fluctuations or differ-
ences. Examples include Karabarbounis (2014) who looks at a wider sample of different coun-
tries, and the relative contributions of the the marginal productivity of labor and the marginal
rate of substitution; Mulligan (2002) documents movements in the U.S. labor wedge for the
1896–1996 period; Hall (1997) studies time allocation over time and, distinguishing between
intertemporal and atemporal driving forces, attributes most of the changes to the atemporal
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In this paper, potential between-country differences in the labor wedge, using the
terminology of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) or Shimer (2009), would
be observationally equivalent to differences in the model’s relative preference for
leisure. If those labor-wedge differences where unrelated to differences in prefer-
ences, one would expect the measure to be more strongly correlated with a host of
labor market indicators than with a survey-based measure of preferences, while,
as previewed above, I obtain the opposite result.
The second concerns the general importance of culture, particularly for outcomes
and choices in the labor market. Closely related to this paper, Mocan and
Pogorelova (2015) employ data from the European Social Survey (ESS) on the
labor supply decisions of second-generation immigrants to investigate the effects
of taxes and a cultural “taste for leisure” on labor supply decisions, and find that
both factors have an impact. Moriconi and Peri (2015), also using ESS data and
a similar approach, find evidence that country-specific labor-leisure preferences
explain a non-negligible share of variation in employment rates across countries.
Also studying second-generation immigrants, but using U.S. Census data, Fer-
nández (2007) and Fernández and Fogli (2009) show that culture has a significant
impact on female labor supply decisions and fertility behavior; Alesina, Giuliano,
and Nunn (2013) traces the origins of gender roles back to traditional agricultural
practices. Also Giavazzi, Schiantarelli, and Serafinelli (2013) find an impact of
cultural traits on female employment rates and for hours worked; they try to
exploit changes in cultural traits over time, and between countries to avoid the
issue of attitudes responding to economic and institutional conditions. Eugster
et al. (2017) look at the impact of culture on unemployment spells by exploit-
ing a swiss language border between Romance and German speakers, that does
not follow political or labor market borders. They find that Romance speakers’
job search lasts for 22 percent longer that the German speakers. Becker and
Woessman (2009) rejects the Weberian hypothesis of a Protestant work ethic
effects of preference shifts; Jermann and Quadrini (2012), and Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012)
study labor wedges as arising from firm-level financial frictions.
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having spurred economic prosperity in (north)western Europe. Instead, they ar-
gue that education promoted the growth of human capital and prosperity. Since
this educational channel was the result of Protestantism, with its instruction to
read the Bible first-hand promoting literacy, the importance of culture as such
is not rejected.9 The positive impact of Protestantism on economic progress
through an educational channel is also one of two cultural characteristics empha-
sised by Landes (1998).10 Another paper closely related to this paper is Falk et
al. (2015) who documents significant cross-country differences for six different
types of preferences (none of which are preferences for leisure), and show that
these differences in preferences have predictive power for numerous aggregate-
and individual-level outcomes. Falk et al. (2015) also share this paper’s agnostic
approach towards exactly what drives a certain cultural characteristic in a given
country; this agnosticism is in contrast to many other papers related to culture
that test a specific hypothesis. For example, Becker and Woessman (2009) test
whether Protestantism is a driving force of longer work-hours. Good literature re-
views of the impact of culture are given by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006),
and Fernández (2011).
Third, over the last decade, a growing body of literature has attempted to tackle
the issue of cross-country differences in labor supply. Prescott (2004) argues
that differences in labor supply between the United States and the European
G7-countries stem solely from variations in taxation. Rogerson (2006) suggests
that taxes and productivity changes together can explain the changing patterns
in hours worked across countries. Rogerson (2008) expands on this hypothesis by
looking at sectoral data. He argues that the market service sector in Europe never
expanded the way it did in the United States, due to the higher labor taxes in
Europe. McDaniel (2011) and Rogerson (2008) both include home production in
9Botticini and Eckstein (2012) propose a similar channel for the economic success of Jews,
as does Caicedo (2014) for various South American missions.
10The second one is the importance accorded to time, reflected in the production and pur-
chases of clocks. My interpretation of this is as an emphasis on organizational efficiency and
minimization of time waste. To the extent this is what Landes meant, it is not necessarily at
odds with the findings of Becker and Woessman (2009), nor with this paper.
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a model otherwise similar to the one used by Prescott (2004), and also attribute
changes in hours worked to changes in taxes and productivity levels. Bick, Fuchs-
Schündeln, and Lagakos (2016) abstract from policy differences, but study a much
wider sample of countries. They find that the number of hours worked is higher
in low-income countries than in high-income countries. Aguiar and Hurst (2007)
document a significant increase in the number of leisure hours in the United States
over the past two generations. A shared feature of these papers is a focus on the
temporal aspect of conditions driving labor supply while preferences for leisure,
among other things, are still assumed to be constant across countries.11,12
3.2 Cross-Sectional Labor-Wedge Differences
In this section, I set out the theoretical framework that lies behind the construc-
tion of either a (post-tax) labor wedge, or a model-based preference-for-leisure
measure.
3.2.1 Theoretical Framework
Following, among others, Prescott (2004), Rogerson (2006, 2009), Shimer (2009),









s.t. (1 + τ ci,t)ci,t ≤ (1− τhi,t)wi,thi,t + Ti,t, ∀t.
11The one exception to the temporal focus is Bick, Fuchs-Schündeln, and Lagakos (2016),
which looks mainly at the cross-sectional aspect of the data.
12In what is partly a response to Prescott (2004), Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005)
show that a crucial assumption for Prescott’s model to succeed in predicting changes in hours
worked is a high labor supply elasticity, which is at odds with micro estimates. Instead, they
emphasize institutional factors, such as trade union density and labor market regulations.
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Here, c is consumption, h market hours worked, w is the price of labor, τ c and
τh are proportional taxes levied by the government, and T is unearned income.
Note that “leisure”, 1 − h, is any time not spent doing paid work in the labor
market, i.e. it also includes home production.






1 + τ ci
. (3.2)







where in optimum, the utility loss from working an additional unit (LHS = −∂u
∂h
)
has to be equal to the utility gain, meaning the additional consumption enabled




A representative firm in country i chooses investment, I, and labor, h, to solve





βt[yi,t − wi,thi,t − Ii,t] (3.4)




i,t and kt+1 = (1− δ)ki,t + Ii,t.
13Note that this tax wedge is different from the “labor wedge” mentioned above. This tax
wedge is also different from what will be referred to as the “tax wedge” later on when discussing
the data used. The OECD uses the term “labor tax wedge” to signal that it is a measure not
only including labor taxes, but also other government-imposed costs that drive a wedge between
the firm’s cost of hiring a worker, and what the net pay the worker receives. This later OECD
“labor-tax wedge” will not include the consumption tax, which is included in the theoretical
version here in Equation 3.2.
14Using a model that is static on both the firm and worker side would not change any of the
optimality conditions that I combine to get Equation 3.6 below. However, in a completely static
setting, there is no reason for consumption to differ from the level of GDP. In the empirical
implementation of Equation 3.6, the consumption to GDP-ratio is less than one. To keep
the model consistent with this fact, I instead look at the steady state of the dynamic model
presented here.
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By assuming equilibrium in the labor market (short of the assumed labor wedge),
adding the labor wedge (1 − τ˜i), rearranging Equation 3.3, and combining with







(1− θi)(1− τi). (3.6)
The business cycle literature has used “accounting” approaches like this one, typ-
ically focusing on a single country over time. For example, Shimer (2009) backs
out the labor wedge from Equation 3.6 over time, and interpret this as frictional
changes. With preferences reasonably assumed to be constant at business-cycle
frequencies, and only moving very slowly (if at all) over longer time spans, this
appears to be a sensible approach.
There is, however, no contradiction between this standard labor-wedge literature
interpretation and cross-country labor wedge differences at a given point in time
being explained partly by differences in preferences. Equation 3.6 makes clear
that allowing for a country-specific labor wedge is theoretically isomorphic to a
country-specific preference for leisure. With data for hours worked, GDP, con-
sumption, taxes, and the labor share, in a given country i, an implied preference
for leisure, γi or labor wedge (1 − τ˜i), can be backed out.15 In anticipation of
my empirical results below, I focus on the intuition of this expression from the
“preference perspective”.
Ceteris paribus, a low model wage (y(1−θ)
h
) means that the representative agent
needs a smaller reward for a given amount of work, which is indicative of a
15The way I have included the wedge implies that it appears in the household’s optimality
condition. This is in line with Karabarbuonis (2014) who finds that the household-side wedge
is the more important one quantitatively.
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weaker preference for leisure. In the same way, a high tax rate reduces both
the pay-off from working more and the preference for leisure γ, indicative of the
pay-off required to work more. If the agent spends a large share of his/her time
endowment working, this choice decreases (1 − h), which is also associated with
a weaker preference for leisure. The parameter γ is decreasing in consumption;
if an agent in optimum consumes (relatively) more, it must be that s/he values
consumption more highly relative to leisure. In the baseline version of the model,
φ will be equal to 1, i.e. a log-log specification, following Prescott (2004).16,17
3.2.2 Data
The data needed to back out the labor wedge or γi from equation 3.6, are the
consumption-to-GDP ratio, the tax rates on labor and consumption, the hours
worked, and labor shares. To ensure that the cross-country comparisons are as
strong as possible, all the data comes from the OECD Data Library.18
As the baseline model consumption, I will use what the OECD calls Actual In-
dividual Consumption which includes tax revenues in the consumption figure.19
Prescott (2004) assumes that public spending (with the exception of defence
spending) substitutes one-to-one with private consumption. As pointed out by
16This parameter, together with γ, determines the labor supply elasticity, which has been
subject to a great deal of debate. To avoid taking a stance on the magnitude of the labor
supply elasticity, for robustness larger values of φ will also be considered. Using a value of 1
corresponds to a significantly higher wage elasticity of labor supply than is commonly found
using micro data. The validity of these labor supply micro elasticity estimates in a macro
environment have been questioned quite convincingly by Imai and Kean (2004), who show that
macro labor supply elasticities would be significantly higher than micro elasticities if estimated
in a model taking human capital accumulation into account.
17Potential cross-country differences in φ will be ignored. This is a limitation of the study;
like γ, φ is a preference parameter, and may very well vary between countries. One reason for
focusing on γ is that it is of first-order importance for consumption/labor-leisure trade-offs.
This preference is something that it is possible to ask people about in a survey, which allows
for comparisons. Trying to inquire about the curvature of individuals’ utility function through
a survey is more challenging.
18The OECD provides data on an annual basis. The model does not take a stance on data
frequency. Given production plans and labor contracts, often including e.g. an annual number
of vacation days, this appears a sensible frequency.
19“Actual individual consumption” (also called household actual final consumption) is the
sum of the total value of household final consumption expenditure, non-profit institutions serv-
ing households (NPISHs) final consumption expenditure and government expenditure on indi-
vidual consumption goods and services.
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Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005), this assumption suppresses the income
effect of taxes and therefore increases how tax changes alter the response in
hours worked as measured in the model. It is reasonable to include taxes in the
consumption figure to the extent by which the government eventually return tax
revenues to consumers; since this extent is debatable, in Appendix 3.B, I consider
what the OECD calls Household Final Consumption, which excludes government
spending. In general, the results I obtain are stronger with this alternative version
of household consumption.
For hours worked, I use the average annual hours worked per employed person. It
is only those people who do work who actually receive wages and pay taxes, and
it is for those working individuals for whom a labor–leisure trade-off, as phrased
in the survey-based measure employed below, is the most relevant. In addition,
whereas voluntary non-participation in the labor market is a choice, being unem-
ployed (or a discouraged worker) is not, but would be treated as such with annual
hours worked per working-age population as the measure of labor supply.20 As
such, annual hours worked per employed person may be more relevant for discov-
ering differences in preferences related to culture than a measure also including
involuntary and corner-solution non-employed individuals. However, for robust-
ness, I also consider the preference for leisure calculated using average annual
hours worked among people 15–64 years of age, taking into account the impact
of unemployment and labor force participation on hours worked. Both measures
adjust for the annual number of vacation days, holidays, and so on. This adjust-
ment gives the actual number of hours worked, as opposed to measures based on
hours worked in “a normal work week” that are sometimes used. The yearly time
endowment (the “1” in equation 3.6) is set to 5,200 hours, or marginally above 14
hours per day.21
20Add to the unemployed and discouraged those individuals that are on sick leave, parental
leave, in education, or early retirees, although they would rather work, and the proportions
of voluntarily/involuntarily out of work is much less clear than it is by simply looking at the
headline numbers of unemployment vs. out of the labor force.
21This is the same as Prescott (2004) who uses 100 hours per week, and very close to
Wallenius’ (2013) 14 hours per day.
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The country-specific labor share is calculated by the OECD as total labor costs
(adjusted for self-employment) divided by output.22 The labor tax rate used
will be the marginal tax wedge for an individual earning 100 percent of aver-
age annual income in a given OECD member nation.23 Consumption tax rates
are mainly based on government revenue in relation to annual average house-




The model’s baseline version uses data from 2004. For robustness, I also consider
the average over the years 2002–2007, where averages are calculated using as many
years as possible given data availability for the individual countries.25 Three main
factors played a role in the timing decision. First, data should be available for as
many OECD countries as possible.26 Second, I have avoided time periods that
are too close to peaks or troughs in the business cycle as this might skew the
measured labor supply. Third, I have chosen time periods that coincide with
time periods where data is available also for explanatory variables (measures of
labor market frictions, institutions, and preferences). The baseline year of 2004 is
one of the years for which the number of countries with available OECD data is
maximized. Moreover, 2004 lies in the middle of the business cycle, between the
inflection points of November 2001 and December 2007 as defined by National
Bureau of Economic Research.27 The 2002–2007 business cycle roughly coincide
22The common assumption to set the labor share to 0.67 across countries is a fairly poor
approximation. The range is 0.42–0.76 and the standard deviation in this sample is 0.08.
23Here the term “wedge” is used by the OECD to indicate that the measure also includes
for example social security contributions not paid by the employee. The marginal tax wedge is
not just the marginal tax rate. The terminology may be somewhat confusing because the “tax
wedge” defined in the previous section also includes consumption taxes, which are not included
in this measure of the marginal tax wedge.
24An alternative approach would have been to follow Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994),
who calculate the consumption tax as τ c = 5110 + 5121c+ g − gw −5110− 5121 where c is household final
consumption, g is government final consumption, and is gw government wages. In the OECD’s
terminology, 5110 is the code for general taxes on goods and services, and 5121 for excise taxes.
The problem with these categories is that some observations for the countries considered in this
paper are lost due to missing data, but this alternative approach has been briefly considered
for robustness.
25These results are shown in Appendix 3.B; they are in line with those presented in section 3.4
of the main paper.
26“Available data” here refers not only to the data needed for calculating the model-based
preference for leisure, but also to control variables in regressions below.
27According to the Economic Cycle Research Institute, also many European countries, e.g.
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with the period in which the survey data was collected, which puts 2004 in the
middle of also this period.
3.3 A Survey-Based Measure of Preferences for
Leisure
To argue that the measure of culture described in section 3.2.1 captures actual
underlying social differences, or alternatively that differences in underlying prefer-
ences are actually related to meaningful differences in macroeconomic outcomes,
some other empirical measure of culture is needed for comparison. Direct quan-
titative measures of culture have typically been based on survey data from The
World Values Survey (WVS), and The European Values Study (EVS). That is
also what I will use. Unless otherwise noted, WVS will refer to both of these
studies; as the survey questions are coordinated, they are essentially equivalent
studies.28 The WVS is a cross-country collaboration by social scientists, in which
researchers interview a statistically representative sample in each participating
country, asking them about a fairly wide range of topics, e.g. attitudes towards
work, politics, religion, life experiences, etc. The WVS has been used quite widely
in the economics literature over the last two decades (e.g. Alesina, Glaeser, and
Sacerdote 2001; Algan and Cahuc 2010; Fernández 2007).
The WVS-question mainly used in this paper is question C041:
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
Work should always come first, even if it means less spare time.
The respondent answers by choosing a number from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds
to Strongly agree and 5 to Strongly disagree. The measure used is the arithmetic
Germany, France, Switzerland, and Austria, did indeed experience a marked downturn in eco-
nomic activity around 2002, as did Mexico, Japan, and South Korea.
28In terms of questions, there are some differences between the two surveys, as well as some
differences between each wave, and which countries within each wave that are asked a particular
question. Here, only questions that are identical in the two studies are considered.
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mean of responses for each country.29 Quite a few other questions concern either
the importance of hard work, of material well-being, or the importance of leisure
time, but none of the other questions addresses their relative importance. The
question I use is the one question that inquires about the relative importance of
work and leisure within the same question.30 To the extent that work is a means
to an end, i.e. wage income is spent on consumption, the question is as close
as the WVS gets to asking about individual’s relative disutility of labor. Since
I try to construct a survey analogue of γi, that is what I want. Question C041
also fulfils the necessary condition of data availability for the vast majority of
OECD countries. The average country values of the survey-based measure can
be seen in Table 3.7 or in Figure 3.3, where I plot the average country response to
this question (henceforth referred to as “the survey-based measure”, or “the WVS
measure”) against the country’s model-based preference for leisure.31
3.4 Results
This section presents the main results of the paper. First, I investigate which
country characteristics best explain the cross-country variation in the labor wedge.
I document a robust relationship between the survey-based measure of prefer-
ences and the labor wedge. This in turn provides a preliminarily motivation to
interpret labor-wedge differences as differences in a model-based measure of pref-
erences for leisure at a macro level. Second, I present the raw empirical measures
of preferences for leisure and explore what component(s) are driving differences
in measured preferences for leisure across countries. Third, I verify that the mea-
29There are also the options of Don’t know, or to not give an answer at all. These respondents
are discarded. Typically, they amount to no more than 5 percent, and usually less.
30There is one exception to this statement, which is question C008. This asks the respondents
to indicate from 1 to 5, whether It’s leisure that makes life worth living, not work vs. Work is
what makes life worth living, not leisure. The problem with this is that for the OECD countries
in my sample, the question was only included in the WVS for about half of them.
31The question is included in wave four (1999–2004) and five (2005–2007) from the WVS
and wave three (1999) and four (2008) from the EVS. The baseline takes the average country
response over all available data for each country. Restricting the sample to the earlier waves
yields similar results. Unfortunately, these two respective waves are the only ones in which this
question is included.
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sures of preferences for leisure have predictive power for labor supply choices for
descendants of migrants in the United States.
3.4.1 Cross-Country Evidence
To investigate what country-characteristics that best explain differences in the
labor wedge (or in preferences for leisure), I estimate equation 3.7 by ordinary
least squares:
LaborWedge = α + βXi + ηWV Si + εi. (3.7)
Here, the left-hand side is as defined above in the left-hand side of Equation
3.6. Xi is a vector of controls meant to capture labor market frictions and other
heterogeneities; I discuss it in greater detail below. WV S is the World Values
Survey-measure of culture, as defined in Section 3.3. εi is an unobserved error
term. The results of the baseline regression are shown in Table 3.1. The corre-
lation between the labor wedge (or the model-based measure of preferences) and
the survey-based measure of preferences for leisure is remarkably robust. Note
also that the point estimate of the coefficient on WV S is quite stable across all
the specifications. This positive correlation is consistent with the hypothesis that
there are meaningful differences in underlying preferences between countries, and
that these differences actually have an impact on aggregate outcomes. Nations
in which individuals indicate a relatively strong disagreement with putting work
before leisure are also nations where the representative agent “reveals” a strong
preference for leisure (a high γ).
As implied labor-wedge differences are normally interpreted as frictional differ-
ences, I include the standard measures thought to capture cross-country differ-
ences in labor market frictions: unemployment, unemployment benefits, employ-
ment protection laws, and unionization. There are various potential ways in
which these variables affect the observed labor wedge or model-based measure of
preferences (γ). Indeed, a large literature investigates how these variables impact
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Table 3.1: Regression of the Model-Based Preference Parameter γ on Self-
Reported Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
“Work Before 0.440 0.316 0.375 0.380 0.344 0.381 0.372 0.349 0.297 0.326
Leisure” (5.18) (2.79) (3.09) (3.32) (2.58) (2.81) (2.63) (2.22) (2.20) (2.89)
Emp/Population- 0.00787 0.00739 −0.00168 −0.00436 0.000457 0.000382 −0.0298 −0.0388 −0.0376
Ratio (1.99) (1.78) (−0.36) (−1.16) (0.09) (0.07) (−1.25) (−1.78) (−1.59)
Union Membership −0.00260 −0.00386 −0.00425 −0.00437 −0.00432 −0.00349 −0.00434 −0.00455
Density (−0.86) (−1.37) (−1.69) (−1.64) (−1.56) (−0.86) (−1.12) (−1.68)
Female Labor 0.0100 0.0115 0.00689 0.00675 0.0363 0.0479 0.0444
Participation (2.51) (3.51) (1.19) (1.27) (1.72) (2.32) (2.06)
Unemployment −0.0131 −0.0101 −0.0101 −0.0293 −0.0159 −0.00273
(−1.68) (−1.07) (−1.06) (−1.69) (−0.94) (−0.14)
Unemployment 0.423 0.421 0.461 0.327 0.457
Benefits (1.42) (1.37) (1.45) (0.91) (1.11)
Tax Evasion −0.00760 0.0417 0.215 0.262
(−0.11) (0.41) (1.77) (2.32)
Employment −0.0610 −0.0404 −0.0171
Protection (−0.84) (−0.68) (−0.26)




Nordics −0.0619 −0.166 −0.0311 0.0541 0.0818 0.0499 0.0549 0.0444 −0.0940 −0.0960
(−0.75) (−1.87) (−0.18) (0.31) (0.54) (0.30) (0.28) (0.18) (−0.36) (−0.44)
Observations 32 32 30 30 30 27 26 24 24 24
R2 0.448 0.520 0.548 0.601 0.633 0.677 0.664 0.682 0.756 0.793
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.469 0.475 0.518 0.538 0.558 0.506 0.477 0.569 0.603
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Dependent variable is the model-based preference for leisure measure as described in
section 3.2.1. “Work Before Leisure” is the survey-based measure, calculated as the country
average of the World Values Survey response to question c041, "Work should always come first,
even if it means less spare time". Unemployment benefits are measured as the replacement
ratio; tax evasion is taken from Buehn and Schneider (2012); employment protection is an
index calculated by the OECD, including individual and collective dismissal.
labor market outcomes. One example is Wallenius (2013), who claims that 17–31
percent of the U.S./European difference in hours worked is explained by differ-
ences in social security programs. In the theoretical literature, unemployment
insurance and other unemployment benefits (UI) are commonly assumed to de-
crease the labor supply, often through lower search efforts (Bailey, 1978; Chetty,
2006). The improved outside option that UI constitutes also leaves workers less
afraid of losing their jobs and decreases incentives to put in effort while actually
working, thereby enabling them to maintain a more lax attitude towards the im-
portance of work. Differences in UI could therefore explain both differences in the
model-based preference for leisure, and attitudes expressed in the WVS. Includ-
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ing UI as a control, defined here as the replacement ratio, leaves the significant
correlation between γ and WV S intact, as does including an additional control
for total spending on unemployment as a percentage of a nation’s GDP. Another
study previously mentioned, is Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005), who em-
phasize less unionization and less employment protection as two key reasons for
why Americans work more than Europeans.
As the measure of hours worked only takes into account the intensive margin
of labor supply, Xi includes both the female labor force participation rate, and
the employment/population-ratio of country i (in a separate robustness check,
I calculate the model-based preference based on hours worked per working-age
population instead of per employed; the results hold — see Table 3.13). Differing
proportions of households with one vs. two wage-earners might skew measured
labor/leisure preferences. If, for example, the different self-reported attitudes to
the importance of work is due to a higher prevalence of families with a single
wage-earner, and this also increases the number of (market) hours worked by this
single earner, the correlation could be due not to actually differing preferences, but
rather to the division of labor within families (again, note that home production
is included in the model’s definition of leisure).32 In line with this reasoning,
female labor force participation is significantly positively correlated to γ in some
of the specifications, but not throughout.
To the extent that people evade taxes, the OECD tax rates are a mismeasured
version of the effective tax rates that workers face. This recognition motivates
adding a control for tax evasion; the measure is taken from Buehn and Schneider
(2012), who use a structural equation approach to calculate the level of tax evasion
over time, across 38 countries.33
32With decreasing returns to hours spent in home production, having a spouse who has al-
ready put in a lot of home production hours will decrease the family’s labor market participant’s
model-based value of “leisure”, while the same spouse does not earn a wage acts to increase the
value of monetary compensation.
33For consumption taxes this should be less of an issue as they are based on government tax
revenues.
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GDP per capita, purchasing power parity adjusted (PPP), and GDP per hour are
also included as controls. If the model used to back out γ was a perfect depiction of
the real world, γ would be describing the relative consumption/leisure preference
for any income level. However, to the extent that the model is misspecified, e.g.
that the functional form does not fully capture the decreasing marginal utility
of consumption, one could argue that at higher levels of GDP, people can afford
both to both work less, and to hold attitudes about work being less important.
The reason for including a Nordic dummy is, as argued by Rogerson (2003), that
the Nordic countries subsidize labor force participation through transfer pay-
ments, e.g. through free daycare, which may make the single-good representative
agent model that I use a relatively worse depiction of reality in the Nordic coun-
tries, than for most other countries. Excluding this dummy, or also including
a dummy for Europe, does not alter the significant explanatory power of the
survey-based measure of preferences for leisure. The regression table without the
Nordics-dummy is shown in Appendix 3.B, Table 3.17.
Although it is comforting for the preference-interpretation that the explanatory
power of the survey-based measure of preferences for leisure is very robust, it is
difficult to claim that I have perfectly controlled for every conceivable factor.34
Appendix 3.B.1 outlines an important robustness check where I instead exploit
the labor wedge within-country time variation to construct the dependent vari-
able. There, I allow the labor wedge level to differ across countries, and ask
what implications misspecified preferences would have on fluctuations in the la-
bor wedge. If it is the case that in reality, preferences are non-constant across
countries, and a labor wedge is backed out under the assumption of constant pref-
erences, then countries with a relatively strong preference for leisure will have a
relatively depressed labor wedge difference over time.35 The advantage of looking
at implications for labor wedge fluctuations relative to the baseline approach is
34Simply using panel data with country fixed effects would not help as γ would be subsumed
in the country fixed effect. This is clear by taking logs of Equation 3.6 and rearranging to get
ln(h) = ln(y)− ln(c) + ln(1− θ) + ln(1− τ) + φln(1− h)− ln(γ)
35I show this in Appendix 3.B.1, as the difference between equation 3.19 and 3.20.
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that it, already theoretically, allows for cross-country level differences in the labor
wedge. In line with non-constant preferences, the labor wedge spread turns out
to be significantly and negatively correlated with the survey-based measure of
preferences for leisure.36
While it is quite reassuring to note that the WVS coefficient is quantitatively
robust as I add various controls, none of these added controls, or the other macro
level robustness checks, improve on potential reverse causality issues. It is indeed
conceivable that the economic circumstances influencing the implied γ (or labor
wedge fluctuations) would also influence what attitudes towards work people re-
port in a survey. Therefore, in section 3.4.3, I turn to micro data for descendants
of immigrants to the United States. This is a group with a common contempo-
raneous environment and country of birth, so any influence from an individual’s
country of origin can reasonably be assumed to reflect beliefs and values trans-
mitted through their parents, grandparents, and so on, i.e. these attitudes reflect
a cultural channel.
Additional Robustness Experiments
This section briefly outlines the robustness checks carried out; Appendix 3.B
supplies the details. Since the preliminary evidence points towards the preference
interpretation of the left-hand side of Equation 3.6, the point of departure of the
experiments is to investigate the robustness of the preference interpretation. I
therefore refer to what could a priori be capturing differences in preferences as
well as labor market frictions
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework was chosen to closely follow the existing related macroe-
conomic literature, but I have considered a number of alternative specifications.
36See Table 3.11.
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Within the class specified in equation 3.2, the baseline log-log specification (φ = 1)
implies a relatively high labor supply elasticity. Results are robust to higher val-
ues; Table 3.9 in Appendix 3.B shows the results of performing same regression
shown in Table 3.1, but with φ = 3. With typical values for other variables, this
corresponds to a Hicksian labor supply elasticity of roughly 0.5, which is in line
with both micro and macro estimates (see e.g. Chetty [2012]). Furthermore, I
have also considered a wider range of values for φ, as well as utility functions of
CES-type, of the type outlined by Greenwood Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988),
and of the type suggested by MaCurdy (1981). The backed-out preference param-
eter is strongly correlated to the baseline specification under all of the alternative
functional form-assumptions, ranging from 0.82–0.96, and the preference ordering
across countries changes little. The labor wedge fluctuations under misspecified
preferences robustness check mentioned above is another robustness check based
on a different theoretical experiment. It is also presented in more detail in Ap-
pendix 3.B.
In a final variation on the theoretical framework I follow Bick, Fuchs-Schündeln,
and Lagakos (2016), and Ohanian, Raﬄo, and Rogerson (2008), and include a
subsistence level of consumption in the representative agent’s utility function.
The results hold; they are presented in Table 3.10.
Data Used
The preference parameter γ is a function of variables, some of which have more
than one reasonable counterpart in the actual data. Perhaps most importantly, I
have considered calculating γ based on hours worked per working-age population
instead of per employed, as this is the measure of hours worked that some other
authors have used for calibrating representative agent models. Furthermore, I
have tried consumption excluding government spending instead of including (most
of) it, and calculating the consumption tax rate following Mendoza, Razin and
Tesar (1994) instead of Prescott (2004) as alternatives to my baseline choices.
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For the time dimension, instead of data from 2004, I have also used the average
γ over the expansion phase of 2002–2007. As Tables 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16 in
the appendix show, the results are robust to each of these respective variations.
Additional Control Variables
In Table 3.1, I include the right-hand side variables ex-ante most important to
control for. In addition, I have also tried variations of those measures, as well as
potentially more far-fetched explanatory variables. These variables are full unem-
ployment benefits as percentage of GDP; a broader measure of amount of spending
on unemployment, including spending on training programs, employment main-
tenance and recruitment incentives, in addition to actual unemployment benefits;
the length of paid parental leave; the expected number of retirement years; the
employment/population ratio restricted to working-age population; two rough
measures of credit constraints: Getting Credit, Distance to the Frontier from the
World Bank, and the difference between interest rates and inflation based on data
from the OECD; a number of different measures from the WVS (see below). De-
spite controlling for these additional variables, the results remain robust (and are
sometimes stronger in terms of statistical significance).
Alternative Cultural Variables
I have run the same regression as the one presented in Table 3.1, but with dif-
ferent variables from the WVS than the main one. This serves as both placebo
experiments, and as including additional control variables. For each of the alter-
native measures, I have both rerun the regressions presented in Table 3.1 with
C041 exchanged for the alternative measure, and run the regressions with C041 as
well as the alternative measure included. The alternative measures broadly fall in
three categories: the role of women, the degree of materialism, and left/right lean-
ings in political beliefs. I have chosen cultural dimensions that can plausibly be
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thought to impact labor supply decisions. For these three dimensions, that could
be through family structures and gender roles that impact household income and
the division of home production; it could be through a focus on material things
(achieved through labor income) as opposed to spiritual or social dimensions of
life (pursued during leisure time), or it could be through attitudes to taxation
and public goods provision as high taxes and a high degree of public goods provi-
sion both alter the labor/leisure trade-off and may impact the attitudes of survey
respondents.37 Throughout, C041 remains significant when it is included, and
when C041 is excluded, the placebo variables are statistically significant roughly
as frequently as what is predicted by chance alone.
3.4.2 Empirical Preferences for Leisure
Table 3.2 gives a picture of each individual country by looking at how much
its preference for leisure deviates from the average OECD preference for leisure,
γ¯, and how much of this deviation we can attribute to the individual factors
of the measured preference. For a given country, I simply move each of the
right-hand side variables in equation 3.6 from the country-specific value to the
OECD average, and look at how much this reduces the total deviation from the
average preference for leisure; this is what column 2-5 in Table 3.2 reports.38 This
approach, as opposed to say, looking at log-deviations from each respective input
variable, is an attempt to not completely abstract away from non-linearities and
37See Appendix 3.B for the precise questions.
38With total deviation denoted by ∆ ≡ γi−γ¯γ¯ (where (x1, ..., x4) = ( 1−hh , yc , (1− θ), (1− τ)),
γi = γ(xi1, ..., x
i
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interdependencies.39,40 For example, Germany’s preference for leisure is slightly
below the OECD average; this is the net effect of a low level of hours worked
and a high labor share, both increasing the measured preference for leisure, and a
significantly above average tax wedge, which work to decrease the preference for
leisure. Greece’s weak preference for leisure is driven mostly by high work hours,
and to a lesser extent by high taxes. Table 3.7 shows the model-based preference
measure and raw data for all the countries in the sample.
The precise variables driving a weak or strong model-based preference for leisure
vary substantially across countries. Based on the summary statistics presented
for the preference for leisure in Table 3.3, and the variables from Table 3.2, tax
rates and hours worked are the two most important sources of explanations for
differences in leisure preferences, but variations in the other variables are not
negligible. For ease of comparison, Table 3.3 and 3.7 also include the average
response to a World Values Survey (WVS) question. I discuss this measure is
below in section 3.3.
The differences in preferences for leisure are quite large, considering that prefer-
ences are commonly assumed to be constant across countries. These differences
in measured preferences are also likely capturing some cross-country differences
in a labor wedge, albeit, as I argue below, the fact is that labor wedge differences
39Table 3.2 takes as input variables (x1, ..., x4) = ( 1−hh ,
y
c , (1 − θ), (1 − τ)). While using
the model variable(x1, ..., x4) = ((1 − h), w, (1 − τ), c) may appear a more intuitive choice,
there are some advantages to the former choice. Including y and c as a ratio makes this
variable “unit-less” and insensitive to some choices that w and c in the other factorisation is
not (such as if and how to adjust for purchase power parity, and which population number
to normalize by). Looking at the impact of hours worked as a separate variable (instead of
splitting it up into leisure and w) is another important reason for the choice of input variables.
Moreover, by a fortunate coincidence, it gives a γ of averages (γ¯) equal to the average γ (up to
two decimals). Furthermore, modelling hypothetical changes in these variables is problematic,
as the model assumes decisions are made simultaneously and in conjunction. Conducting a
thought experiment regarding how much γ would change by moving one of its input factors to
some other number is an inherent violation of the model, since other variables themselves are
outcomes of the original value that gets changed in the thought experiment. Of course, this is a
problem for any attempt to decompose γ-differences into various “causes”, but casting doubt on
the feasibility of making a model interpretation for an exercise such as the one carried out here
does weaken the rationalization for preferring the variable decomposition used in the model.
40One disadvantage is that, in general,
∑
j∈N
∆(xj) 6= ∆. Appendix 3.A proposes an approach
achieving this, whilst also taking non-linearities into account. The results concerning the relative
importance of variables are very similar.
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Table 3.2: Country Percentage Deviation From the “Average” γ, and Each Indi-
vidual Argument’s Percentage Point Contribution to the Total Percentage Devi-
ation.
Country Total Dev. Hours labor Share GDP/Consump Tax Wedge
Australia 19.7 4.1 −5.6 −3.3 23.5
Austria −19.2 −0.9 6.8 1.7 −29.6
Belgium −14.5 15.4 7.3 1.5 −50.2
Canada 6.0 1.3 −2.4 −1.0 7.9
Czech Republic −3.8 −4.5 −4.9 7.3 −2.2
Denmark 11.3 17.5 4.0 −0.0 −11.7
Estonia −22.7 −15.8 −8.5 0.8 1.6
Finland −13.2 3.6 0.3 1.3 −19.7
France 5.4 22.7 8.5 −8.0 −23.4
Germany −6.0 24.7 9.8 −4.7 −50.0
Greece −35.7 −19.4 3.4 −7.0 −8.9
Hungary −65.5 −6.7 0.4 −0.5 −49.1
Iceland 0.2 −4.5 6.1 −10.8 8.2
Ireland 43.6 12.5 −15.0 22.6 25.9
Israel −12.4 −13.3 1.1 −4.1 3.7
Italy −22.2 −3.6 4.6 −3.8 −19.1
Japan 32.3 −1.6 −2.8 −0.9 36.2
Korea 22.9 −79.5 22.3 15.8 37.8
Luxembourg 30.5 17.7 −12.7 37.9 −17.9
Mexico −35.8 −32.0 −28.5 −4.6 21.1
Netherlands 51.7 43.7 14.9 8.7 −13.8
Norway 13.3 31.0 −15.4 13.5 −24.3
Poland −24.2 −14.5 −8.1 −8.8 7.9
Portugal −7.8 −1.4 7.0 −12.6 −1.5
Slovak Republic −16.7 2.2 −20.2 2.3 −1.7
Slovenia −8.2 2.8 10.7 0.7 −25.9
Spain 11.4 6.4 2.6 −2.4 5.0
Sweden 14.0 15.6 7.9 −1.1 −9.3
Switzerland 53.3 12.7 2.3 −0.3 42.7
Turkey −44.2 −7.2 −26.7 −7.3 2.9
United Kingdom 17.0 9.6 10.7 −17.8 12.9
United States 27.2 −3.2 7.2 −12.6 33.1
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD.
Notes: Total deviation from a γ of averages, γ
i−γ¯
γ¯ , and how much variable xj ’s deviation from





γ¯ . A positive number
indicates a positive contribution the deviation. Hence, for e.g. hours worked, since γ is de-
creasing in hours, a positive number is indicative of a below-average labor supply. Due to the
non-linear nature of γ(·), these contributions do not add up to the precise total deviation; see
Appendix 3.A for an approach that does achieve this, while still taking interdependencies into
account.
are empirically insufficient to serve as an explanation for different preferences
for leisure. The relative preference for leisure among different countries does not
accord with cultural stereotypes. Southern European countries such as Greece
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and Italy have a weaker preference for leisure than Germany, the Netherlands,
and other northern European countries, and the United States has a relatively
strong preference for leisure. Why this is the case, or why any given country has
a relatively high or low preference for leisure, varies across the sample.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of the Components of Equation 3.6
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. No.
γ 0.84 0.23 0.29 1.28 32
Hours 1,773 225 1,399 2,392 32
y/c 1.5 0.16 1.3 2.1 32
labor Share 0.62 0.07 0.42 0.76 32
τ 0.54 0.12 0.31 0.81 32
Hours Dev. Cont.∗ 14.1 21.3 −79.5 43.8 32
LS Dev. Cont.∗ 9.0 11.7 −28.5 22.3 32
y/c Dev. Cont.∗ 7.1 10.8 −17.8 37.9 32
τ Dev. Cont.∗ 19.6 24.9 −50.2 42.7 32
Hour Dev.: γi = γ¯∗ 14.9 18.9 −54.0 33.2 32
“Work Before Leisure” 2.82 0.36 2.11 3.36 32
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Summary statistics for components of Table 3.7, and Table 3.2.
∗ “Mean” of the deviation contribution-variables is mean of its respective absolute value; std.
dev., min., and max. are actual values.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between the preference for leisure and hours
worked. The negative correlation is significant at a 1 percent level, with an r-
squared of 0.22. Instead if this relationship is approached from the “opposite
direction”, equation 3.6 implies ln(h) = ln(y
c
) + ln(1 − θ) + ln(1 − τ) − ln[γ +
y
c
(1−θ)(1− τ)]. When estimating this equation by ordinary least squares, with a
cross-country constant γi = γ¯ ∀i, the r-squared result drops to 0.45, compared to
the perfect fit achieved (by construction) with country-varying γ.41 Furthermore,
a regular Wald test of whether the coefficients in this regression are in accordance
with the model, without a country-varying γ, rejects the null hypothesis at a 1
percent significance level.42 Thus, the overall picture is one where differences in
preferences should not be ignored when studying labor supply differences across
41The r-squared is relatively insensitive to choices of a constant preference for leisure different
from the average preference for leisure across OECD countries, as long as these choices do not
approach zero.
42Instead using (the log of) the model variables c, w, (1− τ) as the right-hand side variables
enhances the significance of rejecting the null.
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countries.
Figure 3.1: The Relationship Between the Model-based Preference for Leisure
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD.
Notes: γ from equation 3.6 plotted against annual hours worked. This illustrates that there is
(1) large dispersion in hours worked across countries, (2) a clear negative relationship between
these hours worked and the preference for leisure, and (3) a significant part of cross-country
differences in the model-based preference for leisure comes from other variables than hours
worked.
To more clearly illustrate how large the quantitative differences are in leisure
preferences across OECD countries using the more concrete unit of hours, I carry
out the exercise of fixing preferences across countries at an average preference
for leisure, and allow hours and consumption to adjust in accordance with the
model so that equation 3.6 holds.43 The adjustments range from a 54 percent
decrease (1073 hours) in labor supply for Hungary, to a 33 percent and 31 percent
increase for the Netherlands and Switzerland (464 and 517 hours respectively).44
43To be precise, hours and consumption will adjust according to the following:
hpred = hact+h∆ : (1−(hact+h∆))φ = γ¯cact
w(1− τ)+
γ¯c∆
w(1− τ) ; c∆ = h∆w(1−τ)κ; κ ≡
cact
w(1− τ)hact
where κ is set so that with zero labor input there will be no consumption or production.
44Fixing preferences and only allowing for hours to shift would give even larger adjustments,
but this would not be in keeping with the model, as only letting hours adjust would no longer
solve maximization problem 3.2: either, the consumer’s budget constraint would be violated,
or it would leave labor income unspent.
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The details of this exercise, and further illustrations of differences in the leisure
preference and its components, can be found in Appendix 3.A.
3.4.3 Microeconomic Evidence
In a cross-country comparison, while I try my best to overcome problems of omit-
ted variables by adding controls and through the different robustness exercises,
it is not possible to get at reverse causality issues. To overcome this endogeneity
problem, I follow the “epidemiological” approach and look at second and suc-
cessive generations of immigrants in the United States.45 As argued by, among
others, Bisin and Verdier (2001), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008), Tabellini
(2008), Algan and Cahuc (2010), and Dohmen et al. (2012), people’s prefer-
ences are determined partly by their contemporaneous environment, and partly
by attitudes, beliefs, values, and norms inherited from previous generations. By
comparing people who share the same institutional and economic setting, it is
possible to get closer to the differences that stem from cultural influences.
Second and higher generations of immigrants in the United States constitute
such a group of people, sharing the same contemporaneous environment, but
with potential differences in inherited cultural traits. I look at whether culturally
related preferences for leisure affect labor market decisions, as suggested by the
macro evidence in section 3.4.1, by including either the model-based measure
of leisure, γ, or the survey-based measure from the WVS, associated with an
individual’s heritage as an explanatory variable in a regression with hours worked
as the dependent variable (but, again, only including individuals born in the
United States). The results are supportive of the interpretation of the macro-
level evidence: that preferences for leisure differ across countries, and that this
shows up in aggregate variables.
This approach should be immune to reverse causality issues; it cannot be the
45That is, firs generation migrants are never included, only individuals born in the United
States. For a survey of this literature, see Fernández (2011).
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case that as an individual’s preference for leisure is an outcome of the current
economic or institutional environment, as that preference is based on data at
a considerable temporal as well as spatial distance. However, there are some
difficulties inherent to the approach. The timing of migration in combination
with data limitations is one. Another potential problem would be factors that
have an impact on labor market decisions that are distinct from the cultural
channel proposed here but nevertheless are related to ancestral country of origin.
I discuss these potential issues of the epidemiological approach, that are not
unique to this paper but a general problem of many papers in this literature, at
greater length in Appendix 3.C.2.46
Data and Results
The main data used is US Census data for 2013, the most recent available data
at the time this analysis was carried out.47,48 In addition, because it is the last
year in which specifically second-generation immigrants can be identified, I briefly
consider the 1970 US Census (immigrants themselves are always excluded from
the regressions).
46It is worth adding, as stated by Fernández (2011), that: “It should be noted explicitly
that the epidemiological approach is biased towards finding that culture does not matter. As
mentioned previously, the fact that parents are only one source of cultural transmission among
many and that they may have cultural attitudes that differ from the average ones in the country
of ancestry, implies that one is more likely to rule the cultural proxy insignificant. Thus, just like
the absence of convergence in disease does not provide definitive evidence in favor of genetics,
the absence of a significant coefficient on the cultural proxy does not imply that only the
economic and institutional setting matters.”
47Data downloaded from the IPUMS-USA Database, University of Minnesota,
www.ipums.org
48The reason for choosing 2013 as the time period studied is related to the timing issue
mentioned above. Ideally one would want data for individuals’ ancestors time of emigration,
and measure the country of origin-variable (γ or WVS) roughly coinciding with this point
in time. The data availability problem here is firstly that U.S. Census data only contains
the ancestral country of origin, without specifying the time of emigration or the number of
generations separating the respondents from their migrating ancestors. Secondly, the cultural
measures used are not measured sufficiently far back in time to coincide with this (unknown)
time of emigration. Due to these draw-backs, the necessary underlying assumption that justifies
using this data is that culture is sufficiently slow-moving. To minimize the timing disconnect,
the most recent available data is selected.
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I estimate the following reduced form equation:49
Hi,c = β0 + β1Cc + β2Xi + εi,c. (3.8)
The measure of hours worked, Hi,c, is the product of Usual hours worked and
(the midpoint of the intervall of) Weeks worked last year for individual i with
ancestor country c. Xi is a vector of personal characteristics (varying with the
specification), and εi,c is an error term. The variable of interest is Cc, which will
be the (either survey- or model-based) cultural measure associated with ancestor
country c.50
Related to the issue concerning confounding cultural values (discussed in Ap-
pendix 3.C.2), non-married and married individuals are studied separately. This
is done to mitigate the issue of within-couple gender-related cultural values, whose
effects have been established by, among others, Fernández and Fogli (2009).51 As
labor market decisions likely look quite different for married individuals, the pre-
ferred specification for married couples is the combined household labor supply.52
Since being unemployed is not necessarily a choice related to preferences, I ex-
clude unemployed individuals, and couples where both are unemployed.53
The main results of this section are presented in Tables 3.4–3.5, which show
OLS estimations of equation 3.8 for unmarried individuals and married couples
of prime working age, respectively. All columns include age (squared), sex, edu-
49The reason for not directly estimating the model relationship from section 3.2.1 is the lack
of consumption data, and potential difficulties in calculating precise individual marginal tax
rates.
50Table 3.18 shows the population composition and some basic characteristics split up on the
different ancestral countries. Only countries for which the cultural measures described above
exist are included.
51As a robustness check related to this, I also restrict the sample to the male working-age
population, and find that the results hold.
52The same regressions including married individuals, with individual hours worked as the
dependent variable have been considered for robustness; the results remain qualitatively the
same, and significant, but as would be expected in light of previous literature, they are weaker.
53It may also be argued that the United States should be excluded from this analysis; in-
cluding it basically assumes that the subset of individuals stating the U.S. as their country of
ancestry is a good proxy for cultural values prevailing in the country, despite them making up
only a subset of the people actually living there. Neither of these sample selection decisions
change the significance of the results shown below.
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cation, and dummy variables for metropolitan area; standard errors are clustered
at the country level.54 Given the documented importance of race in the U.S labor
market, I include racial dummies.55 In columns 2–3 and 5–6, unearned income,
number of children below the age of five, and wage, are also included.56 The
negative, significant coefficient on the cultural measure of preferences for leisure
across all the specifications is supportive of there being a culturally related as-
pect of preferences for leisure, varying between countries, in line with what was
suggested by the across-country macro level results presented in section 3.4.1.
Recall that a high value of either γ or WVS is indicative of a stronger preference
for leisure.
Table 3.4 shows these regressions with a population that is restricted to a sample
of individuals between the ages of 30 and 50 years (inclusive). This age range
captures what are arguably the two most active decades in individuals’ working
lives. If differences in age distributions are correlated with ancestral measures
of preferences for leisure (and the age controls do not fully capture its impact),
looking at prime working age individuals should pose less of a problem than an
unrestricted sample.57
Corresponding regressions for married couples, with spouses combined hours
worked as the dependent variable, are shown in Table 3.5. Couples are given the
average γ (or WVS) of the two individuals’ ancestral countries.58 Age and educa-
tion controls are included for both individuals, and unearned income is included
at household level. The results are similar to those for unmarried individuals.
54For couples, to the extent that the small number of clusters is a problem, I can cluster
at the unique country of ancestry combination of the couple. That increases the statistical
significance substantially, compared to clustering at either the level of husband or wife country
of ancestry.
55See e.g. Altonji and Blank (1999) for the importance of race. Results are very similar with
race dummies excluded.
56Where the wage is missing, it has been replaced by its predicted value from a linear
regression.
57The corresponding results for a sample unrestricted by age is presented in Appendix 3.C.
The results are robust.
58Including both the individual measures of a couple instead of the average yields similar
results; generally, these results are statistically stronger if joint significance is considered.
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Table 3.4: Labor Supply and Inherited Preference for Leisure: OLS Estimation
of Equation 3.8 (Unmarried; Prime Working Age)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
γ −138.2 −137.7 −226.4
(−2.89) (−2.83) (−3.46)
“Work Before −131.2 −130.4 −144.9
Leisure” (−6.57) (−6.30) (−9.95)
GDP/Hour 2.63 1.18
(2.39) (1.91)
Age; Sex; Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education
Unearned; Wage No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
No. Child<5
Observations 123,101 123,101 123,101 123,101 123,101 123,101
Adjusted R2 0.759 0.760 0.760 0.759 0.760 0.760
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at country level (32 clusters). Dummies for metropolitan area and race included.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on U.S. 2013 Census data, retrieved from IPUMS.
Notes: The dependent variable is annual hours worked for unmarried individuals, within the
age span of 30–50 years. Dummy variables for metropolitan area of residence and race are
included throughout. Standard errors calculated allowing for clustering at the country level. If
missing, wage is replaced by a predicted wage.
Economically, although the effects are not very large, they are also not negligible:
a one standard deviation increase in γ (WVS) corresponds to approximately 32–
52 (47–52) hours less worked in a year for individuals, and 58–95 (87–99) hours
for couples.59 Of the two cultural measures, the survey-based measure appears
to be the slightly less noisy one.
Robustness
The approach taken above should avoid endogeneity caused by reverse causality.
In 2013, the economic and institutional environment in the United States cannot
possibly be causing individual attitudes that were held (or the economic variables
going into constructing γ) in other countries by individuals’ ancestors many years
prior to 2013. There are, however, other possible reasons for why the cultural
59These figures are calculated by multiplying the standard deviation of 0.23 for γ with
respectively the minimum and maximum of the coefficients from columns 1–3, and analogously
for WV S.
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Table 3.5: Labor Supply and Inherited Preference for Leisure: OLS Estimation
of Equation 3.8 (Households; Prime Working Age)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
γ −252.5 −257.7 −415.2
(−3.39) (−3.28) (−3.62)
“Work Before −244.1 −250.2 −275.2
Leisure” (−11.14) (−10.69) (−15.38)
GDP/Hour 5.048 2.547
(2.86) (4.14)
Age; Sex; Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education
Unearned; Wage; No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
No. child<5
Observations 150,872 150,872 150,872 150,872 150,872 150,872
Adjusted R2 0.906 0.907 0.907 0.906 0.907 0.907
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at country level (32 clusters). Dummies for metropolitan area and race included.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on U.S. 2013 Census data, retrieved from IPUMS.
Notes: The dependent variable is annual hours worked for households with both spouses within
the age span of 30–50. γ and “Work Before Leisure” are calculated as the average of spouses’
individual values. If missing, wage is replaced by a predicted wage. Standard errors calculated
allowing for clustering at the country level.
measures here may be endogenous. One example is if other factors related to the
country of ancestry, correlated to preferences for leisure, affect labor market out-
comes without having anything to do with differences in underlying preferences.
A clear candidate for other reasons why cultural measures may be endogenous,
is human capital differences related to an individual’s ancestral background. For
this reason, in columns 3 and 6 in Tables 3.4–3.5 (as well as in corresponding
regression tables presented in Appendix 3.C), a rough measure of human capital
as it relates to ancestry is included, namely GDP per hour worked. Interestingly,
this measure only works to strengthen the results, both in terms of economic and
statistical significance. I have also tried various measures of educational qual-
ity from Hanushek and Woessmann (2012), or the average educational level of
parents of the same ancestral background; all yield similar results.60
60Alternatively, one could directly include the educational level of parents as control vari-
ables. The issue with this is that data availability heavily skews the sample population towards
younger people. In the subset of the population for which educational level of parents is known,
80 percent are of age 18–30, compared to 20 percent for the unrestricted case. Conditional on
excluding individuals in school, the results are the same also with this measure.
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For reasons discussed in Appendix 3.C, I also try restricting the sample to males,
study a sample unrestricted in terms of age, and look at a sample restricted to
second generation migrants.61 The results, all robust to these variations, are
presented in Tables 3.19, 3.20, 3.21, and 3.22.
At the very least, this micro-level investigation is consistent with the interpreta-
tion of the macro level findings suggested above: there are cross-country cultural
differences in preferences for leisure, and these differences are significant enough
to be detected in national accounts data, in a survey, and looking at labor supply
decisions taking place within the same labor market.
3.5 Differences in Preferences for Leisure and La-
bor Taxation
I provide a final piece of support for the interpretation of cross-sectional labor-
wedge differences as non-negligible cross-country differences in preferences for
leisure by investigating their relationship with labor taxes. I theoretically ask
the following question. Suppose preferences for leisure differ across countries,
what relationship between preferences for leisure and labor taxation should we
then expect? I then test whether the empirical relationship line up with the
theoretical prediction. In that sense, this exercise constitutes an “out of sample”
test of the cross-country differences in preferences for leisure that the preceding
section finds.
In addition, this section can be interpreted as an illustration of the responsive-
ness of policy choices to underlying cultural differences. As such, it argues that
advancing policy (or institutional) differences as an ultimate explanatory fac-
tor may be inadequate as it takes these differences as exogenous when, in fact,
observed policy heterogeneity could partly be caused by underlying preference
61Other regressions include also higher successive generations. First generation migrants are
never included.
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heterogeneity.62 In the setting I study, countries may tax higher because ‘they
can’ (because taxes are less distortionary); to the extent that is the case, dif-
ferences in preferences for leisure attenuate the observed negative relationship
between labor supply and taxation as taxes are higher where the preference for
leisure is weaker.
3.5.1 Theoretical Relationship
To investigate the interaction of preferences for leisure and labor taxation theo-
retically, I start by showing that the labor supply wage (semi-)elasticity increases
with the preference for leisure.63 I then present an extended version of the model
from Section 3.2.1, altered to explicitly include government spending in the repre-
sentative consumer’s utility function. This modification enables me to talk about
optimal taxation — without it, the optimal tax rate is always zero. I show that
the theoretically optimal taxation is, ceteris paribus, decreasing in γ.
As countries differ in other respects than their preference for leisure, I calibrate
wages and unearned income in the model to empirical data and calculate the
optimal model tax rate across countries. I find that the negative relationship
between taxes and preferences for leisure does not appear to be driven by cross-
country differences in the other variables that the model contains. This negative
theoretical relationship is the key prediction that the model delivers, and it is
what I test below in Section 3.5.2.
To get an expression for the labor supply (semi-)elasticity, I first rearrange equa-
tion 3.3 with the agent’s budget constraint substituted for c to get an expression
that implicitly defines optimal hours worked:64
62For a good review of the interaction between culture and institutions, see Alesina and
Giuliano (2015).
63What I need for the setting where I look at theoretically optimal taxation is the semi-
elasticity; since the literature on tax distortions usually focus on the elasticity, I start by
showing an increasing relationship between γ and the standard Marshallian elasticity.
64There is no closed form solution except in the special case of log-log utility.
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h∗(w, T˜ , τ, ρ, φ, γ) : (1− h∗t )φw(1− τ) = γ
[
wh∗(1− τ) + T˜ ], T˜ = T
1 + τc
(3.9)
The (uncompensated) elasticity of labor supply, M ≡ ∂h∗
∂w
w
h∗ , can be obtained by









; E ≡ wh
∗(1− τ)
wh∗(1− τ) + T˜ ; H ≡
h∗
1− h∗ (3.10)
To the extent that government revenue is used for public goods expenditures
(separable in utility from private consumption), which is the setting I will study
here, the uncompensated elasticity is the relevant one for evaluating the distor-
tionary effects of taxes.65 Although γ does not appear explicitly in the expression
for M , it is a function of γ via E and H, that are both functions of γ through
h∗. Since ∂h∗
∂γ
< 0, the earned share of income, E, and H, are decreasing in γ.
Therefore, the denominator in equation 3.10 is decreasing in γ, and the numerator
increasing, implying that the Marshallian elasticity is unambiguously increasing
in γ.










By an argument analogous to the one for the elasticity above, H
E
decreases with
γ, so eM unambiguously increases with γ.66 I will make use of this result to show
65If government revenue is instead given back to the consumer, the Hicksian (compensated)
elasticity would be the relevant one. This can be obtained using the Slutsky decomposition and












Analogous to the argument for the Marshallian elasticity, the Hicksian elasticity will also be
unambiguously increasing in γ.




that the theoretically optimal tax rate decreases with γ. In the setting below,
the difference between a social optimum achieved through lump sum taxes, and
the case of distortionary taxation, is directly proportional to the semi-elasticity,
and therefore increasing in γ.67
To study the optimal (relative) level of labor tax rates, I modify the framework
from section 3.2.1 to include utility from government spending.68 The addition of
utility from government spending enables me to talk about differences in the opti-
mal level of taxation. Specifically, let the utility of public spending be represented
by an increasing, differentiable and concave function G, and define the indirect
utility function v(τ, w, T˜ , φ, γ) = U(c∗, (1 − h∗)), where c∗ = c(τ, w, T˜ , φ, γ) and
h∗ = h(τ, w, T˜ , φ, γ) solves the household maximization problem 3.2. A benevo-
lent government maximizes utility according to
max
g,τ











Without any distortionary effects from taxation, the optimal level of taxation







Hence, the term ∂h∗
∂τ
wτ is what is different between this setting and a social
optimum that allows for lump sum taxes; it captures the distortionary effect
of taxation.69 Since ∂h∗
∂τ
wτ = eMw ∝ eM , it follows from Equation 3.11 that
the distortion increases with the preference for leisure. As distortions are larger
with a stronger preference for leisure, the optimal level of taxes τ is lower when
Mh∗ = 1−E
φH˜+E˜
where E˜ ≡ w(1−τ)wh(1−τ)+T ; H˜ ≡ 11−h ; both E˜ and H˜ are decreasing in γ why ∂h
∗
∂w w
must increase with γ.
67An alternative way to phrase this is that the difference between the marginal utility of
private and public consumption in optimum, which in some sense is a measure of the tax-based
distortion, will be directly proportional to the semi-elasticity.
68In a standard Ramsey framework, it is usually the optimal composition of taxes that is
studied. There, the level of government revenue is exogenously given and of no benefit to the
consumer. Hence, the framework is not well-suited for studying level-differences.
69The expression 1
wh∗+ ∂h∂τ wτ
can also be interpreted as the marginal (utility) cost of public
funds, as it captures to what extent the marginal utility of government spending needs to be
greater in optimum than the marginal utility of private consumption.
145
preferences for leisure are stronger — that is the key theoretical prediction that
I will test empirically below.
The elasticity M above is a partial equilibrium object. In the general equilibrium
version of the model, where other variables adjust as hours change, M will not
capture precisely how the steady state equilibrium hours respond to changes in





depend on precisely how the relationship between hours, wages, and unearned
income is specified.70 I show in Appendix 3.D that, in the setting presented here,
GE, like M , is increasing in γ.
Cross-Country Optimal Taxation
Above, I showed that there is a ceteris paribus downward relationship between
the preference for leisure and labor taxation. Here, I investigate whether it holds
across countries when I confront the model with differences in the other vari-
ables. I calibrate the model outlined above using OECD data for the same set
of countries that I use in previous sections and look at the relationship between
the theoretically optimal tax rate and the model-based preference for leisure. I
do this first in a partial equilibrium (PE) model, keeping wages and unearned
income constant when hours worked change, and then in a general equilibrium
(GE) setting; the results are qualitatively identical.
The specific data and functional form choices are as follows. A benevolent govern-
ment solves maximization problem 3.12, with the baseline utility function from
Section 3.2.1, and G(g) = ψln(g), with ψ chosen so as to match the average
model tax rate with the average of actual tax rates across countries.71 To cali-
70I take the derivative with respect to (1−τ) instead of w as w will be an outcome in general
equilibrium.
71The functional form of utility from government spending is not crucial.

























brate model wages, I set the U.S. wage rate to a Cobb-Douglas steady state level






wUS, i.e. I keep relative model wages equal to the corresponding
relative empirical wages.72 Unearned income is set based on the capital share
of GDP.73 Figure 3.2 plots the solution to the partial equilibrium version of the
problem, i.e. the country-specific optimal model tax rates (light grey), and the
actual tax rates (black) across countries, against the preference for leisure, γ.
In Figure 3.2, the amount of variation generated by preference heterogeneity,
measured by the range of fitted values of optimal model taxes, is 8.8 percentage
points. That implicitly compares optimal tax rates to a horisontal line where
everything across countries is constant. Since that is not the case and other
variables (correlated to preferences for leisure) change across countries, optimal
tax rates with fixed preferences for leisure but country-specific values for other
variables should be the point of reference to judge the magnitude of variation
generated by country-specific preferences for leisure. Compared to this alternative
baseline, preference for leisure-heterogeneity generates a 23.8 percentage point
difference relative to the fitted values of optimal model taxes when preferences
are held constant. Figure 3.6 in Appendix 3.D illustrates the difference; it plots
both the optimal model taxes calculated with a cross-country constant γ = γ¯,
and with country-varying γ.74
The qualitative pattern of optimal taxes being decreasing in the preference for
leisure remains the same in general equilibrium. There, I allow for wages and
unearned income to adjust to their steady state equilibrium values, with T ac-
72Here, y is GDP/Employment, with GDP PPP-adjusted excluding defence expenditure,
and h actual average hours worked. Results are not sensitive to including defence employment
and expenditure.
73Government revenue from taxes are not part of the unearned income here as it is allocated
to government spending.
74The γ used in the figures is the one calculated when government spending is not included
in the consumption figure of equation 3.6 in section 3.2.1. This is because, in this section, gov-
ernment revenue will be spent on a separable public good, and not given back to the consumer.
The differences for optimal taxes are marginal, and the results from previous sections also hold
with this alternative consumption, as demonstrated in Appendix 3.B.
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Figure 3.2: Actual Tax Rates, and Optimal Partial Equilibrium Model Tax Rates
with Country Varying γ
Source: Author’s calculations, based on OECD data.
Notes: The graph plots two different data points for each country against the country-specific
γ:
1. The actual tax wedges, as defined by equation 3.2.
2. The optimal model tax, which will be the τ solving the maximization problem 3.12 (actual
FOC given by equation 3.13) with country varying γ.
In addition, the linear fit of these data series are included. Country labels for the model tax
rate series are excluded to not overcrowd the center of the graph; countries are identified by
their Preference-for-Leisure value being the same for the two series.
cording to T = θwh∗
1−θ (1 − τcap), and add a term, τcap θwh
∗
1−θ , to the governments
budget constraint, paid by the capital owner (τcap is an exogenously given tax on
capital income, calculated following Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994), and not
needed for any of the results).75 The amount of variation in optimal taxation
75The government problem in itself looks very similar, but with a modified FOC, taking into
account other variables’ responses to changes in hours worked:
max
g,τ

























With log-log utility, h∗ = (1−θ)(1−τ)(γ+1)(1−τ)(1−θ)+γθ(1−τcap) , and the indirect utility function v(τ ; p) =
ln[wh∗(1 − τ) + θw1−θh∗(1 − τcap)] + γln[1 − h∗]. Because the wage rate is determined by the
capital/labor ratio, and this in turn in the steady state version is pinned down by the primitive
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that preference heterogeneity generates, corresponding to the partial equilibrum
numbers of 7.8 and 23.8 percentage points, are 4.8 and 7.4 percentage points
in general equilibrium (see Appendix 3.D, Figures 3.7 and 3.8 for the general
equilibrium pictures corresponding to Figures 3.2 and 3.6).
The move to general equilibrium dampens the negative relationship between the
optimal tax rate and the preference for leisure. The intuition is as follows. In
partial equilibrium when taxes increase, the corresponding drop in hours worked
only harms labor income, which is why the unearned share of total income also
increases. The labor supply therefore responds more strongly to tax changes,
and this tax change sensitivity is relatively larger for large γ, mirroring the fact
that the labor supply elasticity increases with the preference for leisure (and
unearned income, T). In general equilibrium, the unearned share of income does
not increase as much with a tax increase, making the response in hours worked
weaker, and hence less sensitive to differences in γ.76 The model matches wages
(or GDP/Hour and labor shares) by construction in both general and partial
equilibrium. The downward relationship between hours and γ is matched, but it
is exaggerated due to the failure to match the negative magnitude between tax
rates and γ. Appendix 3.D includes plots of actual and predict hours worked
against γ, in both partial and general equilibrium.
The theoretical model outlined in this section predicts a negative relationship be-
tween preferences for leisure and taxes; this theoretical prediction holds also when
the model is confronted with differences in other variables. In the subsequent
section, I investigate whether empirical reality is in line with the theory. This
constitutes an additional “out-of-sample” test by asking the question of whether
the relationship between labor taxation and preferences for leisure is in line with
parameters, the (steady state equilibrium) wage does not respond to changes in hours worked.
The expression τcap is also included in the firm’s problem. τcap is exogenous, estimated based
on national accounts data following Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), and adjusted for con-
sumption taxes, analogously to how the labor tax wedge above is adjusted; other variables are
as above. The log-log-log version of the problem does have an analytical solution. Because I
conduct sensitivity analysis to different functional forms, I solve it numerically.
76In fact, it may theoretically decrease if θ1−θ (1− τcap) is larger than (1− τ).
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the theoretical prediction generated by preference heterogeneity.
3.5.2 Empirical Relationship
It is not obvious that one would expect to find the negative relationship between
the preference for leisure and the labor tax that the theoretical framework above
predicts. In cross-country data, basic correlations with hours worked and GDP
suggest a positive relationship.77 Existing research on the interaction between
taxes and raw hours worked indeed suggests a positive relationship. For exam-
ple, Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2006) note that between the 1970s and the
1990s/2000s, the countries where labor taxes have increased significantly are the
same countries where average hours worked have decreased.78
However, empirical evidence does line up with the theoretically predicted negative
relationship. I regress the labor tax wedge, as defined above in equation 3.2, on
preferences for leisure, GDP per capita, government revenue as a share of GDP,
and a few labor market indicators, and find a significant and negative relationship
between the taste for leisure and labor income taxes.
Table 3.6 and 3.23 in the appendix show the regressions with preferences for
leisure as γ and WVS respectively. One reason for the strong correlation between
γ and incmoe taxes may be the mechanical effect of labor taxes on γ, where, by
construction, high labor taxes will push down γ. This is clearly not the case for
the WVS measure, which is the main reason for why I include it. Since I find the
same negative correlation with a measure of preferences for leisure that lacks a
mechanical relationship with tax rates, that mechanical relationship is insufficient
to explain the relationship between preferences for leisure and labor taxes.
77Both preferences for leisure and labor taxes are negatively correlated with hours worked,
and both are positively correlated with GDP per capita; that is true for both the model-based
and the survey-based measure of preferences for leisure, where the latter one does not have a
negative mechanical relationship with labor taxes.
78In a similar spirit, Michau (2013) gives a theoretical argument showing how tax increases
in the past generation may have had an impact on the attitudes of the present generation: when
high taxes make it less rewarding for people to work, it is rational for them to pass on a more
relaxed attitude towards work to their children.
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An interesting note is that these measures for preferences show a stronger correla-
tion with taxes than do other WVS questions meant to more directly capture the
preferences for taxes or redistribution. In the tables here, the line “Gov. provide”
is question e037 from the World Values Survey, which asks to what extent peo-
ple themselves or the government “should take more responsibility to ensure that
everyone is provided for.” Substituting this question with the question asking
whether “hard work brings success” or whether “it’s more a matter of luck”, which
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) documented as having power for explaining the level
of redistribution, yields similar results.79
Section 3.5.1 theoretically answers the question suppose there were differences in
preferences across countries, how would we then expect labor taxation to covary
with the preference for leisure? The fact that labor taxes empirically line up with
this theoretical negative prediction reinforces the evidence from previous sections
that there exists non-negligible differences in preferences across countries large
enough to be picked up at a macro level. It also constitutes an illustration of how
policy differences may arise as an endogenous response to cultural differences.
79Dropping the Nordics dummy does not alter the results.
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Table 3.6: Taxes and Preferences for Leisure (γ)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
γ −.23 −.42 −.25 −.27 −.32 −.3 −.29 −.35
(−2.83) (−4.28) (−3.95) (−3.93) (−4.04) (−3.49) (−3.38) (−4.22)
GDP/Cap .0062 .0018 .0023 .002 .0025 .0025 −.0022
(2.89) (1.26) (1.39) (1.19) (1.32) (1.32) (−0.79)
Gov. Rev/GDP .013 .013 .011 .012 .012 .0077
(6.99) (6.58) (4.21) (4.00) (3.95) (2.30)
Union Memb. −.00064 −.00028 −.00037 −.00015 .00056
Density (−0.59) (−0.24) (−0.31) (−0.12) (0.47)
Unemployment .15 .14 .15 .16
Benefits (1.51) (1.35) (1.41) (1.64)
Tax Evasion .0095 .0027 .007
(0.73) (0.16) (0.46)




Nordics .064 .028 −.091 −.061 −.059 −.062 −.069 −.082
(1.26) (0.60) (−2.71) (−0.99) (−0.92) (−0.93) (−1.01) (−1.31)
Observations 33 33 33 31 28 27 27 27
R2 0.232 0.404 0.783 0.790 0.795 0.782 0.787 0.833
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.342 0.752 0.747 0.736 0.701 0.693 0.745
t statistics in parentheses
p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the tax wedge as defined in equation 3.2. γ is the
model-based measure of preferences for leisure from section 3.2.1. Gov Rev./ GDP is total
government revenue as a percentage of GDP; Union Memb. Density is the share of employed
that are trade union members; unemployment benefits are measured as the replacement rate; the
measure of tax evasion is taken from Buehn and Schneider (2012); “Gov. Provide” is the mean
response to the WVS question e037: to what extent individuals themselves or the government
should take more responsibility to provide for people; Nordics (as above) is included due to
the atypical labor supply subsidizing government spending of these countries, which alters the
distortionary effects of taxation. The results are not sensitive to excluding the “Nordics” dummy
(if anything, they are slightly stronger).
152
3.6 Conclusion
Insights into potential differences in preferences for leisure are important, not
merely to form a better fundamental understanding of the economic realities
we study. Knowledge of such differences also impacts interpretations of various
other labor market determinants, and delivers distinctive predictions for design-
ing optimal policies. By looking at national accounts data through the lens of
a representative agent model, I back out an implied preference parameter and
relate it to a survey-based measure of preferences for leisure. The fact that a
survey-based measure covaries more strongly with the model-based measure than
a host of labor market indicators meant to capture labor market frictions sug-
gests that the model-based measure is in fact picking up meaningful differences in
preferences. This interpretation also is supported by micro-level results. Follow-
ing the epidemiological approach, I find that the preference for leisure associated
with an individual’s stated country of ancestry has predictive power for the labor
supply of U.S. born workers.
Interestingly, public opinion appears to be mistaken concerning which countries
are the most leisure-loving. My results suggest that it is northern rather than
southern European countries that have the stronger preference for leisure. The
United States, according to the proposed measures, is not the work-loving country
it is often assumed to be.
Differences in labor taxation line up with what a relatively mainstream theoretical
framework predicts based on distortionary differences that arise from differences
in preferences. This relationship, between suggested cultural differences and tax
policy, constitutes further support of non-negligible cross-country differences in
preferences, detectable at the macro level. In addition, the relationship illustrates
the error of ignoring the possibility of policy (or institutional) differences being
an endogenous response to underlying cultural differences, as this may bias policy
impact estimates. The bias caused here would be to understate the distortionary
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effect that taxation has on labor supply in a cross-country setting, as it is partly
mitigated by the on average weaker preference for leisure in high-tax countries.
To what extent institutional and policy differences more generally can be ex-
plained partly as country-specific responses to their respective cultural environ-
ment is an exciting avenue for future research. Once social multiplier-effects are
taken into account, relatively small differences in cultural values, preferences, or
beliefs, can cause significant differences in optimal equilibrium responses for both
individual agents and policy-makers.
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Appendix 3.A Model-Based Preferences
Tabel 3.7 gives the raw data used to construct the model-based preference for
leisure, as well as the individual country values of the average response to question
c041 from the WVS. Figure 3.3 plots the model-based measure against the survey-
based.







































2 2.5 3 3.5
World Values Survey
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Raw correlation between the model-based preference parameter, γ, and the mean answer
to question C041 from the WVS: Work should always come first, even if it means less spare
time.
155
Table 3.7: Raw Data and Model Variables for the Components of Equation 3.6
Country γ Hours y/c 1− θ τ Leisure Cons. Wage WVS
Australia 1.00 1,733 1.46 0.59 0.42 0.67 48,451 24.2 3.36
Austria 0.67 1,786 1.53 0.68 0.66 0.66 48,390 28.1 2.59
Belgium 0.71 1,549 1.52 0.68 0.71 0.70 52,797 35.3 3.16
Canada 0.88 1,758 1.48 0.61 0.50 0.66 45,520 23.3 3.04
Czech Republic 0.80 1,827 1.62 0.59 0.55 0.65 28,188 14.8 2.58
Denmark 0.93 1,579 1.50 0.64 0.58 0.70 43,653 26.7 2.75
Estonia 0.64 1,996 1.51 0.56 0.53 0.62 22,048 9.4 2.87
Finland 0.72 1,723 1.52 0.62 0.62 0.67 45,373 25.0 3.14
France 0.88 1,501 1.39 0.68 0.62 0.71 51,621 32.3 3.15
Germany 0.78 1,436 1.43 0.69 0.70 0.72 49,837 34.3 2.43
Greece 0.54 2,092 1.35 0.66 0.59 0.60 47,506 20.1 2.71
Hungary 0.29 1,986 1.48 0.63 0.81 0.62 29,075 13.6 2.18
Iceland 0.83 1,825 1.35 0.66 0.50 0.65 48,480 23.8 3.26
Ireland 1.20 1,668 1.78 0.56 0.43 0.68 47,155 28.3 3.02
Israel 0.73 1,942 1.43 0.63 0.52 0.63 49,332 22.9 2.11
Italy 0.65 1,826 1.43 0.66 0.63 0.65 52,539 27.1 2.72
Japan 1.10 1,787 1.49 0.61 0.36 0.66 39,865 20.2 3.31
Korea 1.02 2,392 1.72 0.76 0.33 0.54 28,473 15.5 2.92
Luxembourg 1.09 1,607 2.11 0.57 0.59 0.69 47,543 35.3 2.92
Mexico 0.54 2,271 1.40 0.43 0.31 0.56 21,562 5.7 2.45
Netherlands 1.26 1,399 1.59 0.69 0.58 0.73 44,487 34.8 3.34
Norway 0.94 1,420 1.70 0.55 0.62 0.73 51,677 33.8 2.83
Poland 0.63 1,983 1.34 0.56 0.48 0.62 26,938 10.2 2.59
Portugal 0.77 1,790 1.32 0.67 0.54 0.66 31,767 15.7 2.63
Slovak Republic 0.69 1,742 1.54 0.50 0.55 0.66 24,131 10.7 2.32
Slovenia 0.76 1,737 1.51 0.70 0.64 0.67 31,769 19.4 2.66
Spain 0.93 1,704 1.47 0.64 0.52 0.67 42,900 23.5 2.71
Sweden 0.95 1,605 1.48 0.67 0.57 0.69 49,336 30.4 3.16
Switzerland 1.28 1,673 1.49 0.63 0.36 0.68 44,353 25.0 2.83
Turkey 0.47 1,918 1.32 0.42 0.51 0.63 26,497 7.7 2.11
United Kingdom 0.97 1,674 1.30 0.68 0.48 0.68 54,162 28.8 3.21
United States 1.06 1,802 1.36 0.66 0.37 0.65 64,682 32.2 3.12
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Cross-country data for the components of equation 3.6. Data is from 2004, extracted
from the OECD Data Library. Hours is actual annual hours worked; y/c is the OECD variable
“Actual Individual Consumption” measured as share of GDP, where “Actual” refers to the
variable including the government expenditure on final good consumption; 1 − θ the is labor
share; τ is the labor tax wedge as defined in equation 3.2; Leisure is 5200−Hours5200 ; Cons. is yearly
consumption per employed (incl. self-employed) in purchasing power parity in terms of U.S.
dollars; Wage is the model wage y(1−θ)Hours·Employed .
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3.A.1 Decomposition of Differences in the Preference for
Leisure (γ)
Table 3.2 illustrates how individual variables contribute to deviations from an
average γ by setting the variable in question to its own average value. Perhaps,
a more straightforward way of decomposing γ would be to look at log-deviations
from averages. Since γ here is seen as a multiplicative function of four factors,
log(γ
γ¯
) = log(γ)− log(γ¯) = (log(x1)− log(x¯1))+ ...+(log(x4)− log(x¯4)).80 The ad-
vantage of the above approach is mainly that it does not ignore the non-linearities
and inter-dependencies in γ(·) in the same way as a log-decomposition does. For
example, in two countries with a 20 percent above-average labor supply, this
“excess” labor supply would be treated as giving the same contribution to the
γi
γ¯
-deviation, regardless of whether one country has low labor taxes and a high
labor share, and the other one high taxes and a low labor share. It does appear
desirable to treat the former case as one where the above average labor supply
constitutes a bigger contribution to a relatively low γ than the latter.




∆(xj) 6= ∆; it will systematically give high values for relatively large γs,
and low values for low γs. Outlined below is an approach similar in spirit to the
one given in Section 3.2.1, but modified such that the individual deviation contri-
butions actually do sum up to the total contribution. The reason for nevertheless
presenting the approach in Section 3.2.1 is mainly its simplicity.
The approach in this section is a compromise between taking non-linearities and
interdependencies into account, and still achieving a decomposition into parts
that add up to the total deviation. Below, it is stated in general terms. For
the special case used in Section 3.2.1, N = 4, x is the individual country i’s




80This would give the same relative picture as only considering the γ(x¯−j ,xj)−γ¯γ¯ -term in the
proposed weighted average, above.
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country value. As such, the decomposition will give an individual argument’s
contribution to the deviation from a γ of averages (as opposed to the average γ).
Table 3.8 presents the decomposition using the approach specified below, with
x = (h, y
c
, (1− θ), (1− τ)).
Table 3.8: Country Percentage Deviation From the “Average” γ, Decomposed
Into Individual Argument’s Percentage Point Contribution to the Total Percent
Deviation.
Country Total Dev. Hours labor Share GDP/Consump Tax Wedge
Australia 19.9 4.0 −4.4 −2.9 23.2
Austria −19.1 −0.9 8.6 2.1 −28.9
Belgium −14.4 19.0 9.1 1.7 −44.2
Canada 6.2 1.5 −1.6 −0.9 7.2
Czech Republic −3.7 −4.4 −4.3 7.9 −3.0
Denmark 11.5 18.2 4.6 0.1 −11.4
Estonia −22.6 −16.3 −8.6 1.0 1.2
Finland −13.1 4.2 1.0 1.6 −19.8
France 5.6 25.3 9.4 −7.5 −21.6
Germany −5.8 30.5 11.6 −4.7 −43.1
Greece −35.6 −21.2 5.0 −8.4 −11.1
Hungary −65.5 −11.4 1.2 −0.8 −54.5
Iceland 0.3 −4.3 6.9 −10.2 7.9
Ireland 43.8 11.2 −11.3 20.8 23.1
Israel −12.3 −13.2 1.8 −4.2 3.3
Italy −22.1 −3.9 6.0 −4.1 −20.1
Japan 32.5 −1.2 −1.7 −0.6 36.1
Korea 23.1 −57.8 23.8 15.9 41.2
Luxembourg 30.7 17.0 −10.1 39.7 −15.9
Mexico −35.7 −33.3 −29.9 −5.7 33.2
Netherlands 51.9 42.4 13.8 7.6 −11.9
Norway 13.5 34.6 −13.1 13.8 −21.9
Poland −24.1 −15.2 −8.3 −9.5 9.0
Portugal −7.6 −1.3 8.2 −12.2 −2.3
Slovak Republic −16.6 2.6 −19.3 2.7 −2.5
Slovenia −8.1 3.1 12.6 0.8 −24.7
Spain 11.5 6.4 3.2 −2.2 4.0
Sweden 14.2 15.9 8.4 −0.9 −9.2
Switzerland 53.5 11.1 2.7 −0.1 39.8
Turkey −44.1 −9.2 −29.1 −9.3 3.5
United Kingdom 17.2 9.5 11.1 −15.3 11.9
United States 27.4 −2.7 7.4 −10.6 33.3
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD.
Notes: Deviations from an average γ, γ
i−γ¯
γ¯ , decomposed into individual variable contributions,
following the approach outlined in this section. A positive number indicates a positive con-
tribution the deviation. Hence, for e.g. hours worked, a positive number is indicative of a
below-average labor supply. γ¯ = 0.833 ≈ 0.835 = γav.
Consider a continuous, real-valued function f : RN → R , and vectors x,y ∈ RN .
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Let ∆ ≡ f(x)−f(y)
f(y) be the percentage deviation between f(x) and f(y). The
aim is to decompose ∆ into parts attributable to individual function argument
deviations. Let ∆(xi) denote the share of ∆ attributable to the xi, yi-deviation.
Denote by N = {1, 2, ..., N}, and if J ⊆ N, zJ = {zi = yi for i ∈ J ; zi =









This will essentially be a weighted average of how much f(x) approach f(y)
when changing argument xi to yi. To achieve a decomposition of ∆, n1, n2, ..., nN
should be chosen such that
N∑
i=1
∆(xi) = ∆ =
f(x)
f(y) − f(y)f(y) . Due to the symmetry of
treating every xi identically,
N∑
i=1
∆(xi), will contain the same number of terms of
f(zJ), f(zK) for any J,K ⊂ N : |J | = |K|. The number of f(zJ)-terms will be








n1N for J = ∅
n|J |+1(N − |J |)− n|J ||J | ∀ J ∈ P(N) : 1 ≤ |J | ≤ N − 1 .
nNN for J = N
With n1 = nN , what is left is to set n|J | such that
n|J |+1(N − |J |)− n|J ||J | = 0 ∀ |J | ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} (3.15)
Let c = N
2
for even N (c = N+1
2
for odd N). Set nc = C, C ∈ R. Then, from 3.15
and n1+k = nN−k,
81For any J ⊆ N, f(zJ) will appear with a plus-sign in all terms ∆(xi) : i /∈ J (there will be
N − |J | of these, each with the weight n|J|+1), and with a minus-sign in all terms ∆(xi) : i ∈ J















c− jC ∀ k ∈ {1, ..., c− 1}. (3.16)
It is straight-forward to show, by induction, that, to fulfil equation 3.15, n1+k =
nN−k, ∀ k ∈ {0, 1, ..., c − 1}.82 This, together with 3.16 and nc = C, spec-
ify ni ∀ i ∈ {1, ..., N} such that
N∑
i=1
∆(xi) = ∆ for any positive integer N.
In the special case used above with N=4, and setting C = 1, this will give
(n1, n2, n3, n4) = (3, 1, 1, 3).
3.A.2 Additional Illustrations of Differences in γ
Figure 3.4 attempts to illustrate γ- (or hour-) differences while taking into account
the issue of inter-dependencies between the variables of which γ is a function. It
plots the leisure of the representative agent in country i, such that γ would
have been observed as constant across countries, while not violating the model’s
assumptions of an optimising agent respecting its budget constraint. As such, it
can also be interpreted as the model’s predicted leisure under equal preferences.
To be precise it plots (1− hpred) against (1− hact), where




c∆ = h∆w(1−τ)κ;κ ≡ cact





The symbol κ represents the change in possible consumption per unit change of
labor supply, resulting from both lost wage income and lower possible unearned
income. Although there should be true numbers δ1, δ2, representing the share
82n1 = nN . Suppose n1+j = nN−j for some 0 ≤ j ≤ c − 2. Then, (1 + j)n1+j) = (N − j −
1)n1+j+1 = (1+ j)nN−j = (N − j−1)nN−j−1 =⇒ n1+j+1 = nN−j−1 where the first and third
equality follows from 3.15, and the second from the induction assumption.
160
of tax revenue and capital income allocated towards final consumption, rather
than trying to estimate these across countries, κ is chosen to stay true to a
more fundamental characteristic of the model, namely that with zero labor input
(h∆ = −hact), there should be zero production and zero consumption, which is
why κ is set to cact
w(1−τ)hact . An additional reason for this choice of κ is that the ratio
of earned to unearned income remains the same in the model state of predicted
leisure under constant cross-country preferences for leisure, as in reality.
If model differences in preferences were negligible in explaining leisure, the fitted
values of predicted leisure in Figure 3.4 would be close to the 45-degree line,
whereas if there is no correlation at all between actual leisure and predicted
leisure with fixed preferences, this would suggest a stronger role for differences in
preferences. In line with this reasoning, the decrease in slope, from the 45-degree
line towards a horisontal line, is another illustration of the role of differences in
preferences. The discrepancy between predicted and actual leisure also give a
more tangible illustration of γ-differences, in the more concrete unit of hours.
The adjustments range from a 54 percent decrease (1073 hours) in labor supply
for Hungary, to a 33 percent and 31 percent increase for the Netherlands and
Switzerland (464 and 517 hours respectively).
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.55 .6 .65 .7 .75
Actual Leisure
Fitted values 45−degree line
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD.
Notes: “Predicted” leisure plotted against actual leisure. “Predicted” leisure here is the leisure
that would be needed to fulfil equation 3.6, with γ = γ¯ for all countries, while adjusting other
choice variables in accordance with the model’s optimality conditions.
Figure 3.5 shows a plot similar to Figure 3.4, but one where “predicted” leisure is
such that only the labor supply adjusts to satisfy equation 3.6 with γi = γ¯:83
log(1− hpred) = 1
φ
[log(c)− log(w)− log(1− τ) + log(γ¯)] (3.17)
Here, γ-deviation from γ¯ is directly proportional to the vertical distance between
the “predicted” leisure and the 45-degree line. One illustration of how substantial
differences in the model-based preference γ are, is that the model’s feasible range
of leisure (labor), [0, 1], is insufficient to satisfy equation 3.17 for all countries.
83The term “predicted” is somewhat misleading here as there is no actual model predicting
the level of leisure in combination with the other variables; it is merely the labor supply that
would have needed to be observed for respective country for γ to have been observed constant
(and equal to γ¯) across countries.
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−.6 −.5 −.4 −.3
Log(Actual Leisure)
Linear fit 45−degree−line
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD.
Notes: Log of “predicted” leisure on the Y-axis is leisure according to equation 3.17, where only
leisure changes to fulfil the necessary (but not sufficient) optimality condition. Other model
variables are not allowed to change. This version of “predicted” leisure is plotted against actual
leisure.
Appendix 3.B Robustness, Macro-Level Empirics
This section shows the details of the robustness checks outlined in section 3.4.1.
3.B.1 Theoretical Variations
Preference-Parameter Variations
A first simple theoretical experiment is to vary the preference parameter in the
representative consumer’s utility function, φ, that is not backed out. There is
a large literature on the subject of the size of labor supply elasticities, and an
unsettled debate about whether one should trust macro or micro estimates. In
163
the baseline model, a lower labor supply elasticity corresponds to a higher φ. I
have tried values in the range of 0.5 - 3. The results hold. Table 3.9 presents the
results for φ = 3. With typical values for other variables, this corresponds to a
Hicksian labor supply elasticity of roughly 0.5, in line with both macro and micro
estimates.
Table 3.9: Regression of the Model-Based Preference Parameter γ, Calculated
with φ = 3, on Self-Reported Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
“Work Before 0.227 0.158 0.177 0.180 0.167 0.192 0.177 0.167 0.125 0.120
Leisure” (4.73) (2.62) (2.51) (2.76) (2.34) (3.03) (2.19) (2.19) (2.65) (2.40)
Emp/Pop-Ratio 0.00432 0.00420 −0.00191 −0.00291 0.000572 0.000265 −0.0165 −0.0237 −0.0239
(2.01) (1.81) (−0.77) (−1.21) (0.18) (0.08) (−1.07) (−1.82) (−1.85)
Union Membership −0.000786 −0.00163 −0.00178 −0.00171 −0.00171 −0.000703 −0.00139 −0.00135
Density (−0.44) (−1.04) (−1.16) (−1.23) (−1.18) (−0.37) (−1.03) (−0.84)
Female Labor 0.00673 0.00728 0.00386 0.00309 0.0208 0.0301 0.0307
Participation (3.35) (3.72) (1.19) (1.11) (1.51) (2.52) (2.58)
Unemployment −0.00491 −0.00298 −0.00332 −0.0139 −0.00306 −0.00547
(−1.14) (−0.65) (−0.77) (−1.48) (−0.42) (−0.61)
Unemployment 0.309 0.306 0.244 0.136 0.112
Benefits (1.80) (1.88) (1.36) (0.65) (0.57)
Tax Evasion −0.0280 −0.00822 0.132 0.123
(−0.59) (−0.15) (2.44) (2.04)
Employment −0.0157 0.000879 −0.00341
Protection (−0.41) (0.03) (−0.11)




Nordics −0.00312 −0.0605 −0.0201 0.0372 0.0476 0.0189 0.0433 0.00871 −0.103 −0.102
(−0.06) (−1.09) (−0.20) (0.37) (0.50) (0.19) (0.38) (0.06) (−0.97) (−0.88)
Observations 32 32 30 30 30 27 26 24 24 24
R2 0.404 0.475 0.477 0.556 0.571 0.648 0.651 0.670 0.830 0.834
Adjusted R2 0.363 0.419 0.394 0.463 0.459 0.518 0.487 0.458 0.699 0.681
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Dependent variable is the model-based preference for leisure measure as described in
section 3.2.1, but with φ = 3 instead of 1 as in the baseline. WVS is the survey-based measure,
calculated as the country average of the World Values Survey response to question c041, "Work
should always come first, even if it means less spare time". Unemployment benefits are measured
as the replacement ratio; tax evasion is taken from Buehn and Schneider (2012); employment
protection is an index calculated by the OECD, including individual and collective dismissal.
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Subsistence Consumption
A number of recent papers in macroeconomics, both concerned with labor supply
and other questions, have modified the consumer’s utility function by includ-
ing a subsistence level.84 Instead of maximization problem 3.2, the consumer





ln(ci,t − c¯) + γi (1− hi,t)
1−φ
1− φ (3.18)
s.t. (1 + τ ci,t)ci,t ≤ (1− τhi,t)wi,thi,t + Ti,t,
and ci,t − c¯ ≥ 0 ∀t.
Table 3.10 presents the results for this adjusted version of the model, with c¯ set to
$1 (PPP) per day. This is following Bick, Fuchs-Schündeln, and Lagakos (2016),
who justifies the level by it being a commonly used poverty threshold. The results
hold also for a subsistence level of $2 per day, another frequently used level of
absolute poverty.
84See e.g. Ohanian and Rogerson (2008); Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2014).
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Table 3.10: Regression of the Model-Based Preference Parameter γ, Calculated
Including a Subsistence Level in the Utility Function, on Self-Reported Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
“Work Before 0.421 0.296 0.371 0.376 0.336 0.375 0.352 0.323 0.269 0.308
Leisure” (4.83) (2.47) (3.00) (3.19) (2.42) (2.67) (2.40) (1.94) (1.84) (2.72)
Emp/Pop-Ratio 0.00791 0.00717 −0.00207 −0.00509 0.000136 0.0000789 −0.0285 −0.0378 −0.0363
(1.84) (1.58) (−0.39) (−1.32) (0.03) (0.02) (−1.16) (−1.67) (−1.65)
Union Membership −0.00295 −0.00423 −0.00467 −0.00467 −0.00445 −0.00367 −0.00455 −0.00482
Density (−0.92) (−1.41) (−1.75) (−1.63) (−1.51) (−0.88) (−1.14) (−1.98)
Female Labor 0.0102 0.0119 0.00716 0.00719 0.0346 0.0466 0.0421
Participation (2.23) (3.41) (1.19) (1.28) (1.52) (2.08) (2.09)
Unemployment −0.0148 −0.0114 −0.0112 −0.0296 −0.0157 0.00155
(−1.81) (−1.13) (−1.09) (−1.54) (−0.84) (0.08)
Unemployment 0.444 0.439 0.561 0.422 0.593
Benefits (1.53) (1.48) (1.82) (1.26) (1.48)
Tax Evasion −0.00859 0.0597 0.240 0.302
(−0.12) (0.54) (1.83) (2.67)
Employment −0.0866 −0.0653 −0.0346
Protection (−1.13) (−1.05) (−0.53)




Nordics −0.0144 −0.119 0.0375 0.124 0.156 0.113 0.114 0.105 −0.0385 −0.0411
(−0.17) (−1.28) (0.20) (0.67) (0.96) (0.64) (0.57) (0.43) (−0.15) (−0.20)
Observations 32 32 30 30 30 27 26 24 24 24
R2 0.413 0.483 0.522 0.575 0.615 0.664 0.649 0.679 0.756 0.816
Adjusted R2 0.372 0.428 0.445 0.486 0.514 0.540 0.483 0.472 0.568 0.648
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Dependent variable is the model-based preference for leisure measure as described in
section 3.2.1, but with the utility function adjusted to include a subsistence level of consumption.
WVS is the survey-based measure, calculated as the country average of theWorld Values Survey
response to question c041, "Work should always come first, even if it means less spare time".
Unemployment benefits are measured as the replacement ratio; tax evasion is taken from Buehn
and Schneider (2012); employment protection is an index calculated by the OECD, including
individual and collective dismissal.
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labor Wedge Fluctuations Under Misspecified Preferences
In the baseline regressions, the way I control for differences in the labor wedge is
by including control variables typically proposed as explanations for a particularly
large labor wedge, e.g. union density and unemployment benefits. By consider-
ing what implications misspecified preferences have for labor wedge fluctuations,
instead of backing out preferences directly, I allow for the labor wedge to differ
between countries.
If preferences across countries were constant, γi = γ¯, the labor wedge spread will
conform to the description in equation 3.19:













where the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) and the marginal rate of transfor-
mation (MRT) are given by (note the difference between the tax rate τ and post
tax-rate labor wedge τw)
MRS =
γici
(1− hi)φ ; MRT = (1− τi)wi.
Instead, if preferences are non-constant, and γi = γ¯ψi , then what is actually backed
out is the left hand side of eqation 3.20:
1
ψi













As we can see, for a country with a below-average preference for leisure (a ψi > 1),
the labor wedge spread is depressed. In line with non-constant preferences, the
labor wedge spread turns out to be significantly and negatively correlated with
both the model- and survey-based measure of preferences for leisure.85
85See Table 3.11.
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Hence, if preferences are misspecified such that the preference for leisure is as-
sumed to be constant, but the true model is one where the preference for leisure
varies across countries, those with a relatively strong preference for leisure will
have a relatively high ψ, and therefore a relatively depressed labor wedge spread.
In line with this, the wedge spread is significantly negatively correlated to the
survey-based measure of preferences for leisure, as Table 3.11 shows.
Table 3.11: Regression of the Labor Wedge Spread Calculated Under the As-
sumption of Cross-Country Constant Preferences, on Self-Reported Preferences
for Leisure and a Number of Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
“Work Before -0.236 -0.316 -0.401 -0.405 -0.395 -0.379 -0.382 -0.378 -0.346 -0.414
Leisure” (0.038) (0.028) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.042) (0.064) (0.098) (0.128) (0.070)
Emp/Pop-Ratio 0.00414 0.00135 0.00122 0.00557 0.0280 0.0418 0.0419 0.0502 0.0477
(0.340) (0.772) (0.802) (0.486) (0.477) (0.298) (0.352) (0.271) (0.276)
Union Membership 0.00372 0.00372 0.00379 0.00400 0.00440 0.00436 0.00644 0.00702
Density (0.072) (0.077) (0.076) (0.168) (0.119) (0.168) (0.087) (0.057)
Unemployment -0.00140 -0.0000121 0.0125 0.00652 0.00655 -0.00320 -0.0234
(0.907) (0.999) (0.648) (0.816) (0.831) (0.919) (0.484)
Female Labor -0.00501 -0.0264 -0.0511 -0.0513 -0.0586 -0.0532
Participation (0.489) (0.469) (0.191) (0.254) (0.198) (0.224)
Employment Protection 0.0170 -0.00985 -0.0100 -0.0200 -0.0645
(0.808) (0.887) (0.905) (0.810) (0.454)
Unemployment -0.0000149 -0.0000149 -0.0000143 -0.00000779
Benefits (0.373) (0.412) (0.426) (0.660)
Tax Evasion 0.000952 -0.129 -0.192
(0.994) (0.456) (0.268)




Observations 32 32 30 30 30 27 25 24 24 24
R2 0.136 0.163 0.312 0.312 0.326 0.348 0.501 0.486 0.529 0.600
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.106 0.233 0.202 0.186 0.152 0.295 0.211 0.227 0.293
p-values in parentheses
p < 0.1, p < 0.05, p < 0.01
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Dependent variable is the model-based preference for leisure measure as described in
section 3.2.1. “Work Before Leisure” is the survey-based measure, calculated as the country
average of the World Values Survey response to question c041, "Work should always come first,
even if it means less spare time". Unemployment benefits are measured as the replacement
ratio; tax evasion is taken from Buehn and Schneider (2012); employment protection is an
index calculated by the OECD, including individual and collective dismissal.
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Utility of Different Functional Forms
The baseline utility function is the one most commonly used in the macro litera-
ture on labor supply. Here I present results on three alternative utility function
specifications. These are of type

















In all three cases, γ is the relative consumption/leisure parameter backed out.
I study the sensitivity of the chosen baseline utility function by looking at how
strongly correlated the model-based preference for leisure using these alternative
utility forms are, to the preference measure from the baseline setup. I also look
at how the preference ordering of countries change. Table 3.12 presents these
results.86 As we can see, the measures are very strongly correlated. For type (1),
parameter values σ, ν, are the same as those chosen by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Huffman (1988), with σ = 0.6 and ν = 1.7.87 For (2), σ = −0.66, ψ = 0.16; this
is following MaCurdy (1983). With CES-preferences, I do not find any guidance
in the literature, perhaps because CES-preferences are not well-suited for static
time-allocation problems. I try parameter values in the range of −0.5–0.5. For
typical values of other parameters, this corresponds to Hicksian labor supply
elasticites ranging from around zero (or slightly negative) to around 3. The
CES correlation in Table 3.12 is based on ψ = −0.3. For all four alternative
specifications, the model-based preference for leisure is strongly correlated to
86In the baseline setup, the FOC used to back out the preference for leisure only includes
the ratio of consumption to GDP, there I can avoid some normalization choices that cannot be
avoided here. Here, as the “baseline”, I use a preference measure calculated consistent with the
other utility functions, why this is actually slightly different from what I have used above. The
difference is, however, very small quantitatively; the correlation between the two is 0.99.
87See Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) p. 412.
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the baseline version. Also the preference-for-leisure-ranking of countries changes
little.
Table 3.12: Correlation and median difference in country ranking between the
baseline preference for leisure pararmeter, and the corresponding parameter cal-
culated using utility function of different functional form
Greenwood, Hercowitz, MaCurdy CES Baseline,
and Huffman (1988) (1981) φ = 5
Correlation 0.89 0.82 0.96 0.83
Median |∆| rank 3 4 2 2
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD.
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3.B.2 Data Used for Calculating the Preference for Leisure
(γ)
In section 3.4.1, hours worked is hours worked per employed (including self-
employed), the measure of consumption used, Actual individual consumption,
includes government final consumption, and the data used is from 2004. Ta-
bles 3.13– 3.15 presents robustness checks in each of these dimensions. Table 3.13
shows the results using hours worked per working age population, in Table 3.14,
the consumption measure used to calculate γ is Household final consumption, and
Table 3.15 takes the average values of γ and control variables over the 2001/2002–
2007 business cycle.88
Two other minor variations are presented. Table 3.16 shows the baseline regres-
sion, but with the consumption tax rate calculated following Mendoza, Razin and
Tesar (1994), instead of Prescott (2004). Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) cal-
culate the consumption tax as τ c = 5110 + 5121
c+ g − gw −5110− 5121 where c is household final
consumption, g is government final consumption, and is gw government wages. In
the OECD’s terminology, 5110 is the code for general taxes on goods and services,
and 5121 for excise taxes. Table 3.17 show the baseline regression from Table 3.1,
but leaving out the Nordics-dummy.
882002 is the first full year included in the business cycle.
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Table 3.13: Regression of the Model-Based Preference Parameter γ on Self-
Reported Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
“Work Before 0.415 0.470 0.634 0.644 0.620 0.673 0.705 0.678 0.613 0.678
Leisure” (2.85) (2.61) (3.18) (3.46) (3.21) (3.46) (3.10) (2.75) (2.50) (2.94)
Emp/Pop-Ratio −0.00347 −0.00534 −0.0230 −0.0249 −0.0182 −0.0176 −0.0374 −0.0485 −0.0460
(−0.53) (−0.81) (−2.27) (−2.31) (−1.58) (−1.44) (−0.68) (−0.90) (−0.92)
Union Membership −0.00507 −0.00752 −0.00779 −0.00783 −0.00783 −0.00781 −0.00886 −0.00930
Density (−1.07) (−1.66) (−1.68) (−1.64) (−1.55) (−1.23) (−1.42) (−1.61)
Female Labor 0.0195 0.0205 0.0103 0.0120 0.0294 0.0437 0.0362
Participation (2.19) (2.24) (0.82) (0.88) (0.54) (0.81) (0.72)
Unemployment −0.00887 −0.00772 −0.00697 −0.0201 −0.00347 0.0250
(−0.59) (−0.46) (−0.39) (−0.53) (−0.09) (0.63)
Unemployment 0.772 0.780 1.010 0.844 1.128
Benefits (1.41) (1.36) (1.43) (1.20) (1.68)
Tax Evasion 0.0605 0.132 0.347 0.449
(0.47) (0.81) (1.52) (2.04)
Employment Protection −0.0999 −0.0745 −0.0237
(−0.92) (−0.69) (−0.23)




Nordics −0.335 −0.289 −0.0118 0.154 0.173 0.156 0.103 0.126 −0.0454 −0.0497
(−2.36) (−1.72) (−0.04) (0.54) (0.59) (0.51) (0.30) (0.31) (−0.11) (−0.13)
Observations 32 32 30 30 30 27 26 24 24 24
R2 0.274 0.282 0.371 0.476 0.484 0.571 0.557 0.506 0.564 0.652
Adjusted R2 0.224 0.205 0.270 0.367 0.349 0.413 0.349 0.188 0.228 0.333
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Dependent variable is the model-based preference for leisure measure as described in
section 3.2.1, but using hours worked per working age population. WVS is the survey-based
measure, calculated as the country average of the World Values Survey response to question
c041, "Work should always come first, even if it means less spare time". Unemployment benefits
are measured as the replacement ratio; tax evasion is taken from Buehn and Schneider (2012);
employment protection is an index calculated by the OECD, including individual and collective
dismissal.
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Table 3.14: Regression of the Model-Based Preference Parameter γ on Self-
Reported Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
“Work Before 0.553 0.408 0.481 0.489 0.443 0.491 0.502 0.481 0.413 0.429
Leisure” (4.84) (3.05) (3.11) (3.36) (3.05) (3.53) (3.06) (2.72) (2.56) (2.55)
Emp/Population- 0.00920 0.00839 −0.00486 −0.00824 −0.00223 −0.00206 −0.0285 −0.0402 −0.0395
Ratio (1.90) (1.63) (−0.61) (−1.02) (−0.27) (−0.23) (−0.73) (−1.13) (−1.08)
Union Membership −0.00157 −0.00340 −0.00390 −0.00392 −0.00395 −0.00226 −0.00336 −0.00347
Density (−0.43) (−0.96) (−1.12) (−1.15) (−1.08) (−0.50) (−0.82) (−0.82)
Female Labor 0.0146 0.0165 0.00824 0.00865 0.0363 0.0513 0.0495
Participation (2.10) (2.38) (0.92) (0.88) (0.94) (1.45) (1.36)
Unemployment −0.0165 −0.0147 −0.0145 −0.0315 −0.0141 −0.00704
(−1.45) (−1.22) (−1.14) (−1.15) (−0.54) (−0.24)
Unemployment 0.650 0.653 0.619 0.445 0.515
Benefits (1.66) (1.58) (1.22) (0.96) (1.05)
Tax Evasion 0.0161 0.0664 0.291 0.316
(0.17) (0.57) (1.94) (1.98)
Employment −0.0487 −0.0221 −0.00958
Protection (−0.62) (−0.31) (−0.13)




Nordics 0.0499 −0.0722 0.0149 0.139 0.174 0.150 0.137 0.0784 −0.101 −0.102
(0.45) (−0.58) (0.06) (0.62) (0.79) (0.68) (0.56) (0.27) (−0.37) (−0.37)
Observations 32 32 30 30 30 27 26 24 24 24
R2 0.477 0.537 0.561 0.629 0.660 0.692 0.684 0.687 0.766 0.772
Adjusted R2 0.441 0.488 0.490 0.552 0.571 0.578 0.535 0.485 0.586 0.564
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Dependent variable is the model-based preference for leisure measure as described in
section 3.2.1, but using a consumption measure not including government consumption. WVS
is the survey-based measure, calculated as the country average of the World Values Survey
response to question c041, "Work should always come first, even if it means less spare time".
Unemployment benefits are measured as the replacement ratio; tax evasion is taken from Buehn
and Schneider (2012); employment protection is an index calculated by the OECD, including
individual and collective dismissal.
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Table 3.15: Regression of the Model-Based Preference Parameter γ on Self-
Reported Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
“Work Before 0.422 0.265 0.320 0.325 0.283 0.313 0.307 0.265 0.216 0.243
Leisure” (4.40) (2.47) (2.56) (2.71) (2.37) (2.70) (2.28) (1.98) (1.81) (1.99)
Emp/Population- 0.00988 0.00936 −0.0000447 −0.00248 0.00213 0.00196 −0.0526 −0.0575 −0.0560
Ratio (2.53) (2.25) (−0.01) (−0.38) (0.31) (0.27) (−1.65) (−2.05) (−1.99)
Union Membership −0.00266 −0.00410 −0.00436 −0.00494 −0.00495 −0.00384 −0.00448 −0.00432
Density (−0.86) (−1.34) (−1.47) (−1.68) (−1.58) (−1.10) (−1.45) (−1.40)
Female Labor 0.0103 0.0112 0.00712 0.00665 0.0607 0.0681 0.0650
Participation (1.81) (2.03) (1.00) (0.85) (1.91) (2.42) (2.30)
Unemployment −0.0170 −0.0150 −0.0153 −0.0483 −0.0302 −0.0199
(−1.59) (−1.30) (−1.24) (−2.18) (−1.44) (−0.85)
Unemployment 0.387 0.390 0.313 0.119 0.201
Benefits (1.16) (1.10) (0.77) (0.32) (0.53)
Tax Evasion −0.0159 0.0480 0.204 0.225
(−0.20) (0.52) (1.92) (2.08)
Employment −0.0813 −0.0540 −0.0380
Protection (−1.39) (−1.02) (−0.69)




Nordics −0.0646 −0.196 −0.0600 0.0320 0.0511 0.0374 0.0518 0.0321 −0.105 −0.114
(−0.69) (−1.95) (−0.32) (0.17) (0.28) (0.21) (0.25) (0.15) (−0.52) (−0.57)
Observations 32 32 30 30 30 27 26 24 24 24
R2 0.403 0.514 0.534 0.590 0.631 0.673 0.664 0.724 0.802 0.818
Adjusted R2 0.362 0.462 0.460 0.505 0.535 0.553 0.506 0.547 0.650 0.651
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Dependent variable is the model-based preference for leisure measure as described in
section 3.2.1, but the average value over the 2001/2002–2007 business cycle. Also controls
are taken as averages, and only included if there is data for at least four of the years. WVS
is the survey-based measure, calculated as the country average of the World Values Survey
response to question c041, "Work should always come first, even if it means less spare time".
Unemployment benefits are measured as the replacement ratio; tax evasion is taken from Buehn
and Schneider (2012); employment protection is an index calculated by the OECD, including
individual and collective dismissal.
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Table 3.16: Regression of the Model-Based Preference Parameter γ on Self-
Reported Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
“Work Before 0.391 0.355 0.449 0.438 0.410 0.428 0.426 0.418 0.344 0.290
Leisure” (2.89) (2.59) (3.12) (3.14) (2.51) (2.58) (2.72) (2.33) (1.88) (2.02)
Emp/Pop-Ratio 0.00526 0.00499 −0.000562 −0.00282 0.000264 0.000265 0.00147 −0.0199 −0.0499
(1.14) (1.08) (−0.12) (−0.66) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (−0.48) (−1.06)
Union Membership −0.00251 −0.00314 −0.00357 −0.00427 −0.00429 −0.00439 −0.00474 −0.00570
Density (−0.77) (−0.99) (−1.23) (−1.33) (−1.22) (−0.89) (−0.93) (−1.94)
Female Labor 0.00810 0.00831 0.00383 0.00373 0.00257 0.0253 0.0500
Participation (1.90) (2.10) (0.67) (0.70) (0.07) (0.59) (1.07)
Unemployment −0.00939 −0.00704 −0.00707 −0.00683 −0.00440 −0.00458
(−0.89) (−0.77) (−0.78) (−0.28) (−0.17) (−0.17)
Unemployment 0.381 0.378 0.438 0.406 0.849
Benefits (1.08) (1.02) (0.97) (0.72) (1.15)
Tax Evasion −0.00493 0.00679 0.169 0.254
(−0.06) (0.06) (1.09) (1.75)
Employment −0.0266 −0.0189 −0.0314
Protection (−0.32) (−0.25) (−0.38)




Nordics −0.0728 −0.154 −0.0387 −0.00947 0.0298 0.0556 0.0596 0.0586 −0.0552 −0.0101
(−0.87) (−1.54) (−0.22) (−0.05) (0.18) (0.33) (0.29) (0.20) (−0.17) (−0.04)
Observations 25 25 23 23 23 22 22 20 20 20
R2 0.371 0.396 0.458 0.509 0.531 0.635 0.635 0.622 0.694 0.769
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.310 0.338 0.364 0.356 0.452 0.410 0.283 0.354 0.451
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Dependent variable is the model-based preference for leisure measure, following Men-
doza, Razin and Tesar (1994) instead of Prescott (2004) when calculating the consumption tax
rate. “Work Before Leisure” is the survey-based measure, calculated as the country average of
the World Values Survey response to question c041, "Work should always come first, even if it
means less spare time". Unemployment benefits are measured as the replacement ratio; tax eva-
sion is taken from Buehn and Schneider (2012); employment protection is an index calculated
by the OECD, including individual and collective dismissal.
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Table 3.17: Regression of the Model-Based Preference Parameter γ on Self-
Reported Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Work Before 0.424 0.336 0.381 0.370 0.331 0.375 0.370 0.347 0.303 0.332
Leisure (5.16) (2.99) (3.21) (3.35) (2.60) (2.90) (2.72) (2.33) (2.31) (2.99)
Emp/Pop-Ratio 0.00454 0.00715 −0.000898 −0.00309 0.00134 0.00132 −0.0289 −0.0399 −0.0388
(1.36) (1.75) (−0.25) (−1.11) (0.42) (0.40) (−1.37) (−1.86) (−1.74)
Union Membership −0.00301 −0.00314 −0.00316 −0.00374 −0.00369 −0.00293 −0.00536 −0.00558
Density (−1.87) (−2.05) (−2.26) (−2.84) (−2.31) (−1.46) (−2.61) (−2.99)
Female Labor 0.00956 0.0108 0.00663 0.00667 0.0362 0.0472 0.0437
Participation (2.88) (3.93) (1.22) (1.28) (1.81) (2.33) (2.07)
Unemployment −0.0126 −0.00948 −0.00943 −0.0287 −0.0179 −0.00482
(−1.62) (−1.02) (−0.98) (−1.76) (−1.15) (−0.29)
Unemployment 0.426 0.424 0.455 0.348 0.479
Benefits (1.46) (1.39) (1.42) (1.05) (1.22)
Tax Evasion −0.000933 0.0473 0.193 0.239
(−0.01) (0.53) (1.81) (2.38)
Employment −0.0604 −0.0430 −0.0197
Protection (−0.85) (−0.74) (−0.31)




Observations 32 32 30 30 30 27 26 24 24 24
R2 0.439 0.472 0.547 0.599 0.630 0.676 0.662 0.681 0.753 0.789
Adjusted R2 0.420 0.435 0.495 0.535 0.553 0.578 0.531 0.511 0.594 0.627
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: The regression table shows the same regression as the baseline in table 3.1, but with the
Nordics dummy excluded. Dependent variable is the model-based preference for leisure measure
as described in section 3.2.1. “Work Before Leisure” is the survey-based measure, calculated
as the country average of the World Values Survey response to question c041, "Work should
always come first, even if it means less spare time". Unemployment benefits are measured
as the replacement ratio; tax evasion is taken from Buehn and Schneider (2012); employment
protection is an index calculated by the OECD, including individual and collective dismissal.
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3.B.3 Variations in Control Variables
In addition to the controls reported above, a few other ones have been tried.
Some are just slight modifications of the ones included, while others are distinct
variables one could imagine to have an impact on labor supply decisions:
• Full unemployment benefits as percentage of GDP, instead of unemployment
benefits as defined above, in relation to average wage
• A broader measure of amount of spending on unemployment as a percentage
of GDP, including spending on training programs, employment maintenance
and recruitment incentives, job search assistance, start-up incentives, direct
job creation, etc, in addition to unemployment benefits
• Length of paid parental leave
• Expected number of years in retirement
• Employment/population ratio restricted to working-age population
• As rough measures of credit constraints, the difference between interest
rates and inflation, and Getting Credit, Distance to the Frontier from the
World Bank
None of these controls change the significance of the results. The general pattern
for all of them remains the same as above: the variable consistently significantly
correlated with γ is the measures of culture, with a few of the other variables
some times, and some times not, being significantly correlated with γ.
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Alternative Cultural Variables
I try a number of additional explanatory cultural variables from the WVS as
“placebo measures.” They are listed below, from three broad categories. None of
them are significantly correlated to the model-based measure of preferences for
leisure (more than one would expect from chance alone).
1. The role of women. C001: When jobs are scarce, men should have more
right to a job than women; D057: Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree,
or disagree strongly? Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for
pay ; D060: A university education is more important for a boy than for a
girl ; D062: A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and
children
2. Materialistic concerns. A038: [Children should be encouraged to learn]
Thrift saving money and things ; C011: [Important in a job?] Good pay
E014: [It would be good with] Less emphasis on money and material pos-
sessions
3. Political beliefs/Individual responsibilities. E033: How would you place
your [political] views on [the left/right] scale, generally speaking ;
To what extent would you agree or disagree with the statement... E035:
Incomes should be made more equal vs We need larger income differences
as incentives ; E037: People should take more responsibility to provide for
themselves vs The government should take more responsibility to ensure that
everyone is provided for ; E038: People who are unemployed should have to
take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits vs People who are
unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want ; E039:
Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new
ideas vs Competition is harmful. It brings the worst in people; E040: Hard
work brings success
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Appendix 3.C Microeconomic Evidence
Table 3.18: Summary Statistics for Respective Country of Ancestry
Country Number Hours Av. Years of Share Unearned Wage No. Child
of Obs. Worked Age Schooling Married Income Inc. < 5
Australia 181 1,387 43.9 14.3 0.51 6,792 36,901 0.13
Austria 3,158 1,132 56.4 14.7 0.59 22,503 37,531 0.06
Belgium 1,763 1,245 52.9 14.0 0.63 14,741 33,945 0.09
Canada 2,236 1,177 51.2 13.8 0.55 12,287 30,866 0.09
Czech Republic 7,319 1,261 52.3 14.3 0.59 14,942 34,041 0.10
Denmark 6,721 1,137 55.1 14.3 0.61 16,756 30,344 0.09
Estonia 108 1,393 48.4 15.1 0.55 11,820 51,299 0.15
Finland 3,716 1,147 52.1 14.0 0.58 12,500 28,721 0.10
France 38,275 1,137 52.4 13.6 0.56 12,394 27,506 0.08
Germany 271,014 1,263 50.9 13.9 0.59 12,797 30,738 0.10
Greece 6,210 1,297 47.9 14.4 0.53 12,833 39,606 0.11
Hungary 6,919 1,188 52.9 14.2 0.59 14,267 34,484 0.10
Iceland 200 1,305 47.8 14.5 0.64 12,993 41,595 0.14
Ireland 165,805 1,219 50.4 14.0 0.55 12,357 32,688 0.10
Israel 233 1,318 37.3 14.8 0.42 10,024 40,255 0.18
Italy 100,342 1,272 48.7 14.0 0.54 11,605 36,189 0.11
Japan 5,639 1,163 51.3 14.5 0.49 14,071 33,339 0.08
Korea 1,936 1,253 30.7 14.8 0.29 4,115 36,931 0.16
Luxembourg 215 1,137 59.0 14.3 0.65 19,701 31,728 0.03
Mexico 52,920 1,209 38.9 12.6 0.39 4,728 21,913 0.17
Netherlands 19,964 1,194 52.5 13.8 0.61 12,844 29,081 0.10
Norway 26,896 1,250 52.1 14.1 0.61 14,605 30,530 0.11
Poland 49,265 1,225 51.2 14.0 0.57 12,718 33,373 0.10
Portugal 5,459 1,233 48.4 13.6 0.52 10,970 31,413 0.12
Slovak Republic 3,959 1,098 57.0 14.1 0.58 14,992 30,817 0.06
Slovenia 936 1,207 55.3 14.4 0.58 16,691 35,955 0.08
Spain 9,700 1,152 47.3 13.3 0.46 9,238 26,951 0.11
Sweden 20,647 1,156 54.0 14.3 0.61 15,835 30,340 0.09
Switzerland 4,821 1,181 54.2 14.2 0.63 18,682 31,951 0.11
Turkey 264 1,194 42.4 14.8 0.44 12,862 38,598 0.14
United Kingdom 194,409 1,080 55.4 14.2 0.61 17,273 29,931 0.08
United States 155,579 1,065 52.6 12.9 0.56 11,401 22,976 0.08
Total 1,166,842 1,184 51.3 13.8 0.57 12,966 29,997 0.10
Source: U.S. Census data from 2013, retrieved from https://usa.ipums.org/usa/.
Notes: Average values for a number of variables split up on country of ancestry. Unearned
income is calculated as Total income − Wage Income.
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3.C.1 Robustness
This section presents robustness checks on the micro-level empirical evidence in
the dimensions of age, gender, time of migration, However, with life expectancy
having increased far more than pension age, decisions to keep working later in life
is an increasingly important labor supply margin, which is why in Appendix 3.C,
Table 3.20 I present the same regressions on a sample that is unrestricted in terms
of age.
As pointed out above, one of the main reasons for studying unmarried and couples
separately, is the existing literature on culturally related female labor supply
decisions. A different approach is to look separately at the labor supply of males,
which is also what much of the labor economics literature has done for separate
reasons. Tabel 3.19 shows the OLS estimation of equation 3.8 with the sample
restricted to the unmarried male prime working-age population (30–50). The
negative relationship between the inherited measure of preferences for leisure and
annual labor supply is slightly stronger than the corresponding relationship for
unmarried individuals in the same age range. The results also hold for the male
population unrestricted in terms of age or marital status.
With life expectancy having increased far more than pension age, decisions to
keep working later in life is an increasingly important labor supply margin. For
this reason, Tables 3.20–3.21 show the results with a sample that is unrestricted
in terms of age.
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Table 3.19: Labor Supply and Inherited Preference for Leisure: OLS estimation
of equation 3.8 (Unmarried Males; Prime Working Age)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
γ −140.9 −137.0 −276.7
(−2.32) (−2.22) (−3.98)
“Work Before −143.4 −140.4 −167.6
Leisure” (−5.15) (−4.87) (−11.13)
GDP/Hour 4.148 2.267
(2.97) (2.31)
Age; Sex; Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education
Unearned; Wage No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
no. child<5
Observations 63,330 63,330 63,330 63,330 63,330 63,330
Adjusted R2 0.749 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.750 0.751
t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered at country level (32 clusters). Dummies for metropolitan area and race included.
Source: Author’s calculations, based on U.S. 2013 Census data, retrieved from IPUMS.
Notes: The dependent variable is annual hours worked for unmarried male individuals within
the age range of 30–50. Dummy variables for metropolitan area of residence and race are
included throughout. Standard errors are calculated allowing for clustering at the country
level. If missing, wage is replaced by a predicted wage.
Table 3.20: Labor Supply and Inherited Preference for Leisure: OLS Estimation
of Equation 3.8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
γ −103.0 −98.59 −162.0
(−2.49) (−2.42) (−2.72)
“Work Before −88.29 −83.56 −87.88
Leisure” (−4.98) (−5.38) (−5.80)
GDP/Hour 1.914 1.003
(2.07) (2.42)
Age; Sex; Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education
Unearned; Wage; No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
No. child<5
Observations 502,707 502,707 502,707 502,707 502,707 502,707
Adjusted R2 0.645 0.652 0.652 0.646 0.652 0.652
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations, based on U.S. 2013 Census data, retrieved from IPUMS.
Notes: The dependent variable is annual hours worked for unmarried individuals. Dummy
variables for metropolitan area of residence and race are included throughout. Standard errors
are calculated allowing for clustering at the country level. If missing, wage is replaced by a
predicted wage.
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Table 3.21: Labor Supply and Inherited Preference for Leisure: OLS Estimation
of Equation 3.8 (Households)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
γ −148.3 −146.8 −356.7
(−1.89) (−1.81) (−3.68)
“Work Before −193.7 −192.2 −232.5
Leisure” (−6.26) (−6.09) (−11.86)
GDP/Hour 6.90 4.70
(4.91) (8.81)
Age; Sex; Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education
Unearned; Wage; No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
No. Child<5
Observations 547,818 547,818 547,818 547,818 547,818 547,818
Adjusted R2 0.821 0.827 0.827 0.821 0.827 0.827
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations, based on U.S. 2013 Census data, retrieved from IPUMS.
Notes: The Dependent variable is annual hours worked for households. Dummy variables for
metropolitan area of residence and race are included throughout. γ and “Work Before Leisure”
are calculated as the average of spouses’ individual values. Standard errors calculated allowing
for clustering at the country level.
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Another issue is related to a potential relationship between labor supply decisions
and differences related to the time that immigrants come to the United States. If
there are systematic differences in how much different generational cohorts of im-
migrants work, and the time center of gravity of migration for different countries
is correlated with γ, this, rather than differences in “ancestral preferences”, could
explain the relationship between labor supply decisions and country of ancestry.
For example, if successive generations of immigrants, work more due to a higher
degree of job market integration (work less because more recent generations of
immigrants have to fight harder to establish themselves), and people from low-γ
countries migrated further back in time (migrated more recently), then this could
explain the significant correlation between hours worked and ancestral preference
for leisure.89 However, by choosing to use the 1970 census data, in which I can
specifically study the second generation of immigrants across countries, I avert
this issue, and other potential issues related to the distribution across genera-
tions within a country being different between countries. Table 3.22 shows the
regressions corresponding to those shown in Tables 3.20 and 3.21, but using the
1970 sample. The country of ancestry is assigned based on the fathers country
of birth because, when both parents are born abroad, the mother’s birthplace
is not recorded.90 As we can see in Table 3.22, the results are similar to those
above, but instead of the preference measured based on the WVS, γ is showing
the stronger relationship to hours worked.91
89Comparing second generation immigrants to those born in the United States by U.S. born
parents, the average number of hours worked are relatively close (1,041 vs. 1,023), and not
suggestive of this being a large problem.
90Restricting attention to those with both parents born abroad makes the results slightly
stronger for γ and slightly weaker for WVS.
91A separate reason to consider the 1970 U.S. Census data is that, theoretically, it is possible
that the point in time that an ancestor migrated is actually closer to the point in time for
constructing the cultural measures, more so than is the case for the 2013 U.S. Census data.
In 1970, a 40-year old second generation immigrant was born 1930, meaning her/his parents
migrated some time before 1930. The mother was probably not older than 40 years, if she
gave birth in 1930, meaning she should have migrated some time between 1890 and 1930. The
average point in time that the ancestor of the individuals included from the 2013 U.S. Census
could potentially be before 1910. Since data limitations prevent answering this, and both
samples likely are significantly off, if the relationships found are not spurious correlations, it
has to be the case that some aspect of between-country differences in culture are sufficiently
slow-moving. Alternatively, the results could be interpreted as supportive of the slow-moving
nature of culture (the slow-moving nature of a culturally related component of preferences for
leisure).
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Table 3.22: Labor Supply and Inherited Preference for Leisure: OLS Estimation
of Equation 3.8 (U.S. Census 1970 Data)
Unmarried Couples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
γ −110.5 −111.9 −219.7 −200.7
(−2.09) (−2.19) (−2.97) (−3.22)
“Work Before −70.46 −70.86 −107.2 −127.5
Leisure” (−1.76) (−1.81) (−2.09) (−2.22)
Age; Sex; Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education
Unearned; Wage No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. Child>5
Observations 41,017 41,017 41,017 41,017 36,719 36,719 36,719 36,719
Adjusted R2 0.546 0.561 0.546 0.561 0.790 0.802 0.789 0.798
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations, based on U.S. Census data, retrieved from IPUMS.
Notes: Data is from the 1970 US Census, specifically for second generation immigrants. The
dependent variable in columns 1–4 is annual hours worked for unmarried individuals, and in
columns 5–8 for married couples. Dummy variables for metropolitan area of residence and
race are included throughout. For couples, the value of γ and WVS is the average of the two
individual values. Standard errors calculated allowing for clustering at the country level (32
clusters).
184
3.C.2 Micro-Level Empirical Concerns
As stated above, although the epidemiological approach avoids reverse causality
issues, there are others. First, there is a timing disconnect between the point
being measured and the transmission of cultural values. Since the rationale for
using measures of preferences for leisure from peoples’ country of ancestry is the
existence of an inherited component, most logical would be to have a country of
ancestry measure dating from around the time peoples’ ancestors actually lived
in their respective countries. The U.S. census data does not identify the time
of immigration or the country of birth (after 1970), of parents and grandparents
of the individuals included, which makes it impossible to distinguish between
second and higher generations of immigrants; meaning, for example, people whose
ancestors arrived 20 or 200 years ago are treated identically. In addition, the
cultural measures identified previously are from the 2000s. Studying labor market
decisions in the United States around 2013 means people of working-age were born
no later than 1995. Provided not everyone’s parents left their home country for
the United States immediately before conceiving, one would need data on country
of ancestry from the mid 1980s, and preferably earlier to also include U.S. labor
market participants who have passed their late teens/early twenties. Due to this
(two-sided) timing issue of data availability, inherently it has to be assumed that
there is a sufficiently slow moving cultural component of people’s preferences.92
To the extent there is not, one would expect preferences of people being put in
the same economic, institutional, and social environment to converge rather than
diverge; if anything, this should work against finding a connection between the
culturally related preference for leisure and labor market decisions.
Not distinguishing between second and higher generations of immigrants does
have some positive implications. One reason for why the literature has focused
on second generation immigrants as opposed to first has been to avoid the impact
92Or that the between-country difference is sufficiently slow-moving.
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of shocks related to the actual migration.93 It is, however, easy to imagine shocks
also related to being the child of migrants, heterogeneous to country of origin.94
Such potential issues will be mitigated by studying a population where only a
small fraction are second generation immigrants.
It could be argued that the correct timing of cultural proxy for descendants of
a particular country participating in the U.S. labor market in, say, 2010, is not
the point in time when the ancestor(s) of this descendant grew up or left the
country, but 2010. If, for example, there is a dynamic component of culture that
would change also in an otherwise static environment (or change independently
of its economic and institutional environment), and this dynamic component is
important enough, then the timing issue outlined is no longer a problem. Exactly
what this dynamic component could be is not obvious, but data consistent with
this timing logic has been used previously in the literature, e.g. by Fernández
(2007) for female labor force participation.95
A second issue is related to the nature of the measures of culture used. Since
these are essentially scaled country of ancestry fixed effects, these variables may
also capture other aspects of culture that affect labor market decisions, but that
are not directly related to preferences for leisure. In particular, female labor force
participation has been shown to have a fairly strong cultural component, docu-
93This is in addition to having preferences, beliefs and values endogenous to precisely the
economic and institutional factors of home countries that one would not avoid when studying
actual migrants.
94Language would be one such thing: having Irish parents would, language-wise, be benefi-
cial from a labor market point of view, compared to having Finish or French parents. Also with
a typical American english accent, which is probably true for the majority of second-generation
immigrants having grown up in American schools, it is likely harder to develop the same vo-
cabulary level with immigrant parents from a non-english speaking country. Heterogeneity in
level of usefulness of the second language that children of immigrant parents most likely will
learn would be another source. Unrelated to languages, the reason of migration may be sys-
tematically different between different ancestor countries: it is not hard to imagine growing up
with parents who migrated due to armed conflict or lucrative job prospects, affect individuals
differently (albeit less so than being the actual, war traumatised vs. lucrative financial sector
job-offered individual.
95Culture has sometimes been defined as the choice of equilibrium in environments con-
taining multiple equilibrias. If cultural values are evolving along a transition path towards an
equilibrium, or between two equilibrias, and due to some version of path dependence logic,
the cultural values follow this path irrespective of the holders of these values being moved to
a different environment, this could provide a justification for the kind of timing choices used
(being imposed) here.
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mented by Antecol (2000), Fernández (2007), and Fernández and Fogli (2009).
As can be seen in Table 3.1 above, the measures of preferences for leisure are
positively correlated to female labor force participation. If women from high γ
countries work (relatively) more due to culturally related gender roles, this will
have a dampening effect on a potential relationship between the measures of
preferences for leisure, and hours worked.96
Thirdly, there are numerous transmission channels of cultural attitudes, of which
parents constitute only one. By studying people in the same economic and in-
stitutional setting, living in the same society, going to similar schools, many of
the mechanisms that would normally be assumed to be important in forming cul-
tural beliefs, values and norms are effectively shut off, again biasing the approach
towards not finding any relationship.
96There could of course be other cultural values working the other way. To the best of my
knowledge, no other such clearly identified cultural aspect, directly affecting individual labor
supply decisions, has been pointed out by the literature.
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Appendix 3.D Optimal taxation
Table 3.23: Taxes and preferences for leisure (WVS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
“Work Before −.079 −.14 −.094 −.12 −.14 −.13 −.13 −.15
Leisure” (−1.20) (−1.85) (−2.39) (−2.91) (−3.07) (−2.65) (−2.46) (−2.66)
GDP/Cap .0037 −.00035 −.00012 .00027 .0008 .0008 −.0019
(1.54) (−0.26) (−0.09) (0.17) (0.42) (0.42) (−0.58)
Gov. Rev./GDP .017 .017 .016 .016 .016 .014
(8.88) (8.38) (6.38) (5.94) (5.81) (4.14)
Union Membership .00044 .00056 .00045 .00059 .0011
Density (0.37) (0.47) (0.36) (0.45) (0.80)
Unemployment −.1 −.098 −.087 −.095
Benefits (−0.97) (−0.87) (−0.75) (−0.81)
Tax Evasion .008 .003 .0076
(0.58) (0.17) (0.42)




Nordics .081 .067 −.11 −.13 −.12 −.12 −.12 −.14
(1.26) (1.06) (−2.78) (−1.96) (−1.84) (−1.76) (−1.77) (−1.93)
Observations 33 33 33 31 27 26 26 26
R2 0.074 0.144 0.776 0.797 0.782 0.763 0.766 0.780
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.056 0.744 0.757 0.717 0.671 0.656 0.657
t statistics in parentheses
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the OECD and the WVS.
Notes: Dependent variable throughout is the tax wedge as defined in equation 3.2. WVS is
the survey-based measure of preferences for leisure from section 3.3. Gov Rev./ GDP is total
government revenue as a percentage of GDP; Union Memb. Density is the share of employed
that are trade union members; unemployment benefits are measured as the replacement rate; the
measure of tax evasion is taken from Buehn and Schneider (2012); “Gov. Provide” is the mean
response to the WVS question e037: to what extent individuals themselves or the government
should take more responsibility to provide for people; Nordics (as above) is included due to
the atypical labor supply subsidizing government spending of these countries, which alters the
distortionary effects of taxation. The results are robust to excluding the “Nordics” dummy.
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Figure 3.6: Optimal Partial Equilibrium Model Tax Rates With and Without
Country Varying γ
Source: Author’s calculations, based on OECD data.
Notes: The graph plots two different data points for each country against the country-specific
γ:
1. The optimal model tax, which will be the τ solving the maximization problem 3.12 (actual
FOC given by equation 3.13) with country varying γ.
2. The optimal model tax, solving the maximization problem 3.12 (or 3.13), with γ = γˆ fixed
across countries. This is abusing the x-axis, as γ is not actually varying, but plotted like this
for comparison.
In addition, the linear fit of these data series are included. Country labels for the model tax
rate series with constant preferences are excluded to not overcrowd the center of the graph;
countries are identified by their position in the Preference-for-Leisure dimension.
The purpose of including the optimal tax rate with cross-country constant γ is to illustrate what
kind of variation country-varying preferences induces, and that other country-specific factors in
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(γ + 1)(1− θ)(1− τ) + γθ (3.23)
=⇒ GE = γθ





Optimal Taxes in General Equilibrium
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the general equilibrium analog of Figures 3.2–3.6 in the
main paper.
Figure 3.7: Actual Tax Rates, and Optimal General Equilibrium Model Tax Rates
with Country Varying γ
Source: Author’s calculations, based on OECD data.
Notes: The graph plots two different data points for each country against the country-specific
γ:
1. The actual tax wedges, as defined by equation 3.2.
2. The optimal model tax, which will be the τ solving the maximization problem 3.12 (actual
FOC given by equation 3.13) with country varying γ.
In addition, the linear fit of these data series are included. Country labels for the model tax
rate series are excluded to not overcrowd the center of the graph; countries are identified by
their Preference-for-Leisure value being the same for the two series.
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Figure 3.8: Optimal General Equilibrium Model Tax Rates With and Without
Country Varying γ
Source: Author’s calculations, based on OECD data.
Notes: The graph plots two different data points for each country against the country-specific
γ:
1. The optimal model tax, which will be the τ solving the maximization problem 3.12 (actual
FOC given by equation 3.13) with country varying γ.
2. The optimal model tax, solving the maximization problem 3.12 (or 3.13), with γ = γˆ fixed
across countries. This is abusing the x-axis, as γ is not actually varying, but plotted like this
for comparison.
In addition, the linear fit of these data series are included. Country labels for the model tax
rate series with constant preferences are excluded to not overcrowd the center of the graph;
countries are identified by their position in the Preference-for-Leisure dimension.
The purpose of including the optimal tax rate with cross-country constant γ is to illustrate what
kind of variation country-varying preferences induces, and that other country-specific factors in
the model work against a negative relationship between optimal model taxes and preferences
for leisure.
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Actual and Predicted Hours Worked
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 plot model hours worked against γ. The steeper negative
relationship between γ and model hours relative to actual hours is reflecting the
model tax rate being flatter than actual tax rates.
Figure 3.9: Actual hours, and Partial Equilibrium Model Hours
Source: Author’s calculations, based on OECD data.
Notes: The graph plots two data points for each country against the country-specific γ:
1. The actual hours worked.
2. The optimal model hours with a country’s given γ and the tax rate τ solving 3.13.
In addition, the linear fit of these data series are included. Country labels for the model tax
rate series with constant preferences are excluded to not overcrowd the center of the graph;
countries are identified by their position in the Preference-for-Leisure dimension.
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Figure 3.10: Actual hours, and General Equilibrium Model Hours
Source: Author’s calculations, based on OECD data.
Notes: The graph plots two data points for each country against the country-specific γ:
1. The actual hours worked.
2. The optimal model hours with a country’s given γ and the tax rate τ solving 3.14.
In addition, the linear fit of these data series are included. Country labels for the model tax
rate series with constant preferences are excluded to not overcrowd the center of the graph;
countries are identified by their position in the Preference-for-Leisure dimension.
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